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This dissertation strives to rethink apolitical and ahistorical efforts for adapting to climate
change in terms of a political struggle for survival in times of radical global environmental change.
Drawing on ethnographic and participatory fieldwork with agro-pastoralists of the Peruvian
Andes, government officials and international NGO actors, this dissertation follows emergent
climate-resilient discourse of rapid glacier retreat as it travels from global origins and articulates
with local culture and indigenous ecologies in the Cordillera Blanca. Through this research, I offer
a critical interpretive analysis of modern, capitalist and rationalist ways of knowing and planning
for climate change, finding that such adaptation efforts in the Andes constitutes hegemonic,
discursive practices that reproduce uneven geographies of power and subalternize “other” ways of
knowing about, and responding to, climate change.

This research probes questions of power and equity in multi-scalar adaptation efforts across
four axes: indigenous representations, environmental narratives, adaptation imaginaries and
collaborative governance. Across the resultant dissertation chapters I argue that a certain type of
power, the ‘coloniality of power’ (Quijano, 2000), emerges as a recurrent motif in adaptation
practices in the so-called “Third-World”. As modern politics for climate change prove to be hostile

spaces for indigenous peoples and subaltern knowledges, this research attempts to understand and
map out a plurality of adaptation imaginaries from the local to the global, illuminating their
synergies and honoring their incommensurability.

After providing a critical reflexive review of collaborative adaptation efforts in postcolonial ecologies, I call for adaptation otherwise as an advance of counter-hegemonic and
decolonial adaptation projects. Three relational lessons for adaptation otherwise that are drawn
from the participatory and collaborative engagements undertaken in this research are suggested for
decolonizing the development-adaptation enterprise, including: i) a recognition and defense of
difference, ii) learning to learn from below, and iii) bridging.
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PREFACE
This dissertation is a collection of quotes, vignettes, tables, figures and images that
constitute a body of empirical data which I have connected to a wide variety of critical social
theory in an attempt to make sense of socio-environmental phenomenon, specifically social,
political and ethical dimensions of adaptation to climate change. The weaving together of
grounded, qualitative, empirical data with theoretical concepts and frames, in an abductive,
iterative, and reflexive way is the practice of ethnography. Although I had not set out to produce
an ethnography of climate change, this research process developed into a critical collaborative,
trans-local, and trans-disciplinary ethnography of environmental change, what Susan Crate (2011)
terms “climate ethnography”.

There is a growing body of literature on the importance and valuable contributions
anthropological engagements with contemporary climate change can have (Barnes et al., 2013;
Roncoli, Crane and Orlove, 2008; Nelson and Finan 2000; Brondizio and Moran 2008; Crate and
Nuttall 2009). Such accounts bring attention to anthropology’s unique offerings, for example:
anthropology’s ethnographic and participatory methods which are powerful tools for gaining
insights into place-based contextual realities, local knowledge and the local implications of
decision-making from above.

Yet, while this dissertation strives to elucidate an understanding of climate impacts and
adaptation actions at the local scale (i.e. local knowledges, effects and affects), I do not aim to
produce an ethnography of local culture (often an academic fascination with the Other, the exotic,
or the subaltern), nor do I offer a full ethnography of the “State” (however, conceived), rather this
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is an account of “global connection” (Tsing, 2005). In this way, I strive to open up moments,
happenings and events that can illuminate local-global relations, their frictions (Tsing, 2005),
partial connections (de la Cadena, 2015), and their co-production by studying through an ecology
of practices and discourses. In this sense, my local fieldsite, Quebrada Quilcayhuanca, and its 240
agropastoralist users do not constitute a “pure” local site nor indigenous identity, rather the
highland landscape and its inhabitants have been and continue to be articulated with knowledges,
markets and powers of the national and global kind. It is this space that Gloria Anzaldúa calls
“Nepantla”, the relational spacing in-between worlds – the place/space that this body of work
strives to ethnographically explore.

This dissertation challenges dominant beliefs, traditions and values that underpin modern
society and modern politics. For practitioners and academics producing research for this enterprise
rather than research about this enterprise, my interpretive findings can be unsettling. However, I
would like to break this dichotomy and suggest that my research about is also research for
improving, and specifically de-colonizing, universalizing projects of care, such as development,
conservation and adaptation. I would like to preface that through a critically reflexive process of
thinking-through, my writing strives to avoid the production of essentializing narratives. I do not
produce objective representations of climate change reality, campesino, or the “State”, rather when
employing these constructs, I am interested in understanding the affinities between them, not
producing their fixed identities. My employment of descriptive categories, for example:
“rationalist” or “modernist”, are not wielded to build up anthropology’s mythic caricature of the
hegemonic European West, rather these terms are descriptive tools that are applied to a diffuse
collective of individuals and institutions. These labels allow me to articulate a type of culture and
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epistemology that emerge from a particular time and place but are today enacted by a multitude of
actors from the local to the global and from within the so-called global North and global South.
These ways of being and thinking, although born from “the West”, are now beyond and not
essentially bound to the imaginary “West”.

A Note on Methodology
This research was initially designed through a hybrid critical and participatory approach,
employing elements from both ethnographic and participatory-action-research traditions over the
course of four-years. Taking a critical approach, this work theoretically engages with poststructuralist, post-colonial and political ecology fields, for the ultimate aim of illuminating and
deconstructing systems of inequality and systemic oppression (Cannella, 2015; Lincoln, Lynham
and Guba, 2011). For Canella, critical qualitative research is about “challenging (and resisting
constructions of new) universalist truth orientations” and is used and expanded by scholars “who
support diverse knowledges and ways of being, those who would stand for equity, and those who
would be transformative, using different perspectives and definitions to increase justice”
(2015:594). However, in recognition that critique all too often deconstructs too much, offering
little more than nihilistic ends and a kind of academic fatalism (Latour, 2004), I have strived to
render this critique open to possibilities otherwise (Escobar, 2007, 2018; Povinelli, 2011). In the
words of Latour (2004), this requires taking-up “matters of concern”, rather than demystifying
“matters of fact” through a skilled, critical, and academic gaze. A renewed critique is constructive
and participatory. It asks critical scholars to enact and engage possibilities otherwise. In this way,
“The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who
lifts the rugs from under the feet of naïve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas
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in which to gather” (Latour, 2004:246). A constructivist shift in a deconstructivist paradigm is
arguably the contemporary role of a critical anthropologist and is called for specifically within
climate change studies and practice, where anthropologists are now called to become actors in the
policy process, and to engage with a wide array of stakeholders through collaborative approaches
(Fisk, 2009; Crate, 2011). Yet, my own shift from critique to critical-participatory research was
informed by more than an intellectual impetus or career goal, it has ethnographic roots.

While conducting research throughout the duration of this project, I had encountered
researcher fatigue and skepticism among the agropastoralists with whom I was working. Many of
them would ask me directly, what can this research do for them – a legitimate question to ask of a
probing researcher who is naïvely investigating a population of people living in capitalist climatic
ruination. For over half a century now, far too many engineers, ecologists, geologists, glaciologists,
anthropologists and interventionists have been poking around the Cordillera Blanca, promising
projects of hope, improvement, knowledge and aid, without fruitful outcomes for the highland
inhabitants. As I spoke with Esteban Nicanor, an elderly campesino at his home in Llupa, he said
to me:
“How can you help? In what way are you going to…? For all of that, you must
have time. Sure, you can say, “we’re going to do this, we’re going to…” But there
isn’t enough time. [Turning and speaking to my translator] She’ll be doing
something else, the other …, a year passes, two years and they (researchers) don’t
live up to their promises. They don’t live up to their promises. When she finishes
her studies, she won’t even remember this place and that will be the end. [For] what
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she has studied, she has seen how it is, but after all that she won’t do anything.
That’s how it is.” (Interview with Esteban Nicanor, January 17, 2018)

Moments like this one with Esteban, along with my own growing awareness of the failure of
critical inquiry to actualize beyond the academy and reach those who it takes as its subjects, led
me to adopt a participatory action research (PAR) approach to this research mid-way through. This
entailed moving beyond interviews and talking with people, to gathering together stakeholders and
organizing participatory workshops with campesinos as opposed to attending stakeholder
workshops about campesinos.

This climate ethnography consists of five months of fieldwork, carried out over four
iterative periods from 2015-2018 (Table X.1). Each fieldwork stay was a busy time in which a
variety of qualitative research methods were employed as tools for gathering ethnographic and
qualitative data. These methods included: informal and semi-structured interviews; observation
and passive participant observations, transect walks, two different questionnaires and a series of
two participatory workshops (for detailed accounts on each method employed see appendix A)
each with their own methods (i.e. seasonal calendars, photo elicitation, etc.) employed.

xviii

Table X.1. Fieldwork Schedule
Fieldwork Period
2015, June 27 - July 21

Intent/Purpose
Exploratory Fieldwork

2016, June 27 - August 25

Ethnographic and
participatory Research:

2018, January 7 - January 28

Ethnographic and
Participatory Research

2018, April 20 - May 4

Participatory Research

Methods
Interviews, observation
Interviews, stakeholder
mapping questionnaire,
resilience questionnaire,
observation, participant
observation, participatory
workshop
Interviews, resilience
questionnaire, observation
Participatory workshop and
member-checking

Table X.1. Fieldwork Schedule
Each phase of research was designed to address one or more of the following research questions:
RQ1. How is adaptation to rapid climate change governed in the Peruvian
highlands?
RQ2. What are the narratives of environmental change and adaptation imaginaries
converging within Q. Quilcayhuanca? And, what are the points of synergy and
disjuncture among them?
RQ3. What are the constraints and barriers to collaborative adaptation governance
in the Cordillera Blanca?
RQ4. How do collaborative adaptation efforts, or ‘contaminating encounters’,
shape divergent and competing adaptation imaginaries and possibilities?

The Purpose of this project is of both applied and scholarly intent. The research-driven
impetus for this project aims to better understand how adaptation to capitalist-climatic change is
governed in spaces of contestation and across social difference. This study is concerned with a
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plurality of adaptation imaginaries (historically and politically shaped adaptation visions) that
converge and compete to co-produce adaptation options and future livability – or death – within
sites of radical environmental change. By ethnographically engaging in “nepantla”, the “contact
zone” in which divergent worlds meet, I explore new ways of thinking through local-global
connections and the productive governance of climate change. Specifically, this research aims to
understand how historically produced power-relations mediate new discursive-material practices
that emerge from within the struggle to become resilient to ensuing climate change impacts, and
how these practices come to matter at the local scale.
In an applied research sense, this study is dedicated to mobilizing an otherwise
marginalized Campesino adaptation imaginary in a rapidly unfolding political process of
adaptation. The participatory dimension of this research employed participatory-action-research
(PAR) as a way to “take up matters of concern” (Latour, 2004) and empower subaltern
communities to politically activate their own responses to climate change within what has so-far
been an elite and exclusive climate politics, hostile to other ways of knowing and being that are
deemed “irrational” or culturally “regressive”. In this way, this study engaged classic PAR aims,
what Fals-Borda describes as efforts “to enable the oppressed groups and classes to acquire
sufficient creative and transforming leverage as expressed in specific projects, acts and struggles,
[as well as] to produce and develop socio-political thought processes with which popular bases
can identify” (1987:330) (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). However, as this research and my field
colleagues have taught me, campesinos – as well as all peoples – are already empowered. Power
is not something that can be given or taken away, it is productively produced. In this way, the
project of empowerment is far more complex, and as I have found throughout this study, must be
turned on its head. A project of “empowerment” is not so much a project to give power to
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campesinos, rather it is a matter of productively opening up spaces in a socially stratified world
for campesinos’ inherent power to actualize, mobilize and permeate the borders of modern politics.
That means the project of empowerment is not a project oriented towards “fixing” the colonized,
oppressed, or marginalized social groups, but towards the decolonization of imperial, oppressive
and dominating institutions and structures. Broadly defined, these are the aims and intentions of
the work that follows.
Lastly, this dissertation is in partial fulfillment of my doctoral degree which was supported
by the NSF IGERT program. As the traineeship encourages interdisciplinary research, it is
important to address the ways in which this research is both interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary.
Scholars suggest that interdisciplinarity “analyzes, synthesizes and harmonizes links between
disciplines into a coordinated and coherent whole” (Choi and Pak, 2006:351); and that disciplines
can be thought of as a field of study or branch of knowledge. For this research, methods and theory
from international development studies, indigenous studies, post-colonial studies, political
philosophy, anthropology, history, economics, ecology and climate change studies have all been
woven together to elicit understanding and critical insights into contemporary human responses to
radical environmental change. The transdisciplinarity of this research moves beyond efforts to
employ and synthesize diverse disciplinary information and methods, and extends the scope of the
research to working with people who have a stake in the site-specific climate change impacts under
study. Specifically, the participatory elements of this research allowed for transcending the
boundaries of academic disciplines, engaging with local knowledges and practices, and allowed
for new ways of thinking about climate change and adaptation in the highlands that are not derived
from disciplinary silos and training, but rather through relational research. Moreover, this research
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not only attempts to be transdisciplinary, but also critically reflects upon the process and outcomes
of integrative (chapter 4) and collaborative (chapter 5) research efforts for climate adaptation.
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INTRODUCTION
“this is an instrument that can and should have a transforming
role for the economies, societies and institutions of our world”
(Mr. Ollanta M. Humala Tasso, President of Peru, remarking on
the Paris Agreement during the Leaders Event at the UNFCCC
COP21/CMP11, 2015)
“This is an opportunity for the State to increase the efficiency of
public spending and generate public investment projects where
climate change is incorporated into national development
planning, seeking to increase the resilience of the population,
ecosystems, and infrastructure in the face of external climate
events.”
(Mr. Martín Vizcarra, President of Peru, April 17, 2018)1
In troubling times of melting glaciers, shrinking harvests, and increasing hydrometeorological disasters, the State of Peru has optimistically embraced both global and domestic
policies combating climate change. Despite being positioned as a country “particularly vulnerable”
to climate change impacts, and notably contributing scarcely to the worlds’ accumulated
atmospheric carbon (.3% of the global share) (UNFCCC, 2015), Peru has demonstrated leadership
in its international cooperation on climate policy. In 2014, Peru hosted the Conference of the
Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in its capital city,
Lima. The COP has become the world’s largest annual political forum for international climate
diplomacy. During Lima’s COP20, Peru championed and cemented two pillars of the 2015 Paris

1

The Presidential announcement can be found at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=6&v=AfOI-iROZIA or
https://www.dar.org.pe/en/news/president-vizcarra-enacts-the-climate-change-framework-lawin-peru/
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Agreement: sense of urgency and high-level ambition, as well as arguably played an instrumental
role in the pathway to Paris (UNFCCC, 2015).

Peru’s country-level commitment to climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts have
not only been performed through international diplomacy and policy, rather the State has also been
busy mobilizing national and sub-national climate policies, plans, and programs. In the words of
State leaders, even prior to the county’s enthusiasm and commitment towards the Paris Agreement,
Peru has been “implementing innovative projects, based on domestic resources and contributions
from international cooperation, in several regions and sectors [that] test and expand systems and
strategies designed to address climate change, thereby enhancing the social and physical resilience
of the territory” (UNFCCC, 2015).

National actions to redress issues or seize opportunities related to climate change are not
unique to Peru. Many countries across the so-called global North and South have taken-up climate
change as a national priority, and as such are mobilizing policies, markets and imaginaries for a
climate resilient future. As adaptation interventions are understood as “necessary and inevitable”
(Marino and Ribot, 2012:323; Nelson, Adger and Brown, 2007) for the making of resilient peoples,
communities, and worlds, a new global environmental agenda has emerged.

Throughout this ethnographic account, the concepts of adaptation and resilience are
frequently employed. These concepts derive from a variety of academic disciplines including:
anthropology, ecology, disasters and hazards, resource management, engineering, and psychology,
among others; and have diverse applications across the contemporary sciences (Schipper and
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Langston, 2015, Nelson, Adger and Brown, 2007). Therefore, it is important to offer a note on
how these concepts are conceptualized here. My use of ‘adaptation’ and ‘resilience’ is informed
by their application within the environmental change literature. Adaptation within this body of
scholarship, refers to “a process by which individuals and societies make and implement decisions
regarding the use of adaptive capacities [situated capabilities] in order to manage risk and moderate
harm from perceived or projected change” (Nelson, 2011: 114). According to this environmental
change perspective, “adaptation is about decision making and the power to implement those
decisions. It is a process in which knowledge, experience, and institutional structures combine
together to characterize options and determine action. The process is negotiated and mediated
through social groups, and decisions are reached through networks of actors that struggle to
achieve their particular goals” (Nelson, Adger and Brown, 2007:398). Therefore, reference to
“adaptation” throughout this dissertation refers to this political process of negotiation and struggle
for a particular policy goal, that is “resilience”.

Resilience, in turn, is the institutionalized rationality that has come to underpin and guide,
through frameworks and models, political adaptation decisions and actions. Resilience is often
assumed as an inherently good policy end, in which the policy subject, be it a person, community,
or system becomes capable of absorbing disturbances while still retaining the same structure and
function, and maintaining options to develop (Nelson, 2011). However, resilience in this
dissertation is conceived of as more than a purely good policy outcome. Instead, resilience is
understood as a certain policy paradigm or governing rationality (Reid, 2014; Lindroth &
Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2014) through which adaptation actions can be imagined, enacted, and
performed. This paradigm consists of: (i) an ontology, i.e. notion of reality from complex systems

xxv

theory; (ii) an epistemology, i.e. ways of knowing this reality through positivist science; and, (iii)
a methodology, i.e., operationalizable tools, frameworks and definitions to measure and assess the
resiliency of a community or system. In this way, resilience is observed in this research as a certain
type of adaptation practice which is discursively constructed through rationalist, modernist, and
developmentalist logics. The climate-resilient paradigm undisputable informs global adaptation
discourse and policy, as well as local adaptation interventions within the site of this study and
elsewhere.

As the global goal of resilient-adaptation, now constitutes a travelling idea (Weisser et al.
2014). It does not just stay at the international scale, rather it permeates all the way down,
materializing into programs and projects with affective and effective outcomes at the local level.
In this ethnography, I refer to the global(izing) project of climate adaptation emerging in late
modernity, as the Social Project of Adaptation. Adaptation efforts have been carried out in myriad
ways, as formal and autonomous, incremental and transformative, planned and spontaneous. Thus,
the diversity of ways in which humans are adjusting to climate impacts are not all captured by the
social project of adaptation concept, nor do all adaption projects become a social project. Rather,
what renders the vagaries of climate adaptation planning and practice into what I call the social
project of adaptation is when such projects enact a universalizing effect that hegemonically reifies
a singular way of knowing and being across a diversity of cultures and socionatural worlds, and in
doing so, participates in the erasure of social difference and infinite adaptation possibilities
conjured up from alternative ways of knowing, being and doing. The social project of adaptation
is closely linked to a developmentalist-adaptation approach, where climate adaptation ends are
sought through conventional development and design tactics (albeit, often in new guises).
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To be clear, by the Social Project of Adaptation, I am speaking of a universalizing project.
It comes to matter and materialize in the form of markets, projects, and practices through a
material-discursive dialectic (Barad, 2003) that negotiates a global imaginary of climate resilience
with local adaptation imaginaries rooted in place-based particularities (performances, practices,
discourses and onto-epistemologies). This space, in which a multiplicity of global and local worlds
collide, has been referred to as a “contact zone” (Ogden, 2011), a site of “global connections”
(Tsing, 2005), and the “glocal” (Escobar, 2001). Yet, regardless of the concept used, what
anthropologists have illuminated from these local-global entanglements are the tensions and
asymmetries of power, as well as the productive possibilities that are co-produced from their
“frictions” (Tsing, 2005).

In this dissertation, I strive to illuminate the political and ethical tensions inherent in
climate resilient development as it travels into porous subaltern contexts in the Peruvian highlands.
The writings on the pages that follow, are the outcome of a five-year effort to better understand
climate resilient development (broadly construed) and discourse. The central undertaking of this
climate ethnography is to story and think-through sites of climate change intervention – the
“contact zone” in the context of adapting to climate change – and capture but a moment in the
process in which global renderings of climate resilient development become articulated with local
ways of knowing, being, and doing. This “climate ethnography” (Crate, 2011) is thus storying the
ways that a global adaptation discourse comes to matter (forging practical and material
implications) at the local level, and specifically for the agro-pastoralists of the Peruvian Andes.
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Quilcayhuanca
Quebrada Quilcayhuanca is the place in which this story takes root and situates itself in the
matters of climate change and adaptation that are now materializing. The quebrada is a long yshape valley in the Peruvian Andes and home to the headwaters for tributaries that contribute to
the Peru’s important Santa Rio river which courses throughout the Callajón de Huaylas, carrying
alpine glacier-melt waters to their terrestrial end at the Pacific Ocean. Positioned within the
Cordillera Blanca mountain range – the most extensively glaciated mountain range in the tropics
– Quebrada Quilcayhuanca is a glacier-carved alpine valley, with steep rock bluffs forming its
tunneled-feel and a faint and disappearing glacier at the valley’s high end. The valley floor is a
wide and flat topography of green alpine flora, peppered by glacier eradicates, and shaped by the
windy glacier-fed river that cuts through the entirety of the valley’s distance.

For millennia, Quilcayhuanca has been a landscape inhabited by an assemblage of Andean
Indinos, glaciers, and a diversity of non-human actants. Highland Indinos of Quilcayhuanca,
commonly known as campesinos – the rural agro-pastoralists of Incan decent – have been
repeatedly displaced from and reconfigured within their highland homelands by globalizing
projects for centuries. These local-global encounters have perpetuated current conditions of
marginalization and a motif of abandono or abandonment within Quilcayhuanca and across the
Cordillera more broadly. For campesinos of Quilcayhuanca, abandono is not so much the lack of
government, as the State is seemingly omnipresent in the highlands – but rather, a mode of
governance that produces a certain kind of State-citizen relationship – and specifically, constitutes
the problem of government. That is, since the first wave of State occupation in Quilcayhuanca,
highland Indinos have been finding ways of negotiating their togetherness with the State
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apparatuses, and specifically finding ways of “how not to be governed like that, rather than not be
governed at all” (Povinelli, 2011:15).

At the contemporary moment of global climate change, the Peruvian State has once again
set its gaze on Quilcayhuanca and the Cordillera Blanca as a prioritized site for intervention (i.e.
fixing, saving, or transforming). Historian Mark Carey states, that indeed “Climate change and
glacier disasters brought a host of state institutions to Ancash [the department in which
Quilcayhuanca is located], in many cases for the first time. But increased state presence did not
simply represent the expansion of unwanted government authority imposed from above. Instead,
many residents saw clear roles for government, believed state institutions could and should help
them, and invited the national government into the Cordillera Blanca region” (2010:193). Thus,
this story of climate change and adaption interventions across the Andes is not a simple story of
hegemonic rule and grassroots resistance, rather this ethnographic account grapples with the
entangled connections among partially-connected worlds. As anthropologist Mattias Rasmussen
puts it, “this is not a society being against the state but about finding the right amount of state-ness
in dealing with what is at stake” (2015:11).

Local, State and (trans)State relations, negotiations, and frictions have been transpiring for
more than the last four centuries in the Peruvian Andes. Through a series of globalizing projects,
beginning with colonial expansion and the civilizing crusade, and continuing most recently
through environmental governance regimes, including: agrarian reforms (1969; see Mayer, 2009),
disaster mitigation (Carey, 2010), conservation (Rassmussen, 2015), and most recently, climate
change adaptation — the reaches of the Capitalist-State have increasingly expanded upon and

xxix

subalternized the indigenous ecologies, knowledges and worlds that inhabit Quilcayhuanca.
Today, what was the indigenous territory of Quilcayhuanca is now legally recognized as the
property of the State, and inhabitants of Quilcayhuanca have been pushed to the margins of the
quebrada, residing outside the enclosure of National Park Huascarán, while still using the contested
lands for traditional pastoralism. Despite government tactics of dispossession and erasure, the
association of Quilcayhuanca pastoralists is among the largest in the park’s domain, with 240
active users (i.e. families, often with two, three, four, or more offspring) of the valley’s resources.
Territorial struggles claiming rights of belonging to Quilcayhuanca over the centuries have
produced a (re)territorializing landscape of contestation and asymmetrical power-relations upon
which climate change impacts and hopeful expectations of collaborative governance are now
occurring.

Throughout this dissertation, my use of the state is not envisioned as a natural or static
apparatus of power, but the enactment of power through a heterogeneous assemblage of non-fixed
actors. The state thus emerges, paradoxically, as a dynamic figure in which the notion of a nationalstate sometimes seems more visible and encroaching and at other times, appears less effective and
less relevant. Scholarship on the State has increasingly suggested that globalization renders the
nation-state irrelevant not only as an economic actor but also as a social and cultural container as
“new” global institutions (NGOs, social movements, trans-State organization such as global
corporations to the World Bank and a variety of environmental governance funds) perform
significant practices that at times reject or bypass national state power (Trouillot, 2001).
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In the case of climate change politics in the Andes, the centralized state maintains a critical
role, but so do various other non-state, quasi-state and citizen actors. Therefore, as I employ the
term “the State” throughout this dissertation, I conceive of it as an assemblage of diverse, and at
times unlikely, actors brought together (however temporarily) through their alliances to modernist
(cultural) and rationalist (epistemic) tenants. I avoid static renderings of what is the State and
instead move away from the notion of an isolated nation state and instead adopt three propositions
put forward by Trouillot (2001):

(1) State power has no institutional fixity on either theoretical or geographic grounds;
(2) state effects are never obtained solely through national institutions of governing sites; and,
(3) these two features, inherent in the capitalist-state, have been exacerbated by globalization.

This figuring of state allows for a more holistic study of state-craft and the coloniality of
power that is enacted through a loose assemblage of actors that are not institutionally nor
geographically fixed. Instead, the State, as I employ the term, is mostly akin to an “epistemic
network” of plural and multi-scalar apparatuses, rather than a monolithic nation state. Louis
Althusser (1971[1969]) was among the early and formative social theorists to propose that the
State is not an apparatus but is apparatuses plural and state-craft is enacted through the variety of
state institutions (i.e. prisons, schools, hospitals, etc.) that ascribe to a dominant ideology.
Trouillot’s rendering of the capitalist state takes Althusser’s notion of the “ideological state
apparatuses” into the contemporary moment of globalization, extending state apparatuses beyond
the spatial homogeneity of state institutions into an a-spatial network of ideological sites. In this
way, “there is no necessary site for the state, institutional or geographical” (2001:127). Instead the
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State “appears as an open field with multiple boundaries and no institutional fixity—which is to
say that it needs to be conceptualized at more than one level” (Ibid).

Within the scope of storying environmental change in Quilcayhuanca, the State is an
assemblage (set of processes) performed by various apparatuses brought together in alliance by an
ideology – a governing rationality – for climate resilient development. When the State enacts this
vision in a totalizing or universalizing way, the governing rationality becomes the social project
of adaptation.

At the contemporary conjuncture, campesinos of Quilcayhuanca and across the Quillcay
sub-watershed and the Peruvian Andes are facing radical landscape change due to capitalist
climatic change. While I could refer to this socio-natural phenomenon in its more a-political frame,
anthropogenic climate change, I want to redirect readers to the more precise drivers of climate
change impacts, as not all humans have provoked climate change by their anthropogenic activities,
rather capitalist activities of extraction and consumption have. Therefore, like Moore, Haraway
and Tsing, I find capitalist climate change a more accurate term, instead of pretending that all
humans have caused this global devastation. This political phrasing is ethnographically informed
as well, as campesinos of Quilcayhuanca are keenly aware of the radical landscape changes that
are occurring in their homelands, impacts of: seasonal changes, water shortages, temperature
increases, among others, have profound effects in localized sites across the Andes, and
Campesinos are not blind to the fact that these environmental changes are largely driven by the
comforts and complicit behaviors found among a rich and highly-consumptive Western world.
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Capitalist climatic change has already resulted in death and destabilized livelihoods within
Quilcayhuanca. Like the national leaders of Peru often communicate, the high-mountain regions
are fragile ecologies with both human and non-human inhabitants that are among the State’s most
vulnerable populations and resources. Across the quebrada, water, a primary source of life for
biotic assemblages has become toxic for both human and animal consumption. The growing
acidification of the Quilcayhuanca river is a capitalist-climatic impact resulting from the rapid
disappearance of tropical glaciers. This phenomenon has resulted in the die-off of fish and sensitive
amphibians in the Quilcayhuanca valley. It has forced campesinos to seek other sources of water
from neighboring valleys or to increasingly rely on underground springs, and has given rise to a
widespread anxiety among both the rural inhabitants and downstream urban residents. Direct and
indirect users of Quilcayhuanca waters, grasslands and other resources worry about issues of toxic
bioaccumulation as valley glacial melt-water is up-taken by the grasses that serve as the primary
food source for campesino’s cattle and sheep which inevitably finds its way to urban markets.

Noticing the situation of radical landscape change and specifically the hydrologic issues,
the State, through various apparatuses, has begun to address the situation of capitalist-climatic
impacts and highland resilience in the Cordillera Blanca. While different state agencies, NGOs
and international organizations promote a range of different adaptation projects, many of them
come together in the Quillcay sub-watershed (of which Quilcayhuanca is a part) promoting a
unified capitalist-State adaptation imaginary focused on issues of so-called “natural” water
degradation. State adaptation plans designed without campesinos, promote an ecosystem-based
solution, predicated upon a payment for ecosystem-services scheme. Although this dominant
capitalist-state imaginary has gained traction and political support from elite and scientific groups,
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it neglects its social costs – the displacement of campesinos from Quilcayhuanca valley. From a
subaltern perspective, this adaptation scheme for resilience building is a false adaptation solution.
It does not make viable a quasi-subsistence-based campesino world in the wake of capitalistclimate change, and further entrenches the coloniality of power which has produced conditions of
“underdevelopment”, marginalization and vulnerability in the first place.

Throughout this ethnography, I stress that the major issue facing inhabitants of
Quilcayhuanca is not the disappearance of Andean glaciers or other biophysical manifestations of
climate change impacts per se, but rather the issue that most greatly threatens their rights of selfdetermination and territorial sovereignty are the State-led climate change adaptation projects and
programs targeting campesino’s homelands. An antagonistic relationship between highland
campesinos and the State is nothing new, nor are structural outcomes of power imbalances,
marginalization, and displacement of highland inhabitants from their ancestral lands. Yet, a new
wave of global moral order for ambitious climate change action, tied up with a neoliberal State
apparatus, is legitimizing the continuation of hegemonic and colonial acts into twenty-first century
modern climate politics.

Theoretical Situatedness
This dissertation takes as its point of departure, the “coloniality of power” (Quijano, 2000)
that continues to live on through universal dreams and global schemes. Throughout this
ethnographic account, my central argument is simply that the struggle for Anthropocene livability,
has as much to do with capitalist-climate change impacts as it does with the coloniality of power
that mediates climate adaptation efforts. I begin my analysis by paying attention to what post-
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colonial scholars call “the colonial difference” – that is the ways in which “global culture” inserts
itself within place-based “worldly culture[s]” (Ibid).

Historically, local-global entanglements across the Andean mountain chain have been
widely uneven in terms of power and authority and outcomes of so-called “winners and losers”,
resulting in a landscape of contestation and friction that is simultaneously inhabited by local
communities and occupied by distant and global forces. While struggles for territorial sovereignty
prevail in Quilcayhuanca (as well as in an innumerable amount of other postcolonial sites), this
study seeks to better understand how late liberalism’s global climate adaptation imaginary and the
universalizing project of resilience become articulated within preconditions of coloniality and
asymmetrical power relations.

Central within post-colonial studies is the assertion that “Modernity carries on its shoulders
the heavy weight and responsibility of coloniality” (Mignolo, 2000:37) and that this is not located
solely as a project of the past, producing lasting legacies and hauntings, but that the coloniality of
power remains currently enacted throughout modernity’s contemporary ways of thinking, being
and doing (Escobar, 2018). Global-local engagements that operate though hierarchies of power
and visions of “progress” have persisted for over the last 500-year period of global expansion
producing “uneven geographical development” (Harvey, 2006), the “development of
underdevelopment” (Escobar, 1995) and subalternized ways of knowing and being – “subaltern
modernities” (Mignon, 2000:13). “The Modernist Project” in all is vagaries: colonialism;
modernization; development; and most recently in question, adaptation (including mitigation), is
a technology for asserting the singular and dominant World Culture across all social alterity and
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thereby enacting and bringing into being conditions of coloniality. Universals, such as Science,
Capitalism and Modern Politics, render all social difference subject to a dominant modernist
imaginary that still seeks “progress” (e.g., “modernization”, “securitization”, “resilience”, inter
alia) through the erasure of radical social difference and multiple worlds, and envisions (knowingly
or otherwise) a hegemonic and homogenous global universality, what John Law (2015) calls the
One-World-World.

Thus, given the global contemporary need for collective responses to devastating capitalistclimatic impacts, the question central to this dissertation is: can modernity’s world-making projects
such as climate change mitigation and adaptation operate without reifying the coloniality of
power? Can the Modernist Project be decolonized; and similarly, can the Social Project of
Adaptation allow for adaptation otherwise? These are not only political and ethical questions, but
ontological questions that push critically on the ways in which modernity worlds worlds, and in
doing so occupies a plurality of worlds.

A Political Ecology + Political Ontology Approach
Political ecology (PE) and political ontology (PO) infused with insights from postcolonial
and science and technology studies inform the theoretical approach of this research. While political
ecology allows for studying through “the political dynamics surrounding material and discursive
struggles over the environment” (Bryant, 1998), political ontology enables further understanding
of territorial struggles beyond cultural, ecological and economic determinations, opening up to the
ontological domain. Both PE and PO are fundamentally concerned with how uneven powerrelations constitute and are constituted through an interweaving of ecological, cultural, economic
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and social relations (Escobar, 1999; Bryant, 1999). In this way, the engagement of both approaches
provides theoretical strength for understanding the politics and ethics of climate change adaptation
in contested landscapes, and yields contributions in the political ecology of adaptation literature.

The origins of the field of political ecology, according to some, took shape in the 1970’s
with the infusion of cultural and human ecology with considerations of political economy (Bryant,
1992; Peet and Watts, 1996). In the 1980s and 1990s, this political-economy-driven political
ecology, which had been dominated by a neo-Marxist leaning, absorbed other elements,
particularly the poststructuralist analyses of knowledge, institutions, development, and social
movements (Peet and Watts, 1996), as well as feminist insights into the gendered character of
knowledge, environment, and organizations (Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter, and Wangari, 1996).
While a political ecology approach is now regarded as open and holistic, this has also been
understood as a weakness. As some scholars suggest, political ecology has become a “hugely
expanded and polyglot landscape that has nearly dissolved itself over the last several decades as
scholars sought to extend its reach” (Watts, 2009). In light of this critique, want to be explicit of
my use of the political ecology approach so to avoid unnecessary ambiguity.

Political ecology is often understood as “the study of ecological distribution conflicts,
meaning by this, conflicts over access to and control of natural resources” (Alier, 2002 in Escobar,
2008:13). This definition, however, remains little more than an extension of political economy as
the study of “economic distribution conflicts – class distribution of wealth, income, assets and so
forth” – applied to the field of ecology (Escobar: 2008:13). Political ecology as the extension of
political economy is not my intended inquiry. Instead, I align most closely with a post-structuralist
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or antiessentialist political ecologists and engage recent developments in political ontology, in
order to shift the question of access and control from its economic, technological, and managerial
center to the cultural and onto-epistemological realms.2 In this way, I strive to pay attention not
only to the economic and ecological elements of the PE framework, but also strive to understand
the role of cultural dominance (coloniality), the production of knowledge, and discursive processes
in place-based struggles for adaptation to environmental change.

Poststructuralist leanings in political ecology stress the unstableness of political ecologies’
Eurocentric underpinnings in the division of nature and society. Of this view, Anthropologist
Arturo Escobar proposes an antiessentialist political ecology, an alternative definition that does
not depend upon “the common categories of nature, environment, or culture (as in cultural ecology,
ecological anthropology, and much of environmental thinking) or on the sociologically oriented
nature and society (as in Marxist theories of the production of nature). Ethnographic research has
empirically shown that such modern categories of “Nature” and “Society” are often absent in socalled non-modern contexts (William, 1980; Strathern, 1980)3, or in other instances, they may exist
in a common vernacular, but not in a common meaning, leading to problematic equivocations (de
la Cadena, 2015; Tsing, 2005). Thus, for studies that aim for a grounded and locally-engaged
understanding within non-modern or alternatively modern worlds, which are often among PE’s
core interests (i.e. the “third-world”, “fourth-world”, and agrarian rural life), the essentializing

2

Similar to Escobar’s call for a post-structuralist PE in which he states: a post-structuralist of antiessentialist PE is that which “shift[s] the question of sustainability from its economic,
technological, and managerial center to the ecological and cultural level” (Escobar, 1999:x).
3
While an anthropology of local knowledges has shown this repeatedly, Marilyn Strathern’s work
is arguable the most systematic analysis in anthropology theorizing nature as locally produced.
“In a classic article on the subject (1980) Marilyn Strathern made it clear that we cannot interpret
native (non-modern) mappings of the social and biological in terms of our concepts of nature,
culture, and society.
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categories of a traditional political ecology may result in little more than the forced application of
a Western way of knowing (cultural frame) upon non-Western ways of knowing and being.4 By
taking relativism seriously, a post-structuralist political ecology often deconstructs static
categories of nature/society, of core/periphery, external/internal and exposes such dualisms as
socially and historically produced concepts without universal grounding.

Despite the critical advancements post-structuralist PE has yielded, this approach alone
was not sufficient for thinking-through ethnographic moments and adaptation happening within
the Peruvian highlands. Marisol de la Cadena and Mario Blaser suggest that when it comes to
matters beyond culture and epistemology, political ecology falls short. For these critical
anthropologists, Political Ontology “stands where political economy and political ecology,
formulated with ideas of nature and economic growth, are insufficient (at times even unable) to
think antagonisms, that for example, involve things like mountains and forests that emerge as
resources through some practices but also as human persons through other practices” (2018:5).
With the “ontological turn” in social theory well underway (Escobar, 2007), new ontological
inquiries within PE (Goldman et al., 2018) are ushering in possibilities for thinking and becoming
otherwise, as well as new dangers of academic colonialism (Todd, 2016). However, when ethically
done, political ontology, overcomes PE’s onto-epistemological limitations while simultaneously
facing the coloniality of power head-on. This is accomplished as PO takes as its point of departure
the “presumption of divergent wordings constantly coming about through negotiations,

4

I believe this is the same critique put forth of Marxism. Marxist theory is a theory of capitalism
that is grounded in Western contexts and therefore may not always be directly applicable across
radically diverse worlds.
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enmeshments, crossings, and interruptions. It asks how those practices transpire and with what
consequences” (Blaser and de la Cadena, 2018:6).

Going beyond PE, political ontology allows for thinking and doing otherwise. Political
ontology was put forth by anthropologist Mario Blaser (2009, 2010, 2014) and continues to be
developed along with Marisol de la Cadena and Arturo Escobar, among other critical and
indigenous scholars. Political ontology’s emphasis is on worlds and ways of worlding in two
senses: “on the one hand, PO refers to the power-laden practices involved in bringing into being a
particular world or ontology; on the other hand, it refers to a field of study that focuses on the
interrelations among worlds, including the conflicts that ensue as different ontologies strive to
sustain their own existence in their interaction with other worlds” (Escobar, 2018:66).5 Geographer
Mara Goldman and colleagues (2018:3) suggest that the ontological domain of adaptation “opens
up a more radical form of politics by proposing a plurality of existing worlds and asking, “in which
world would you like to live, and what can you do to bring such a world into being?”. For these
scholars, the PO approach goes beyond the scope of PE and “challenges the fundamental
assumptions of the modern world: that there is one reality out there, about which we can explore
different perspectives” (Ibid). Yet, on the contrary, if reality is understood as enacted in practice,
then there are multiple ontologies brought into being simultaneously (Mol, 2002, p.6), not just
multiple [cultures or] epistemologies. PO allows for thinking through multiple natures and multiple
world-making practices.

5

Worlding according to Marisol de la Cadena: “Our ways of knowing, practicing, and making our
distinct worlds – our worldings, or ways of making worlds – had been “circuited” to gather and
shared practices for centuries; however, they had not become one. In the circuit, some practices
have become subordinate, of course, but they have not disappeared into those that became
dominant, nor did they merge into a single and simple hybrid. Rather, they have remained distinct,
if connected.” (de la Cadena 2015:4)
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While political ecology has provided great insight into the processes of accumulation by
dispossession (a constant thread throughout this dissertation), Escobar suggests that a political
ontology intends “to make visible the ontological dimension of the accumulation by dispossession
that is going on today in many parts of the world through land grabbing and extractivism (Escobar,
2018:66). Increasingly, PE scholars are suggesting that territorial struggles are also always
ontological struggles (McElwee, 2016; Blaser and de la Cadena, 2018; Escobar, 2018). A greater
understanding of the ontological dimensions (i.e. multiple worlds, multiple natures) involved in
the struggle for Anthropocene survival (adaptation to climate change), is precisely what the PO
framework contributes to this dissertation (namely in chapters 4 and 5).

Lastly, PO is designed to stand in opposition to domineering universalizing ideologies,
epistemologies and ontologies – it is that which makes academically viable the political
imagination of the Pluriverse, as opposed to a political imagination of the Universe. The
Pluriverse, introduced to Western anthropological scholarship by Arturo Escobar (2018), is used
in this study as an analytical and political tool for thinking through the heterogeneous worlds
“coming together in a political ecology of practices, negotiating their difficult being together indifference” (Blaser and de la Cadena, 2018:4) in the specific site of Quebrada Quilcayhuanca.
Thus, the Pluriverse, is engaged in this dissertation as both a metaphor that allows for thinking
through a world made-up of many worlds, and a political proposal that stands in opposition to
universalizing missions.
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In summation, I have taken up a post-structuralist political ecology approach for its
sensitivities to the shortcomings of socially constructed realities, identities, natures, histories and
futures, and coupled it with a political ontology that is capable of entertaining radical social
difference and worlds otherwise. The gift of this approach is plurality: to hold in tension plural
perspectives, plural natures, plural value regimes, plural knowledges, and plural realities across a
landscape of local-to-global and more-than-human entanglements. The task then of this critical
political ecology is to find a way for the weaving together of the biophysical, cultural, politicaleconomic and onto-epistemological domains for storying moments of life and death in capitalist
climatic ruination, and for thinking through futuring possibilities of getting along well in
togetherness that also enables our differences.

Towards a Critical Political Ecology of Climate Adaptation
Vulnerability, adaptation, and mitigation studies could greatly benefit from a poststructuralist political ecology and political ontology approaches. Although much work has already
been produced at the intersection of political ecology and climate change, studies of adaptation,
vulnerability and mitigation rely most often on a positivist or pragmatist paradigm, as opposed to
a critical, post-structuralist, social-constructivist paradigm, and lean heavily upon functionalstructuralist ways of knowing and doing. As a result, Basset and Fogelman (2013) find that that
over 70% of academic publications on the subject present adaptation as a technical process of
planned social engineering to guard against proximate climate threats. For Taylor (2015), this
approach “sidesteps” the core socio-historical production of hierarchical ordered control over land,
capital and bodies, and paves the way for managerial and technocratic interventions. Within the
context of agrarian environments, Taylor finds that “climate change adaptation is repeatedly
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represented as a case of adjusting regions and communities to climatic threats with scant attention
paid to the historical roots of vulnerability that many marginal groups face” (Taylor, 2015: 15).
Increasingly, models of adaptive capacity, resilience, vulnerability are critiqued for their myopic
conceptions of processes of social change that fail to account for the root causes of vulnerability
(the political, historical and onto-epistemological dimensions), and for their hubris, championed
through a techno-optimism that maintains a modernist dream of “progress” and greater control
over nature and social difference.

As a counter intellectual move, political ecologists and other critical scholars have begun
to explore the various ways in which adaptation and mitigation initiatives interact with existing
social and economic inequalities, vulnerabilities, or injustices (Marino and Ribot, 2012; Fairhead,
Leach and Scoones, 2012). Attention has been paid to issues of: neoliberalism’s marketization,
privatization and commodification of nature (Fairhead, Leach and Scoones, 2012; Liverman,
2009;); ‘new’ discourses and practices that intersect with legacies of (post)colonial enclosures and
encroachment of indigenous territories and resources (Peluso and Lund, 2011); and, the various
ways in which historically produced power-relations shape climate change and vulnerability
discourse, governance, and practices of knowledge and policy construction (Goldman et al., 2011;
Goldman et al., 2018; Yeh, 2016; Forsyth, 2003).

However, despite the uptick of political ecologists’ engagement in climate change and
adaptation studies over the last few decade, there continues to be numerous calls for an expanded
theorization of power and social change (Eriksen et al., 2014), greater empirical and ethnographic
engagement within sites of intervention (Crate, 2011; Taylor, 2015), and for more critical political
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ecologies (which engage more than neo-Marxist interpretations) – those that engage knowledge
production, ontological politics and power-relations (Taylor, 2015; Goldman et al., 2018; Forsyth,
2003; Parsons et al., 2016) in the context of climate adaptation and mitigation. These scholars have
championed these positions as calls to both enhanced theoretical understanding of vulnerability,
resilience and climate interventions and to inform more just climate action.

Major Argument and Chapter Outline
Despite representations of capitalist-climatic ruination and despair that accompany
narratives of the Anthropocene, the political and intellectual movements that have emerged at the
turn of the 20th century are not all overly determined, rather critical thinkers are increasingly
opening-up spaces for new ways of understanding and challenging the hegemony of an
imperializing and universalizing capitalist-modernity. That is, critical thinkers are taking seriously
the task of finding alternatives to modernist alternatives which do not go far enough to redress our
modern socionature problems. Likewise, this book is critical in its assertions and interpretations
of the current conditions of climate change and dominant adaptation responses to them, yet this
critique is offered through an optimism for making another way possible. It is intended to be
critically deconstructive of the features of the coloniality of power that continue to course through
the social project of adaptation to climate change, while simultaneously building constructive
ground for de-colonial practices of becoming with climate change – that is for relational practices
of adaptation otherwise that can foster pluriversiality.

Following the introduction, this book is structured into five chapters and an epilogue that
collectively build upon one another to tell a story of capitalist-climatic ruination, and the possibility
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of Anthropocene co-livability in which multiple worlds can work together, but not for the sake of
becoming one.

Chapter 1 provides an introduction to Quebrada Quilcayhuanca, the localized site in the Peruvian
Cordillera Blanca, in which this study finds its grounding. In this beginning chapter, I unpack both
the biophysical manifestation of climate impacts at the local level, and provide a contextual
background of the socio-historical production of the asymmetrical geographies of power that are
influencing formal responses to climate change. In this chapter, I strive to articulate not only
campesino’s contemporary struggle with radical climate change impacts that threaten their
subsistence ways of life, but also situate this contemporary moment within its historicity of localglobal encounters over time.

Chapter 2 introduces readers to the uneven power-relations among the epistemic adaptation
community that is now imagining, designing and operationalizing the Social Project of Adaptation
in Quilcayhuanca and across the Cordillera Blanca. This chapter opens at a decisive moment in
August 2016, when a diverse set of trans-local actors descended upon the high mountain city of
Huaraz, bringing with them a global discourse of climate change, glaciers and mountain ecologies
formulated by modern/rationalist imaginaries right to Quilcayhuanca’s backyard. In this moment,
I strive to illuminate through a series of ethnographic vignettes the problematic ways in which
campesinos are included into this discursive space of informal adaptation planning through various
representations of the Other. I argue that, new modes of inclusive and participatory environmental
governance are not a better politics of a “reflexive modernity”, rather are a new mode of “politics
as usual” (de la Cadena, 2015) fraught with issues of representation that construct the identity of
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the “vulnerable” climate subjects and objects (both human and non-human) that the State desires
to render visible and knowable.

Chapter 3 draws upon a governmentality theoretical framework to illuminate the neoliberal and
neocolonial ideologies that underpin the social project of adaptation. This chapter explores an
ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) project that an assemblage of state actors brought to the
decision-making table and the Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme on which it hangs.
Through a critical discourse analysis of interviews and government documents, a capitalist-state
ideology, predicated upon neo-Malthusian (rationalist) and market-based (capitalist) logics, is
rendered visible. As this governing capitalist-state adaptation imaginary comes to matter and
materialize at the local scale, it redirects the problem of climate impacts from a causal explanation
of capitalist-climatic change to a narrative of overgrazing and in doing so, results in new demands
for the eviction of traditional ways of life in the highlands. In this analysis, the hegemony of a
neoliberal adaptation governmentality, that is also neo-colonial, becomes more evident and
perpetuates ongoing forms of State capture and indigenous disposition in the highlands.

Chapter 4 directly calls into question the coloniality of power that moves through the production
of knowledge for resilience planning. This chapter critically reflects on a participatory attempt of
knowledge integration for resilience planning in Quilcayhuanca. The effort to integrate a diversity
of local to global knowledges about resilience (broadly conceived) began by employing the Hybrid
Resilience Framework designed by Engle and colleagues (2014). Finding the tensions and
incommensurabilities with the project of integration itself, I argue that knowledge integration
cannot offer empowerment or emancipatory outcomes simply through an extractive process that
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“takes” local knowledge out of its localized contexts and (re)presents it in terms of global and
generalizable categories. In this way, the process of integration is problematize as the politics of
making difference same. Three “domains of excess”, or things which are both accommodated into
and yet exceed modern/rationalist resilience frameworks, are then identified.

Chapter 5 is the final chapter of my dissertation and works to bring together the theoretical and
empirical work done in previous chapters to analyze and think though the second participatory
workshop. This second workshop in the highlands was a multi-stakeholder collaborative gathering
co-designed by the president of the campesinos users’ association, Pablo Pachari, and myself, in
2018. My ultimate intention was to mobilize campesinos’ adaptation imaginary within the
dominant and elite adaptation discourse. Yet, as this chapter shows, collaborative encounters are
not always beneficial, and although the outcomes of this engagement remain ongoing, I argue that
this collaborative moment for adaptation further reified long established, asymmetrical powerrelations among the various state and campesino participants. In the end, I offer three relational
lessons learned from my attempt to carry out PAR research in the Andean highlands. Specifically,
I call for collaborative adaptation practices to: foster a greater awareness and a defense of
difference; learn to learn from below; and, bridge.
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CHAPTER 1
QUILCAYHUANCA
Sitting atop a small hill in the center of Quebrada Quilcayhuanca, Moses and I
watched as the first beams of sunlight crested the steep valley walls. Though it
was no more than 6am, our ascending journey up the valley together began five
hours prior at the base of Quilcayhuanca and at the entrance gates of Huascaran
National Park. Moses explains that Quilcayhuanca campesinos are now leaving
their homes earlier and earlier in the morning hours to take care of their livestock
which are frequently left in high parts of the quebrada, where there is still plenty
of grass to graze. Their walks to the far ends of the valley now begin in the dark
in order to beat the threatening heat from an intensifying sun, a feature of the
radical environmental changes that many are indeed now noticing.
(Fieldnotes, August 6, 2016)

A Landscape of Entanglement
Quebrada, translated to English, means valley. Located around 4000 meters elevation is
Quebrada (Q.) Quilcayhuanca, a very long, y-shaped valley, in a glacier studded section of the
Andes mountains, known as the Cordillera Blanca. The Cordillera Blanca, or White Mountains,
are furnished with more than 600 expansive alpine glaciers that run in a North to South pattern and
have brought international recognition through a geographic imaginary of a majestic, wild, and
exotic landscape (Carey, 2010). The West’s conjured image of a pristine “wilderness” (Cronon,
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1996), projected upon an otherwise inhabited glacierscape, has long lured adventure sports
enthusiasts, trekking hobbyists, resource capitalists, and scientists to the alpine highlands.

However, unlike these geographic imaginaries of a pristine Andean wilderness, my
understanding of the Quilcayhuanca landscape is not static in time, nor space – but is rather
conceptualized here as a “contact zone” (Ogden, 2011:76) of a more than human sociality, fluid,
and always in a process of becoming, territorializing and reterritorializing. In this way, I am
denying the end destination of what is Quilcayhuanca. It is not so much a something, but rather a
something that is being, shifting, messaging, and territorializing. This framing of Quilcayhuanca
is much more akin to Michael Taussig’s (1993) “epistemological zone”, a meaning-making fluid
entanglement of intra- and inter-dependent relationships.

Drawing upon Ingold’s “view of the open” environment, as opposed to one that is enclosed,
“what is unthinkable is the idea that life is played out upon the inanimate surface of a ready-made
world. Inhabitants, I contend, make their way through a world-in-formation rather than across its
performed surface” (2008: 1802). In this view, a “world that is occupied […] is furnished with
already-existing things. But one that is inhabited is woven from the strands of their continual
coming-into-being” [emphasis added] (Ingold, 2008:1797). Distinguishing between an occupied
environment and one that is inhabited and co-constituted in a relationship of obligatory belonging
will be a recurrent theme throughout this dissertation. The relationships of belonging between a
diverse assemblage of human and other than human actors, or actants, in a multi-species
entanglement (Ingold, 2008:1796), is what constitutes my understanding of Quilcayhuanca as
place. This framing of environment is akin to notions of culture as process (Gupta and Ferguson,
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1992) and allows for a non-essentializing and non-imperializing writing of landscape. This frame
also opens up for thinking through Quilcayhuanca as a place of multiple inhabited histories,
multiple belongings, and multiple worlds.

Figure 1.1. Bofedales in Quilcayhuanca Alta. Pictured in the foreground are the alpine wetlands,
called bofedales, and in the background, the disappearing glaciers of Quebrada Quilcayhuanca.
Photo by Holland Haverkamp, July 2016.

Inhabitants of Quilcayhuanca have endured, for millennia, the rhythmic cycles of glacial
advance and retreat, and have benefited and suffered at the hands of glacier melt and its secondary
properties of potable water and hydrologic hazards. The tropical glaciers have long provided a
reliable water source for downstream actants throughout the geologic period known as the
Holocene, while simultaneously threatening their existence with glacier lake outburst floods
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(GLOFs) (Carey, 2010).6 In the path of glacier-fed rivers, diverse and verdant ecologies have
gathered, and today, Quilcayhuanca is a biodiverse hybrid wetland-grassland ecology comprised
of about 901 exotic and native flora species, 210 birds, 25 mammals, 4 reptiles and 2 amphibians
(SERNAP, 2011) (Figure 1.1). Quilcayhuanca’s alpine grasslands, referred to as the puna, and
wetlands, known locally as bofedales, are also habitats for hydropower infrastructures, mineral
excavation, seasonal tourists, and indigenous agropastoralists and their companion species
(Haraway, 2008) – namely wild vacuña and taruca, and domesticates of cattle, pigs, sheep, horses,
guinea pigs, chickens, rabbits and dogs.

A fluid and interdependent ecology between human life, non-human life, and non-life
actants in the Cordillera Blanca dates back to a pre-Columbian Andean period (Fagan, 2005), and
is made evident not only by the visual symbolic markings embedded in the contemporary
landscape today, including: ancestral Inca ruins, livestock corrals, cave hieroglyphics, and ancient
hydro-engineering technologies; but also, such inter-being dependency over time finds expression
in local cultural identity, folklore, and mythology of the highland Indians (Orlove, 2009). This
geographic history of highland campesinos over the past 11,000 years has not been in isolation
however, rather for more than 4,000 years the remote pristine Andean wilderness and its
inhabitants have been in connection with global knowledges, institutions, and markets. To be sure,
highland Indios have not been the only human inhabitants of the Quilcayhuanca landscape, and
today, have been relegated to the margins of what is now a post-colonial and pericapitalist
ecology.7
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Actant is used here as opposed to actor to allow for the inclusion of non-human “actors” to also
be located as agential figures in the alpine assemblage.
7
For pericapitalist ecology, see Tsing, 2015.
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Figurations of Tense
Tense can be understood in relation to time, as place is to space, and the tense of the
Quilcayhuanca landscape that I have become entangled with is situated firmly at the threshold of
the epoch commonly referred to as the Anthropocene. In the Anthropocene, the “age of Man”,
“The Human emerges as an abstraction on the one side with the Nonhuman world on the other”,
through a discourse that contrasts a homogenized human actor to all other biological,
meteorological and geologic actors (Povinelli, 2016:11). Povinelli reminds us that the central
concepts in this drama of finitude, the Human, the Nonhuman, Life and Nonlife “are abstractions
and distractions from the fact that humans did not create this problem. Rather, a specific mode of
human society did, and even there, specific classes, races and regions of humans.” I employ
Povinelli’s thinking and align closely with Jason Moore’s notion of the ‘Capitalocene’ (2017), and
Anna Tsing’s depiction of ‘capitalist climatic ruination’ (2015). Through this re-framing of the
Anthropocene, humans are no longer cast as opposed to Nonhumans and Nonlife, but rather the
antagonist in this narrative is not all humanity, but more accurately a certain type of human society,
one that strives to reduce all things, human and nature alike, to commodities for surplus value.

Capitalist climatic change has punctured highland ways of life and in this nowness,
Quilcayhuanca and the Cordillera Blanca more broadly embody multiple temporalities of a past,
emergent present and future. Similar to the ethnographic experiences that anthropologist Mattias
Rassmusen (2015) wrote of in Quebrada Rurcay, a valley only a short distance from
Quilcayhuanca, I too encountered a sense of “looking both backward and forward in time” during
walks with campesinos in Quilcayhuanca. There is a lingering “past” that has not gone away but
endures in the mundane and daily practices of the contemporary Quilcayhuanca inhabitants and
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continues to shape the future. Yet, Quilcayhuanca is also an emergent ecology that is becoming
with the onset of capitalist climatic ruination. The tense in the highlands is thus marked by a sense
of urgency and uncertainty in becoming with the consequences of contemporary human carbonbased expansion – and the overrunning of all other forms of existence by late liberal capital
(Povinelli, 2016:28).

As campesinos are increasingly articulated with a Western modality of worlding (way of
making worlds), through capitalism, climate change, and modern social projects of care, they are
also swept into a moment of acceleration, where social trends are directed not only towards growth,
but towards accelerated rates of growth and notions of ‘progress’. This removal of the barriers of
time and space, what David Harvey refers to as the time/space compression (1999), has not been
any more evident than in the current moment of the Anthropocene. As landscape inhabitants,
indigenous campesinos are both locally embedded, as well as globally entangled through a web of
capitalist-climatic-relations.

Articulating clearly this moment in time in which I am writing Quilcayhuanca is as
important to this story as defining Quilcayhuanca spatially, as a contact zone. It is an act of
reclaiming the natural history of Quilcayhuanca and therefore setting up for a future of multiple
paths and empowered social alterity. Through this discursive exercise, there is a destabilizing of
the anthropological construction of the Other, an art that all too often renders research participants
into objects of scientific inquiry and bounds them to a fixed time and space. In both defining the
place of Quilcayhuanca, and the tense, I strive to set this interpretive study apart from modernist
research traditions and positivist anthropologies.
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In Time and the Other, Johannes Fabian presents us with the concept of the “denial of
coevalness” (Fabian, 1983), referring to a systematic technique of oppressive power exerted in
both anthropological writings, as well as colonial discourses, that produces the Other through an
ordering of time. That is, anthropology’s subjects, traditionally the ‘savage’, ‘primitive’, ‘peasant’
or ‘non-modern’, are dislocated from the Self by a discursive practice that temporarily displaces
the Other from the contemporary discursive moment. Through ethnography, writing
culture/writing nature, the Other is produced through description as a nostalgic survival of the past,
belonging to an antiquated mode of sociality, and a denial of her present and future.

Anthropologists’ “denial of coevalness” and the invention of the Other has wider
implications that stretch beyond academic orientations of representation however, and manifest as
socio-political forces that ascribe certain populations to a place in different moments in time
(Povinelli, 2011). These broader implications constitute a technique of power that Povinelli (2011)
calls, “figurations of tense”. Figurations of tense, in academic and political discourses, enable
programmatic narrative and governing interventions that deny current coevals rights of political
participation in decisions that affect their own lives. It is a tactic for making legitimate the erasure
of the Other from circles of power and decision-making in the present and future. According to
Rasmussen, figurations of tense in Peru state that, “while the past belongs to the indigenous
populations, the present and future belongs to the mestizos and the whites, in other words […]
capitalism and neoliberalism” (2015, 45). This political imaginary allows for world-making that
denies sustained highland indigeneity through a logic that effectively transforms local modes of
belonging through tense, a discursive ordering of time. Rasmussen suggests that within this
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contemporary moment of capitalist-climatic disruption in the Cordillera Blanca, it is worth
noticing how issues of coevalness come into play and the figurations of tense are being
reconfigured, renegotiated across a varied landscape of uneven power-relations.

Capitalist-Climatic Change in Quilcayhuanca
Capitalist climatic change is well underway in Quilcayhuanca. Both socionatural change
and unevenly distributed degrees of vulnerability characterize the Quilcayhuanca assemblage.
Glaciologists and physical geographers point out that climate impacts of increasing temperatures
and shifting precipitation patterns caused more than 25% glacier coverage loss in Peru’s Cordillera
Blanca since 1970 (Bury et al., 2011). The majority of glaciers are now past peak melt (Polk, 2016)
and are expected to disappear as soon as mid-century (Gonzales, 2011). Historian Mark Carey
describes this moment in the Cordillera Blanca as being at the confluence of radical social and
environmental change (2010). Amidst this contemporary conjuncture of abrupt change, it is worth
paying attention to the ways in which Quilcayhuanca is conceptualized as a rapidly disappearing
glacierscape, and the variety of concurrent changes that are unfolding.

Rapidly disappearing alpine glaciers across the Cordillera Blanca are catalyzing profound
effects on all aspect of socio-natural organization in Quilcayhuanca and across the Peruvian
highlands more broadly. The relationship between the biophysical changes and human induced
drivers of change manifest in capitalist-climatic impacts that disrupt the established ways of social,
economic and political order in Quilcayhunaca. Socio-economic activities including tourism,
commercial agriculture, agropastoralism, rural and urban access to drinking water, hydroelectric
production, and cultural meaning-making practices are increasingly challenged by warming
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temperatures, disappearing glaciers and a chain of effects (Carey et al., 2012). Geographers
working on comparative studies of social vulnerability go as far as to say that inhabitants of
Quilcayhuanca are among some of the most vulnerable in the world to hydrologic impacts of
globally ensuing climate change (Michelutti et al., 2015). And those who dwell in the valley are
also noticing this emergent situatedness.

Conceptualizing the Contemporary Conjuncture
On an overnight bus from Lima to Huaraz in July 2015, I arrived for the first time to the
Andean highlands, just as the sun was coming up over the steep Cordillera Blanca mountains.
From the moment I arrived, I found that navigating within this moment of radical environmental
and social change was not a neat and organized process, rather a clumsy, disorienting experience
in which I began a journey of feeling and thinking through, and eventually, understanding the
contemporary happenings. Formulating a conceptual map of who or what was being effected by
climate impacts? how? who was responding, and in what ways? were some of the questions that
preoccupied my early fieldwork phase, as well as each sequential fieldwork phase thereafter, since
the discourse and institutional composition never remained static for long. Through ethnographic
encounters after time spent being there, informal conversations and semi-structured interviews, I
began to formulate some semblance of answers to these questions, and found the inherent
complexity within them.

In an effort to map out all adaptation actors in Quilcayhuanca, I conducted stakeholder
interviews within the adaptation actor network and relied on a Multi-level Stakeholder Influence
Mapping questionnaire (Appendix A). The questionnaire tool, designed by Sova et al. (2014),
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not only elicited an emic perspective of who is included within the political epistemic landscape,
but it also enabled, however temporally, an idea of actors’ relative authority as perceived by the
members within the epistemic network themselves (Figure 1.2).

Landscape of Adaptation Actors and Relative Influence
Huascarán National Park (HNP)
Nat. Research Inst. of Glaciers and Mountain Eco. (INIAGEM)
Campesinos
The Mountain Institute (I-NGO)
Local Government
Regional Management of Nat.Res. & Environ.
Ministry of the Environmnet (MINAM)
EPS Chavín
Gerente de la Mancomunidada Warwaq
Rural Agriculture Productice Development Program (Agrorural)
Regional Government
National Water Authority (ANA)
Ministry of Culture
CARE (I-NGO)
Jamie Haverkamp (Anthropologist)
Foreign Donors
Other NGOs (i.e. ALLPA)
National Forest and Wildlife Service (SERFOR)
National Institute of Glaciology
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (Agrocultura) (MINAGRI)
Ministry of Economy and Finance
National Institute of Civil Defense (INDECI)
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Figure 1.2. Landscape of Adaptation Actors and Relative Influence. This bar graph is a
visualization of questionnaire data from 35 research participants who identify themselves as
belonging within the network of adaptation actors in Quilcayhuanca. Participants were asked to
identify all adaptation actors within Quilcayhuanca from a possible list of actors, as well any others
who were unaccounted for (i.e. “Jamie Haverkamp”, which was a new actor entry presented in
campesino responses only). Then, participants ranked their selection within a visual hierarchical
map relative to one another (for map see Appendix E). The graph reflects the aggregate of
questionnaire responses for all adaptation actors placed within the top tier of influence and ranks
them according to frequency of mentions. Actors that were mentioned as part of the adaptation
network, but located as having lesser degrees of influence (below the top-tier) included: Comité
de Regentes, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Education, Dike
Energy, Junta de Usuarios ‘Callejón de Huaylas”, SENASA, and Civil Defense. For more on
methodology see Appendix A.
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While adaptation actors in Quilcayhuanca is numerous (31 identified), varied, and always
in flux, I noticed that some actors were more or less prominent with regards to ongoing adaptation
planning in the highlands throughout the duration of my ethnographic engagement. Specifically,
through ethnographic insights, which align with the questionnaire results above, the more
influential and recurrent actors/institutions operating within Quilcayhuanca included: Huascaran
National Park (HNP); the National Research Institute for Glaciers and Mountain Ecology
(INAIGEM); The Mountain Institute (INGO); Rural Agriculture Productive Development
Program (Agrorural); the Regional Government; EPS Chavín (quasi-government corporation);
National Forest and Wildlife Service (SERFOR); The National Water Authority (ANA), and
campesinos (specifically, campesino communities and the Grassland Users’ Association of
Quilcayhuanca). Those that remained semi-constant over the time horizon of my research were
also perceived (by the network itself) as among the most influential actors in the formal responses
(planning and policy) to climate change.

Within these few first weeks of arriving to Huaraz and the Quilcayhuanca valley, I met
with Augusto Lliuya, a 69-year-old campesino who was born and raised in Tayocoto, a village
sector of the Quilcayhuanca valley, and a part of the community, Cahuide. Augusto is an educated
campesino who has held the position of community president and now serves as secretary to the
Users Association of Quilcayhuanca (Asociación de Usuarios de Quebrada Quilcahyanca). In the
coolness of the late evening, at the home of his parents, Augusto and I (with a translator in tow)
sat in a dim light. Upon first impression, Augusto projected a gruff disposition, through which he
intensely and agitatedly, yet, still patiently, described the effects of environmental change in the
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campesino’s homelands. Augusto informed me that campesinos were indeed now noticing the
environmental changes:

“Uughhh ... in everyday life, well... we notice perfectly [...] climate change has
damaged the grassland, I mean the grassland does not grow like before... it grows
only a little and it seems that the earth is very weak […] And not only that in
pastures, but also climate change is affecting our agriculture, which has reduced
low water levels... water has decreased greatly, meaning that there is not enough
water. For example, you can notice the effects of climate change here, Churup was
once all covered in snow... now it isn’t. That water coming down from Churup
supplied Llupa, Unchus, until Nueva Florida... now there is no water, it is
disappearing. There is a lot of change […] now it is hotter, this affects agriculture
and you know that campesinos live from small farming, small livestock... that's what
they do, nothing else.”
(Augusto Lliuya, July 7, 2016)

Reflected in Augusto’s remarks is a glimmer of the complexities of the environmental
changes occurring at the hands of capitalist-climatic impacts in the Quilcayhuanca landscape, and
the confirmation that, indeed, highland peoples are living these effects of climatic-change and
noticing very well. What Augusto shared with me in this moment are some of the environmental
changes that are, perhaps, of broadest concern for campesinos, as well as for the State and
international actors in Quilcayhuanca who are also taking-up climate change in Quilcayhuanca as
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a matter of concern.8 Augusto’s concerns over the degrading alpine grasslands, water shortages
and food scarcity issues are at the forefront of stakeholders’ minds in Quilcayhunaca. However, it
is also important to note that this quote from Augusto is only partial, meaning that it is incomplete.
In this way, I came to understand that reflected in this interview is only a partial selection of the
ways in which climate change is intervening across this landscape. While Augusto points to the
dominant crises arising in Quilcayhuanca, other climate impacts fall outside of the story, omitting
the wide diversity of other, perhaps less commonly mentioned but still concomitant changes in the
quebrada.

Seeking a more comprehensive view of environmental changes occurring in
Quilcayhuanca, I aggregated interview responses regarding environmental change from across the
diverse set of trans-local adaptation actors with responsibility of, or belonging to, Quilcayhuanca.
Perceived and experienced changes expressed by a multiplicity of participants include a variety of
different identified changes. Twenty identified socio-environmental changes happening
concurrently in Quilcayhuanca, as a result of climate impacts, are shown in the table below (Table
1.1) in association with interview quotes that add contextual insights as to how these impacts are
coming to impact and matter in everyday life.

8

The trans-local actors that are also taking-up climate change as a matter of concern include: the
State and its regionally devolved satellites of power, as well as the international conservation and
development apparatuses, i.e. UNESCO, The Mountain Institute, CARE, several multi-lateral
and bi-lateral institutions, scientists of Western centers, among others. The constellation of new
and old trans-local actors coupled with the National State government constitutes the
heterogeneous assemblage of adaptation governance actors—what I refer to as the State, in this
dissertation.
13

Table 1.1. Perceived Environmental Changes in Quilcayhuanca.
Perceived
Changes
Climate and
Weather

Type of
Change

Contextual Significance of Change

Seasonal
variability

“we cannot forecast, before we had well-defined seasons, the rainy
season began in November and December, now we no longer know
when it will begin and end. So, these changes confuse campesinos,
for example we think it’s possible to sow at a given month but it
doesn’t rain, then there are problems with planting.” (Government)

Frost

“The cold snap comes. […] - I don’t know what causes that sickness,
that cold snap. And that cold snap dawns at five in the morning. It
gets cold, really cold, it burns all the grasses, everything, it burns
everything, all the grass. It’s not even just the fields, it crushes
everything, all the grass the animals eat; it spoils all of it, everything,
all the grass. The whole valley, the whole valley, it burns everything.”
(Campesino)

Temperature
and Heat
Extremes

“…we also now have colder temperatures, the sun rays are more
intense, same as the rain, you can see this, it’s getting worse every year,
compared to last year the difference is noticeable: cold, sun and rain are
more intense, all this results in an undependable planting season for
campesinos.” (Government)
“Now it’s impossible to withstand the hot temperatures when you work
outside and wear short sleeves, not even wearing a hat, you can easily
get sunburned.” (Campesino)

Water

Rainfall

“As a result of climate change we can see the impact now, for example
the weather has changed, and today starts the rainy season but the sun is
still scorching. […] There has been a notorious change in weather, the
rainy season starts late and this affects agriculture” (Government)

Water
Quantity

“Another radical change is water shortage […] there is no water in June
and July […]. About 10 or 15 years ago there was water everywhere,
rivers, other water sources... now not anymore, it is dry.” (Government)
“There is very little water even for irrigation. And there isn’t enough
water to irrigate either.” (Campesina)

Water Quality

“[…this] one valley from which the water comes down is already
contaminated. That’s why all the animals died from contamination.”
(Campesino)
“Some ten years ago it [Quilcayhuanca River] became contaminated I
believe, because there used to be trout too, there were in that river that
descended Quilcayhuanca.” (Campesino)
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Table 1.1. Perceived Environmental Changes in Quilcayhuanca.
“Years ago Quilcayhuanca had clean water, but snow melting has
washed away minerals and that has contaminated water. Now the water
from Quilcayhuanca stains stones.” (Campesino)

Landscape
Change

Alpine
Grasslands &
bofedales

“What I notice most is the loss of grass. And the ice is also
disappearing.” (Campesina)

Forest
Composition

“In respect of forests, we have vast areas of eucalyptus which is
growing up and adapting to high altitude ecosystems due to climate
change, the same happened with pine trees, and they both have changed
the landscape considerably.” (NGO)

Glaciers

“I think the changes are noticeable, if we look at the glaciers, they now
have a different form” (Government)
“when I was young, right? I saw Churup [Mountain], it was very
beautiful with its white glaciers, right. But after that there was the
glacial retreat. Little by little it lost everything…” (Campesino)

Soil

“Sickness takes hold, the grubs take hold, it rots where it is. In other
words it is not fertile.” (Campesino)

Species Shift/
Emergent
Ecologies

“…climate change, how it affects is the way that the temperature
gradient is increasing at higher altitudes, meaning that in areas where
plants grew, in less cold areas at 4000m, now we will find at 4600m or
higher, these plants are at lower altitudes.” (Government)
“Another indicator of this change in temperature is fruit, for instance,
there were some pacay trees which never bore fruit, however now they
do, [pointing out to a pacay tree that can be seen through the window]”
(NGO)

Agropastoralism

Species
Extinction

“…now it is colder and many animals have disappeared too […]. For
example... toads and condors that used to live in the valley… you
cannot see them anymore... maybe one or two... but there were more.”
(Campesino)

Crop
Production,
Disease and
Pests

“In the past, our planting turned out well, […] In the past there was
good production without any fertilizer. It’s not like that anymore. The
grubs are eating the potatoes such that they want treatment.”
(Campesina)
“…when we were young, we didn’t use treatments, insecticides,
fertilizer; we didn’t use them. […] but right now, without fertilizer,
without treatments, not even a single plant produces, none of the fields,
no, it doesn’t produce.” (Campesino)

15

Table 1.1. Perceived Environmental Changes in Quilcayhuanca.
“crops are getting less resistant to cold and frost, which is detrimental
to people’s food security. In that sense, there is a reduction of
production of Andean crops, especially wheat, barley, oca (a tuber) and
more; there is also a strong presence of pests in crops and all that.
(NGO)
“We are affected by the rain and by the sicknesses in the foods (crops),
the sewn fields. Sometimes the rancha (blight) attacks […] the
potatoes” (Campesino)
Crop Zone

“there were positive changes, regarding crops, such as corn. Corn only
used to grow at 3200m, 100m above Huaraz approximately, but now
you can find […] it’s higher. Thus. the corn is adapting, growing at
higher altitudes and that is due to changes in temperature.” (NGO)

Livestock

“In the old times there was grass, our animals were fat, now they are
skinnier.” (Campesina)
“Another thing that is affecting communities is the presence of new
pests and diseases in their livestock and pets.” (NGO)

Social
Impacts

Education

“[…] the consequences of global warming and climate change are very
complex for our entire society. Many children have to leave, talking
about education, they leave the schools we built in their villages and
they do not study here, then what future awaits those creatures?”
(Government)

Human
Health

“I noticed that sunlight currently hurts you, when going out you can
feel it burns your skin. […] It damages your eyes.” (Government)
“communities are basically being affected by cold temperatures, hence
the occurrence of diseases, such as pulmonary and bone diseases”
(NGO)

Urbanization/
Migration

“Climate change has affected... the [agrarian] economy. Then that
population migrates, there are fewer farmers involved in the fields, they
migrate to the city and they do not get a job, their entire economy
shrinks and disappears, they end up as beggars in the cities most of the
time. […]. They are precisely the people who occupy human
settlements, encroach on properties and lands, it becomes a large social
problem.” (Government)

Infrastructure Cultural

“[climate change] it affects everything. For example, we cannot have
our cemetery in the same place, because it’s so hot and it should be
relocated in a higher area.” (Campesino)

Time

“And now, I don’t know why but it seems that time (itself) has
changed, time passes more quickly.” (Campesina)

Infrastructure
Time
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Table 1.1. Perceived Environmental Changes in Quilcayhuanca. List of twenty perceived
environmental changes derived from 21 interviews with institutional actors and one participatory
workshop with 20 campesinos.

While the observed environmental changes widely vary from crop disease, to reduced
water supply, to melting glaciers, among myriad others, all perceived changes have a profound
effect on agro-pastoralist’s way of life. For some participants, their encounters with climate change
has led them to stress the changes in land cover, such as the degradation of the bofedales and
grasslands, or forest composition; for others, their focus is on the changes in water quality and
quantity, or changes in precipitation; and still others spoke of an intensifying sun and increasing
weather extremes. Although the table presents these statements in their individual categorical bins,
they are interconnected in complex ways. While highland inhabitants are usually experiencing a
combination of these environmental changes, traditional agrarian practices, fishing, and access to
water is significantly undermined, and in some instances, no longer feasible.

The culmination of climate impacts has beset a time of radical landscape change in
Quilcayhuanca, and across the Cordillera Blanca more broadly. Depending on which stakeholders
are speaking, the identified problems and opportunities associated with climate change can vary.
Problem framing of climate change impacts differs across global to local adaptation actors,
provoking a plurality of different adaptation imaginaries (the central concept in Chapter 4) as a
result. For some, emergent issues of water and agricultural shortages in the highlands are linked to
a causal explanation of poor agrarian practices, whereas for other actors, it is the product of global
capitalism, and still others link it to spiritual forcings. However, despite the disparities across
multiple socially and politically produced problem definitions, participants hold several central
environmental change concerns in common.
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While agropastoralists may encounter climate impacts in different ways than, say an NGO
director who is aiding in conservation efforts, or a National Park ranger who monitors and enforces
park policies, the diversity of their climate knowledges coalesce more or less along how the climate
impacts are effecting and disturbing highland life, and specifically agrarian life. What the
contextual quotes in Table 1.1 (above) illuminate, are the partial connections across actors and the
prominence of several matters of concern shared across the adaptation policy network, specifically:
water scarcity (quality and quantity), food (in)security, disruption to agropastoralist activities, and
human health.

Climate change in Quilcayhuanca is indeed already being felt by local inhabitants and the
severity of the impacts are drastic. As a government informant with the Director of the National
Civil Defense System (INDECI) explained, the Cordillera Blanca is like a “disaster zone”, because
the damages of climate change have already been felt (Interview, August 1, 2016). Yet, a national
declaration of a state of emergency has not been enacted, as if it were an abrupt event, and thus
the agency is not mobilizing aid or any kind of relief efforts. I have come to understand the disaster
situation in Quilcayhuanca as a slow onset of loss and killing, as opposed to the sudden disruption
of a rapid onset event like the glacier lake outburst floods (GLOFS) and earthquakes that are met
with immediate State and international attention and aid. Despite the notable climate effects
eroding away at human health, food and water security, and traditional livelihoods in the highlands
– the State engineer with INDECI informed me that without the declaration of a federal
“emergency”, INDECI cannot intervene in the situation of loss and damage. For many campesinos
of Quilcayhuanca valley, they have already lost access to vital resources such as fish, clean water
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and sufficient grasslands as a result of climate change impacts. They have already withstood
decades of climate change devastation in their homelands and are living precariously with water
and food insecurity. Thus, I wonder how the gradual changes of glacier-melt and seasonal
unpredictability – quasi-event effects (Povinelli, 2011:13,144) – are governed differently from
sudden-impact events, even when their outcomes are those of famine, water scarcity, loss of
livelihoods and widespread illness. In an era of sensational urgency, how might gradual
environmental changes that pose threats to wellbeing and sustainability be overlooked and
abandoned?

A Historically Constituted, Territorializing Assemblage of Quilcayhuanca
“In order to be knowingly in each other’s presence
we must somehow share each other’s past.”
(Johannes Fabian, 2006: 145)
Although this contemporary moment of environmental change and uncertainty in the
Peruvian highlands is remarked, by some, as “unprecedented”, it is not campesinos’ first encounter
with radical landscape change, nor their first encounter with state and international actors who
have come to “help” in their plight (Carey, 2010; Lipton, 2014; Rasmussen, 2017). To begin to
understand this contemporary moment in the highlands, I must reflect on the historical production
of this nowness – a present informed by a past and moving into a future. Although I cannot offer
a full archeology of power in the highlands, I attempt in this section to weave together some
poignant moments in the process of becoming the Quilcayhuanca that I have encountered and
become entangled with. I explore here the events and quasi-events that have contributed to the
contemporary moment in which Quilcayhuanca is understood as a territorial assemblage, a
“contact zone,” of local to global actants.
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The historical articulation of various global powers and markets in the Cordillera Blanca
have led to a vexed, plural, and contested sense of sovereignty in Quilcayhuanca and throughout
the neighboring valleys that fall within the somewhat recently established territorialized zone of
Huascaran National Park. A multiplicity of historical narratives and historical happenings
constitute the highly political and contested landscape of Quilcayhuanca valley, and the National
Park more broadly. In this alpine, glacier-formed landscape, no two valleys share the same
historical particularities, present situatedness, and future imaginary (Rasmussen, 2017). However,
it is clear that there is a shared history, a “tradition of land invasions in Peru, which has generally
been accepted as a means of dealing with contested land issues” (Rasmussen, 2017:5).

In order to be “knowingly” in this present moment of radical environmental change, it is
essential to remember that contemporary campesinos have been in an ongoing process of
dispossession by a series of different capitalist and (neo)colonial events since Spanish conquest.
Since 16th century Spanish colonial rule, ways of life in the highlands have been interrupted by,
and intertwined with, the global order of things. Geographer Jennifer Lipton (2014) and
anthropologist Mattias Rasmussen (2017) suggest that current resource contestation in the
territorial zone of Huascaran National Park are rooted in two lasting legacies: the 1970 earthquake
and former President Velasco’s 1969 agrarian reform. Yet, the work of historian Mark Carey
further extends the prominent significance of these two historical junctures in the highlands,
drawing attention to the 1941 earthquake and concomitant glacier lake outburst flood in the
Cordillera Blanca, and marking this as the disaster event that brought a wave of foreign aid and
capitalist entrepreneurs to the agrarian highlands (2010). Here, I review the major events of
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Velasco’s agrarian reform, the establishment of Huascaran National Park and hydrologic disaster
events, so to articulate the historical happenings that largely influence the current political struggle
of climate change adaptation today. While I review these major key historical happenings in the
next section, I am compelled to compose them along with events in a minor key (Povinelli, 2011),
striving to illuminate the more unspoken histories and “non-events” that co-constitute the sociohistorical production of the contemporary Quilcayhuanca landscape. This is attempted by weaving
together campesino’s tellings of historical moments with more popular narrations of the major key
events by historians and anthropologists. In this way, the political history of Quilcayhuanca that
follows is punctuated with subaltern accounts and gestures to the many untold histories of the
oppressed.

From Serfdom to “Freedom”: Uneven Effects of Agrarian Reform
Agrarian Reform is the story of “hacienda to community” in the Peruvian highlands. It was
a period of more than four-decades (1950’s-1999) in which social, economic, political and
ecological organization underwent a radical transformation from a system of feudal haciendas and
servitude to emancipated communidadas campesinas, campesino communities (Mayer, 2009).
Though the legacy of agrarian reform is still controversial, there is no doubt that the State’s initial
left-wing shift and sweeping reforms of practically every aspect of life were an important
watershed moment for campesinos and the country. The most ambitious and aggressive attempt at
agrarian reform occurred during a five-year period under the military rule of Jose Velasco
Alvarado (1968-1975), when the military rigorously implemented in top-down, corporatist, and
undemocratic ways a slew of profoundly radical reform measures (Ibid). Yet, despite an obsessive
operation of control, Velasco’s agrarian reform was said to have carried out many of the desired
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changes and dreams of progress that left-leaning politicians and intellectuals had desired for
decades (i.e. correction for social and income inequalities).

Agrarian reform is recognized as the largest attempt at a significant income redistribution
in a society of great inequalities. To paraphrase Enrique Mayer (2009), it completed the abolition
of all forms of servitude in rural highland estates, a momentous shift in the history of the Andes,
akin to the abolition of slavery in North America. It glossed over racial/ethnic issues that divided
a deeply segregated Peruvian society by using the neutral class-derived word campesino (peasant),
and banishing the word indino (Indian). It afforded campesinos rights of full ownership to their
(re)allocated usufruct land parcels, abolishing the status of serfdom (yanaconaje and colonato).9
And, in the end, agrarian reform is said to have vastly expanded the political participation of
previously un- or underrepresented sectors of society. Through the reform, “popular classes in
towns, villages, indigenous communities, and shantytowns were involved in projects and programs
that ultimately advanced their incorporation as citizens. The government treated them with greater
respect than before [when they were landless laborers], discouraging forms of social injustice and
everyday humiliation” (Mayer, 2009:3).

Yet, despite the glowing political rhetoric, the execution and unintended outcomes of
agrarian reform were hugely problematic. While governing tactics were namely those of
surveillance, discipline and punishment, producing a repressed and paranoid public, the rise of a
highly technocratic discourse was said to be equally troubling. “Reform measures were
implemented through the imposition of ‘models’ derived from beliefs that a scientifically correct
9

The system by which a family was granted the use of a small plot of land in exchange for
obligatory work for the landowner
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formula could be designed and reinforced to change human character and behavior, thus bringing
about a reduction of class conflict and inequality, and the achievement of social cohesion” (Mayer,
2009:4).

Among the primary government mandates of the agrarian reform was that technical
regression must be avoided and the central productive system on newly collectivized and
adjudicated lands was to be maintained, improved and enlarged (Mayer, 2009). This objective fed
the imaginary of making a “modern” national Peru. “Backwards” agrarian practices performed
within a feudal system were seen by Peruvian elites as non-efficient and a deadweight in the
process of modernization. The sweeping reconfiguration of the campesino landscape, beginning
with their emancipation from serfdom, collectivization and adjudication into agrarian collectives
was seen as a means to a more productive economic system. As Mayer explains, “Velasco’s
original reform had neither the patience nor the desire to create new [indigenous] communities [as
opposed to capital producing peasant collectives] or give them land because it considered them
archaic and an impediment to agricultural change. Instead, campesinos were supposed to be
obedient participants in the modernizing efforts of the reforms intent – even as it meant that the
reform was to contribute to their demise” (2009:29). Velasco’s officials had repeatedly stated that
their objective was to create wealth and distribute it, but not to spread poverty by breaking up
economies of scale (Ibid).

Critics of the reform proclaimed it a “bourgeois” project, stating that because the reform
handsomely compensated bourgeois landowners in money and forced peasants on land plots in
exchange for “agrarian debt” the reform was thus reconstituting the old social classes in thin
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disguises and continuing the process of accumulation of capital in the hands of the bourgeois
(Saldívar, 1974 and Atusparia, 1977 cited in Mayer, 2009:26). By the mid 1980s the agrarian
cooperatives were in total economic collapse. Most had been dismantled or sold off. In contrast,
the campesino communities (comunidades campesinas) that avoided organization into agrarian
collectives, proved a more stable form of social organization in the ex-hacienda lands. In the end,
three hundred thousand campesino families received some small plots of land, which they had to
take forcibly back from the failed agrarian cooperatives in which they were pushed (Mayer, 2009).
They did this by using the proverbial weapons of the peasants: they infiltrated the cooperative’s
lands, they increased the number of their cattle on the pastures, they inflated the number of
members in the cooperatives. On the legal front, they agitated to deactivate the cooperatives, they
staged land invasions, and they sought official recognition as communities (Ibid).

Adverse effects associated with the agrarian reform are now resurging for campesinos in
the present moment of capitalist-climatic change. For campesinos of Quilcayhuanca, the
contemporary moment parallels the ongoing radical social and environmental reconfiguration
during agrarian reform, the motif of highland abandonment (not the absence of governing, but a
certain way of governing difference), and the continual struggle for land-based sovereignty in the
highlands. Augusto Lliuya (campesino of Tayocoto) explains that “in the time of Juan Velasco
Alvarado the land belonged to those who worked it, but he gave us these pieces of land in a bad
way…it was a problem, that resulted in a failure of agriculture” (Interview, 7 July 2016). Augusto
links the problematic elements of Agrarian Reform to the contemporary climate change challenge
in his homelands. He continued to explain the linkages as such:
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“the government does not support us [campesinos] in anything, they only visit our
community during election campaigns, they offer many things… then they win and
forget about it. That is all. Campesinos will always be poor, although their
agriculture feeds the city. […] I am almost 70 years old, I know the community
well, what they [the state] have given us. President Alan Garcia [under agrarian
reform] gave us a tractor but it broke down. […] Now with this type of government
the rich will always be richer and the poor will always be poorer, that’s it. That’s
a fact. […] We need technical support, fertilizers, training [to deal with climate
change] but we don’t get any of that. That is precisely what happened with the
agrarian reform. The land was distributed to the campesinos, to those who worked
it… but, was that good? We had no capital, no training, no technical support,
nothing, and agriculture died as a consequence.” (Augusto Lliuya, 7 July 2016)

As Augusto narrates campesinos historically informed situatedness within a landscape of
capitalist-climatic ruin, he does through by harkening to a past project of social engineering, where
visions of national progress and modernization were driven by Peruvian elites with commitments
to economic growth and technocratic visions of agriculture, despite – or worse yet, so to – disband
the socio-cultural milieu of a campesino world. For Eleazer and other campesinos of
Quilcayhuanca, the agrarian reform, an elite and intellectual vision of emancipation, failed them.
It entrenched Capitalist-State power relations, indebted communities, truncated alternative
systems of economic reciprocity (i.e. the Minka), and delivered a devastating blow to agricultural
production.
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The stories of agrarian reform are pertinent to understanding the contemporary moment,
specifically to understand land and power-relations at play in adaptation decision-making. Yet,
this important historical happening that informs the present is further complicated and layered with
another coercive project of environmental control. Prior to the dithering end of agrarian reform,
and with only a few active years of campesinos’ usufruct rights within newly collective lands, the
project of Huascaran National Park interrupted and complicated the territorial fallout of the reform.
The establishment of Huascaran National Park, marks another critically informative historical
happening shaping ongoing efforts of climate change adaptation in Quilcayhuanca, and across the
Cordillera Blanca.

From Communal Land to State Enclosures: The Making of Huascaran National Park
After agrarian reform, Hacienda Tayocota was expropriated and various communities
emerged throughout the greater Quilcayhuanca region. The large, flat and open Quilcayhuanca
valley made for good pasturelands and user rights became established through a local users’
committee, known as the Asociación de Usuarios de Quebrada Quilcahyanca, to which access is
kinship based. As such, the valley is not inhabited by a single campesino community, but rather it
is used as communal pasture lands for eight village “sectors” that constitute the users committee
of Quilcayhuanca, including: Uqui, Unchus, Tayacoto, Rivas, Marian, Llupa, Huancha, and
Carhuas. Some sectors also belong to a variety of campesino communities making for a complex
and layered system of local institutions.

Salvina Quispe is an 87-year-old campesina, and a child of the Tayocoto sector of
Quilcayhuanca. Salvinia and I frequently encountered one another on the collective, or combi, a
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shuttle bus that travelled between the urban center of Huaraz and the eight communities of
Quilcayhuanca, all of which were forcibly re-organized during agrarian reform and again with the
establishment of Huascaran National Park. On July 16th, 2016, I was invited to Salvinia’s home
to interview her about the environmental changes in the quebrada. Talking with Salvinia was an
important moment for me, as she had a widespread reputation among other campesinos, as well as
NGOs and National Park officials, as being one of the last remaining “true” campesinas of the
valley. Residing in this pericapitalist zone, on the edges of the State’s reach, Salvinia and her
family live a more “traditional” way of highland life, one that is less articulated with the global
capitalist economy compared to many of their peer-campesinas, and they even maintain the
maximum allowable physical distance from the nearby urban center of Huaraz while not
‘encroaching” on the Park’s enclosed territory (Figure 1.3).
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Figure 1.3. Quilcayhuanca Fieldsite Map. The map consists of three maps at various spatial
scales in order to orient the fieldwork location of Quebrada (Q.) Quilcayhuanca within the larger
context of Huascaran National Park, and Peru. There are eight campesino sectors united as users
of Q. Quilcayhuanca through the user’s association. These eight sectors are symbolized on the map
with a red circle and their corresponding sector name, and located in a thin territorial zone outside
of the urban center Huaraz and beyond the boundary line (in white) of the National Park. Map
produced by Ani St. Amand and Jamie Haverkamp (2018).
As a child of Tayocota, Salvinia grew up dwelling inside what is now the National Park
Huascaran (NPH) reserve. Her home, livestock, and daily activities were primarily within the
quebrada. Recounting her birth, Salvinia recalls her family living inside what is now the National
Park enclosure at an elevation that was too high for newborn infants to easily breathe at. After she
was born at a lower elevation in the valley, Salvinia and her family resumed their way of life as
the valley guards, before the establishment of the National Park. Salvinia stated: “When my father
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lived in the mouth of the valley he worked as a guard those first years. And when he was a guard
and I was just a baby they brought me up to the gate, my mother with no rest (after giving birth)
went there [gesturing to inside what is now the National Park enclosure]” (Interview, Salvina
Quispe, 16 July 2016). Following after her father, Salvinia and her brothers served as the guardians
of the valley until 1975, when the National Park was established and their roles as guards of the
quebrada were usurped by new guardians – State imposed park officials. Over the years, Salvinia
and the Quilcayhuanca peasantry found themselves no longer as the guardians of valley, but as the
new trespassers, and their agrarian way of life criminalized. Although campesinos use the title of
guards interchangeably between national park guards and campesino guards, the guardians of the
present serve quite different functions than that of Salvinia and her siblings.

According to Augusto Lliuya, the new guardians of Quilcayhuanca, the park rangers, “only
charge entrance fees, they don’t do anything else” (Interview, 7 July 2016). Campesinos are hostile
towards the lack of care given by the new guardians of the land, claiming that they are uninterested
in protecting the environment from foreign pressures, pollution, mining, and irresponsible and
naïve tourists who clamber through the campesino’s sacred, economic, and politically entangled
landscape, with little knowledge or regard for whose homelands they are moving through.
Furthermore, campesinos are perplexed by the lack of investment put back into Quilcayhuanca by
National Park revenues. During conversations with Augusto, Salvinia and other campesions, it was
not uncommon to hear about the corrupt situation in which NPH guards would occupy the entrance
to Quilcayhuanca, collecting entrance fees, and yet the communities of Quilcayhuanca see no
reinvestment of this money into the maintenance of roads, the instillation of bathrooms, or the
establishment of proper tourism facilities from which Campesinos could sell their wares and
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engage productively in the tourism economy that has sprung up in their homelands. After posing
his rhetorical question, “but what does the park do with all their income?” – implying “nothing”
for the community – Augusto goes on to say, “That’s why we call rangers “Cobraparques” – a
condescending play on words that means money collectors of the park. It is important to notice,
that since the establishment of Huascaran National Park, the park officials, national directors and
campesinos have had an antagonistic and contentious relationship.

People do not dwell, that is make a permanent residence, inside of Quilcayhuanca valley
today. Rather, Quechua (and increasingly Spanish) speaking indigenous agropastoralists were
evicted from their valley homelands in the quebrada with the establishment of Huascarán National
Park in 1975. According to historian Mark Carey (2010), the origins of what is still an ongoing
process of fortress conservation and neocolonial dispossession across the Cordillera Blanca have
their roots in a legacy of “disaster capitalism” (Klein, 2007), beginning almost a century prior.

While glaciers in the Andes have been in both a natural and capitalist-induced mode of
retreat, their associated alpine glacial lakes have been expanding in volume, and are becoming
increasingly hazardous to valley inhabitants downstream. Commencing with the 1941 glacier lake
outburst flood that claimed the lives of 5,000 humans from Cojup Canyon to Huaraz, the Cordillera
Blanca has experienced a terrible string of similar events. Historically narrated in In the Shadow
of Melting Glaciers, Climate Change and Andean Society, Carey (2010) explains the chain of
historical disasters following the 1941 event, signaling to the 1945 outburst flood, which took 500
lives and destroyed the town of Chavín de Huantar; to the 1950 event that killed 200 from lake
Parón; and again, to the 1962 event when a glacier avalanche from the famous Mount Huascaran
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swept through Ranrahirac killing another 4,000 people. Lastly, Carey articulates that “in 1970,
came the deadliest glacier disaster in world history – another glacier avalanche from Mount
Huascarán”, triggered by an earthquake, and claiming over 15,000 lives and devastating the town
of Yungay (2010:7).

Although the traumatizing legacy of the hazardous glacier events in Peru focus most
heavily on this last and greatest 1970 disaster (Oliver-Smith, 1999), Carey suggests that it was the
initial 1941 glacier lake outburst flood that “unleashed a series of historical processes that
ultimately led to the commodification of glaciers, the consumption of Andean natural resources
and landscapes, and the modernization of Peru” (Carey, 2010:10). With the shocking wreckage of
the 1941 event, specifically within the urban center of Huaraz, international disaster relief efforts
immediately mobilized and brought not only emergency and development aid, but also scientists
and disaster opportunists. “The glacier experts later became important advocates for the creation
of Huascarán National Park, designed as much for a tourism economy as nature protection” (Carey,
2010:10). Since the 1941 disaster, and culminating with the 1970 avalanche in Yungay, an
international market of Scientific knowledge and outdoor adventure sports have bolstered and
partially brought to fruition the establishment of Huascarán National Park, and the enclosure of
the previously “open” Cordillera Blanca landscape. Today, the National Park encompasses a legal
boundary around 3400km2 (Polk, 2016), contains the world’s largest concentration of tropical
glaciers (Kaser and Osmaston, 2002), and has governing authority over the mountain ecology and
glaciers across the Cordillera Blanca.
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Although Salvinia was raised dwelling within Quebrada Quilcayhuanca, her current
homestead only abuts to the entrance of the gates to Huascaran National Park, at approximately
3,800 meters in elevation. Here, Salvinia is physically situated outside the official entrance to the
State’s monitored, measured, and controlled territorial zone. However, it has not always been this
way and when explaining the physical situatedness of her home-place, Salvinia explained that the
buildings were built only a few decades ago. Despite the traditional looking circular stone-walled
and grass-thatched roof structures, Salvinia’s home is relatively new (Figure 1.4). Dating their
home, both Salvinia and her husband recall their move to this lower valley location, beyond the
Park entrance, as marked by the event of their wedding in 1980. A wedding in campesino tradition
means a redistribution of resources, namely of cattle and land. Salvinia recalls their wedding of
1980 occurring only five years after the establishment of Huascaran National Park, and narrates
the articulation of the minor key event of the wedding, with the major key event of the National
Park. The construction of new homes within the park’s territorial boundary would have been illegal
under State law, despite campesino’s concurrent legal usufruct rights established under agrarian
reform to land and resources within Quilcayhuanca. Therefore, Salvinia began her new married
life just beyond the park boundaries, looking in towards left behind homelands. What is interesting
in Salvinia’s story is that the process of dispossession was not told from the view of a single forcing
agent of coercive park policies that evicted her and her family from their homelands, but rather the
co-constitution of the events and quasi-events that manifested in her marginalized situatedness on
the periphery of Quilcayhuanca.
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Figure 1.4. Salvinia’s Homestead in Q. Quilcayhuanca. This building was built in 1980 after
Salvinia and her family relocated outside Quilcayhuanca valley with the newly imposed
establishment of Huascarán National Park. The building here is for cooking and faces towards the
entrance of Huascaran National Park – Salvinia’s prior homeland. Photo by Holland Haverkamp,
July 2016.
Living on the edges of the State for Quilcayhuanca campesinos is to live squeezed into a
spatially and temporally thin and fractured zone on the peripheries of a “past”, rural highland
indigeneity, and a “future”, urbanized and modern way of life. While there is a sense that Peru’s
past belongs to the Indinos, and its future to the Mestizos and Whites, the present-progressive that
is Quilcayhuanca is populated by cholos, a term sometimes used in a derogatory fashion to refer
to the upwardly mobile people who neither have become fully integrated into the dominant Statesociety nor fully shed their peasant identity (Isabell, 2005).
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Figure 1.5. Grazing in Quilcayhuanca. Salvinia Quispe walks her flock of sheep from her
homelands in the lower part of Q. Quilcayhuanca to the grasslands within Huascaran National
Park, in her daily act of quiet resistance. Photo by Holland Haverkamp, July 2016.
Although to a foreigner Salvinia’s homestead appears to be within the mountain landscape,
she is well aware that she is living only on the periphery of her homeland and her attachments to
it are played out in acts of “everyday resistance” – grazing cattle and sheep inside of Quilcayhuanca
and on contested grasslands (Figure 1.5).10 Salvinia and her family are not the only campesinos of
10

“Everyday resistance” (see James Scott’s Weapons of the Weak, 1984: 32) … “the quiet,
piecemeal process by which peasant squatters have often encroached on plantation and state
forest lands” … “What everyday forms of resistance share with the more dramatic public
confrontations is of course that they are intended to mitigate or deny claims made by
superordinate classes or to advance vis-à-vis those superordinate classes. Such claims have
ordinarily to do with the material nexus of class struggle – the appropriation of land, labor, taxes,
and so forth. Where everyday resistance most strikingly departs from other forms of resistance is
in its implicit disavow of public and symbolic goals. Where institutionalized politics is formal, overt,
concerned with systematic, de jure change, everyday resistance is informal, often covert, and
concerned largely with immediate, de factor gains.”
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Quilcayhuanca that have resettled along the entrance of the national park boundaries, and her story
reflects the gradual, and still ongoing, processes of coercive eviction from indigenous homelands
that campesinos have endured since the 1970s. However, Salvinia remains steadfast in her
conviction to continue with a campesina way of life. Despite decades of state efforts to fully restrict
cattle and sheep grazing from the quebrada, Salvinia argues, “why would we lower the numbers?
We would organize and protest [this demand]. […] how would we live without milk, meat? How
would that affect Huaraz [the urban market consumers that campesinos feed]?” (Interview July 16,
2016). Salvinia’s narrative signals that the territorial dispute between the State and campesinos
for access and belonging in Quilcayhuanca is not over, a critical consideration for modern climate
politics in Quilcayhuanca and the Cordillera Blanca.

The articulation of the major events of Velasco’s agrarian reform, the establishment of
Huascaran National Park and disasters, with local cultural ways of life in Quilcayhuanca has
created subjects of territorial dispossession, resulted in the eviction of highland campesinos from
a State confiscated landscape (Huascaran National Park), and has shaped the conditions of
highland abandonment and precarity for over a century. The outcomes of multiple social projects
for highland “improvement” have proven uneven at best, and colonial at worst; and, as this
ethnographic dissertation illuminates, continues into the contemporary moment of capitalist
climatic devastation with new social projects of climate adaptation.
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CHAPTER 2
PERFORMATIVE GATHERINGS AND THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION
“Having thus described the scene, and the actors, let us now proceed to the
performance”
(Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, 1922)
“culture is made present through performance”
(Fabian, 2006: 145)
The venue was packed. There must have been over two-hundred attendees
including representatives from the state, regional and local governments, a vast
amount of local to global researchers, trans-national NGOS, and United Nations
organizations. The event, el ‘Foro Internacional de Glaciares y Ecosystemas de
Montaña, or the ‘International Forum of Glaciers and Mountain Ecosystems’, in
English, was put on by Peru’s Ministry of the Environment and the National
Institute of Glacier and Mountain Ecosystem Research (INAIGEM), in the middle
of August 2016. During the forum’s opening remarks, I sat squeezed in-between
conservationists and research professionals, and watched the stage eagerly, as
servants of the State and Science presented to the elite and techno-scientific
audience. Admittedly, I was not attending the forum to engage the latest and most
cutting-edge research on the geo- and bio-physical complexities and phenomena
occurring in the Cordillera Blanca today. Rather, I was in attendance to observe
the constitutive process through which discourse on glaciers, mountain ecologies
and climate change in the specific context of the Cordillera Blanca was coming
into being. Moreover, I was paying attention to the ways in which highland
inhabitants themselves were included and represented in this discursive practice.
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Thus, when, the president of the highland community of Catác emerged on stage
in the opening hours of the forum, I noticed. His presence on stage was that of a
representative figure of his (and for some, all) peasant communities in the
highlands, and he addressed the massive audience speaking both in Quechua and
in Spanish. Yet, his words about environmental change and challenges in his
homelands were few, and not the main point. Rather, what happened next was.
The President of the community of Catác moved to be greeted by Engineer (Ing.)
Diego Fernández, the director of the organizing agency, INAGEM, and perhaps
the most venerated figure at the forum. The two men sat together on a theatrically
lit stage under grids and spotlights that drew everyone’s attention center-stage
where the men signed a contractual agreement to collaborate and open
community lands for scientific investigation. This performance of “freely” given
consent and consensus ended in celebratory, and perhaps obligatory, clapping.
With this, the symbolic gesture of inclusion and democratic principles of
consensus established, the proceedings of the scientific-statist assemblage
commenced on liberalism’s moral high-ground.
(Fieldnotes, August 10, 2016)

Although the International Forum was not a formal decision-making space, participants
exercised considerable influence over local to global agents who do possess decision-making
power over inhabitants of the Cordillera Blanca, human and non-human, life and non-life. I have
argued elsewhere that climate change adaptation forums (such as this one), though often
understood as a-political and neutral information sharing spaces, are rather highly politicized

37

discursive practices that establish the doxa and dogma of the emergent social adaptation field, and
equip certain actors with various amounts of social and political capital and knowledge/power
(Haverkamp, 2017; Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2014). These political relations –
constituted between institutions, socio-economic processes, forms of knowledge, technological
factors, etc. – define the conditions under which some objects, concepts, theories, and strategies
are legitimized and can be incorporated into the political discourse for what is at stake – while
other ways of thinking and doing are dismissed. In the words of Escobar, these relational
entanglements “establish a discursive practice that sets the rules of the game: who can speak, from
what point of view, with what authority, and according to what criteria of expertise; it sets the rules
that must be followed for this or that problem, theory, or object to emerge and be named, analyzed,
and eventually transformed into a policy or plan” (Escobar, 1995:40-41). Thus, environmental
conventions and forums for networking and knowledge sharing are anything but a-political, they
are events of structuring structures in which the political games will soon commence.

This chapter is an ethnographic account of the production of climate subjects through the
politics of representation at the international forum. I offer vignettes from the International Forum
that I attended during fieldwork in August 2016 to illustrate the eventfulness of the climate change,
conservation, and adaptation nexus in the highlands. These windows into a glocalized scene in the
Peruvian highlands illuminate the discursive practices and performed acts through which climate
change and its concomitant adaptation responses are figured and governed. From my situated view
as a critical Mestiza academic, I pay particular attention to the mechanisms through which powerrelations are produced and reproduced and try to understand a multiplicity of co-produced
subjectivities including, the campesinos, the NGOs, the State apparatus and the Scientific
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community as they are all entangled in the process of becoming or making climate resilient
communities. In the end, I argue that through local people’s own participation at the International
Forum and through different representations of the local, the emergent climate change adaptation
discourse remains rooted in logics of modernization and constitutes yet another capitalist-colonial
social project for the “improvement” of society.

Performing State, Performing Subject
In the last chapter I tried to illustrate the radical reconfiguration of the Quilcayhuanca
landscape at the hands of capitalist-climate change, the localized effects, and the assemblage of
geo-political actors who are all now noticing. This chapter opens at a moment in August 2016,
when the diverse set of trans-local actors descended upon the high mountain city of Huaraz,
bringing a global discourse about climate change, glaciers, and mountain ecologies right to
Quilcayhunaca’s backyard. Although the history of trans-local territorial assemblages in the
highlands is nothing new (Carey, 2010; Mayer, 2009; and Rassmusen, 2017), the scene depicted
in the vignette above captures an important symbolic moment – the performative act of waging a
new social contract between the President of Catác and Ing. Diego Fernández of the National
Institute of Glacier and Mountain Ecosystem Research (INAIGEM). On the one hand, this
performance may be understood as a proper moral response to climate change by a reflexive
modernity whose global-local encounters are (re)oriented in awareness of the colonial history and
the neoliberal extractivistism in the highlands.11 Reflexively learning from past social harms from

11

For “reflexive modernity’ see Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994) and for reflexive modernization
within the context of climate change see Beck (2010)

39

such projects, a reflexive modernity will at least, in theory, seek new “ethical” engagements with
highland campesinos.

Yet, on the other hand, this act can be understood critically, when drawing upon Judith
Butler’s theory of performativity – through which the performance of the social contract is located
in its historical and cultural milieu and illuminated as a state-making practice. Beginning with the
point of departure that, ‘the State’ is “a discursively produced structural/structuring effect that
relies on constant acts of performativity to call it into being” (Dunn, 2010:80), then this
performance can be interpreted as a structuring event that produces and reproduces the State and
its subjects (Dunn, 2010). As Dunn puts it, “social performances underscore the point that there is
‘no such thing as the state,’ (my emphasis added) but processes that call it (temporally, impartially
and conflictually) into being” (Dunn, 2010: 88).12 Thus, the process of state-making relies on
constant performativity. Military parades, tax collections, custom checks, national conferences,
and social contracts (as with the case here), are just a few examples of the daily performances that
help to reify the ‘state’. In this way, this public performance of the social contract between the
national government of Peru and the community of Catác appears to be both a governing
technology of “reflexive modernity”, as well as a performative act for the expansion of the reach
of the State into indigenous lands.

The resurgence of the social contract at the International Forum raises intriguing questions
regarding issues of how to govern emergent responses to environmental changes, including climate
change, in postcolonial ecologies: or, to frame it slightly differently; how capitalist-climatic

12

See classic argument in Doty (2003)
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change is reconfiguring the political landscape in the highlands. O’Brien, Hayward, and Berkes
(2009) posit that climate change is creating new challenges for both states and citizens, inevitably
forcing a rethinking of existing and evolving social contracts. Indeed, new ways of relating
between the State and the peasantry in the Cordillera Blanca are likely a pre-requisite if formal
adaptation responses, predicated upon scientific investigations and technological interventions, are
to flourish in the contested mountain territories. Contemporary conversations of territorial disputes
between highland peasants and the State have been an ongoing struggle since Velasco’s Agrarian
Reform, a project for the emancipation of serfs from feudal haciendas and the promotion of selfdetermination, a process beginning in 1969. In the Late Liberalism’s disapproval of exercises of
force and sovereign power, the trans-national climate change apparatus, must use other tactics for
the extraction of knowledge, resources, and territory, and the right to rule in the highlands.

In this way, the appearance of the social contract at this conjuncture is not surprising as it
has long served as a productive, “non-violent” tool for projects of state-craft and the accumulation
of State power. Thinking on social contracts has undergone a resurgence in academic literature,
specifically within the domain of climate change adaptation (Castree, 2016; Pelling, 2011;
O’Brien, Hayward and Berkes, 2009).13 The theory of social contracts predates and implicitly
informs modern democracy. It is one of the most influential political-relational tools and is
attributed to political philosophers from Aristotle to Hobbes (1998), Rousseau (1973), Locke
(1965), Kant (1959), and Rawls (1971). These thinkers were working within the premise of social
contracts, so as to identify principles that might underpin legitimate government. While there is no

13

see Castree, N. (2016). Geography and the new social contract for global change research.
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers; and, Pelling, M. (2011) Climate Change
Adaptation: From Resilience to Transformation
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universal notion of legitimate government, or what is moral and just for that matter, there is wide
agreement among these thinkers that “legitimate, collective governance arrangements should be
informed by the consent of the people” (O’Brien, et al. 2009:2). This ‘consent’ is thought to be
achieved through a real or ideal agreement, or compact, between a civil community and the state
and serves to define the rights and responsibilities of these groups to each other (O’Brien et al.,
2009:2).14

While the social contract may serve different functions, what is of interest to me here is the
way that it legitimizes and extends governing authority. In theory, a social contract proposes
mutual benefits. We can understand the performance of consensus and the contract made at the
International Forum as a benefit to the community, if and when, research conducted is community
engaged, goes back to the community, and is used with (as opposed to on) the community to
improve their climate change challenges. Given the empirical evidence that State adaptation efforts
are overwhelmingly operationalized through top-down and technoscientific approaches in recent
adaptation work (Anguelovski et al., 2016), this leaves little hope for community engaged and
moreover, community-led, future interventions as an outcome of this social contract. Instead, it is
not too large a leap to wonder if this new climate change compact made with Communtiy Catác,
even when made “reflexively”, will still continue to enact a coloniality of power that operates
though extractivist and exclusionary tactics. Studies of contractual consent for climate change
action have already critiqued such engagements on these grounds (Brown, 2013), calling for
critical attention to the making of new social contracts in the wake of Anthropocene times.

14

See list of reference for this in O’Brien et al. 2009:2
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However, it would be short-sighted to imply that there is no benefit to the community of
Catác, and thus no ethical basis for the social contract in governing climate change. Unlike
Quilcayhuanca, Catác is a popular tourist destination site that has received significant capital
investment from the State and the tourism sector, helping to maintain material conditions – the
valley roads, artisan shops, public bathrooms and horse trails, among other things. In a way, one
might argue that community Catác is privileged as the only community to take the stage at the
International Forum out of the more than 400 campesino communities of the Cordillera Blanca.15
Their invitation alone may be understood as an achievement of their acquired ecological
legitimacy, recognition, and social capital.16 However, this is also precisely what is at stake in the
political performance of the social contract (and more broadly, ecological democracy). That is,
what choice does a climate vulnerable agrarian community have to reject the social contract and
deny government-led scientific investigations within the community ecology? A dignified decline
alone may serve to undermine the existing privileged relationship that Catác has with various State
institutions.

It would be an act of academic hubris for me to speak any further to the motivations of
community Catác in signing the social contract. Rather, my point here is that, while the benefits
of the social contract to Catác are predicated on if-then statements and hopeful speculation, the

15

Entering into the new social contact is to make a symbolic break with the ontology of social
abandonment that is all too palpable in the highlands (See Rassmussen, 2015), and ushers in a
new ontological condition of vulnerability. Catác’s privileged situatedness within the international
tourism regime is a likely reason they were was asked to perform at the forum in the first place,
instead of the communities of constant resistance and abandonment, such as the sectors
belonging to Q. Quilcayhuanca.
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benefits to the State are immediate and concrete. This contract creates a legitimate pathway for
scientific investigations of the State to be conducted on contested territory within the Cordillera
Blanca. Through a form of consensus, the Peruvian State has obtained community consent for
projects of measuring, monitoring, and control, within indigenous homelands.

While this is not a display of absolute authority, it is a governing tactic that has insured the
State’s access to knowable bodies of both life and non-life forms in indigenous peasant ecologies,
which can eventually be translated into elements of design (policy, programs, projects) for the
making of disciplined, productive, and now, resilient human and other-than-human bodies. The
global project of resilience is the most recent imperative in the ongoing neoliberal ‘drama of
finitude’, and as performed, I argue that this moment of democratic consensus is an act of statemaking and an extension of the State’s power through the employment of a tool (the social
contract) notable for its historic role in nation building and State expansion (Mills, 1997).17,18

A Familiar Song and Dance: The Politics of Representation
Shortly following the performance of the social contract, campesinos took to the stage for
the last time during the four-day event. This time not just one campesino, but an ensemble of both
men and women, dressed in their “traditional” highland attire, performed for the more “modern”

17

Borrowing from Povinelli in her book Economies of Abandonment (2011), the “Drama of
Finitude” is used as a metaphor for contemporary governance under the auspice of finite planetary
resources.
18
Given the history of power imbalance, many have argued against the social contract
(Nussbaum 2006) highlighting their patriarchal, racial, and imperializing logics and their effects of
exclusion and domination (Pateman and Mills, 2007). Also, for more about how the environment
is usually exploited by social contracts that have been forged for development, progress and
economic growth missions, see O’Brien, et al. 2009.
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and professionalized audience. The men, in their dark pants and button-up shirts, played a variety
of musical instruments, while the women, with their long black braids and skirts in an array of
vibrant colors, sang and danced. As I watched the traditional Andean performance, I felt that the
importance of this moment of ‘entertainment’ should not be overlooked. If the quote by Johannes
Fabian in the beginning of this chapter is to be taken seriously, and “culture, is that which is
performed,” then the assemblage of actors in the forum at this moment were shaping and defining
the culture of the capitalist-climatic devastation in the highlands just as much as the prior
performance of the social contract. What stands out about this performance, however, is the
juxtaposition between the performance of the “traditional” campesino – a figure that matches the
West’s imaginary of the highland peasantry as almost mythical and rooted in the past – and the
prior performance, that of a “rational” and almost modern peasant operating on the grounds of
national policy.

These two figurings of peasant identity and self-representation within the trans-local
epistemic community are perhaps best understood in terms of what postcolonial theorist and
historian, Dipesh Chakrabarty calls the ‘double bind’. For Chakrabarty, “There is this double bind
through which the subject of “Indian” history articulates itself. On the one hand, it is both the
subject and the object of modernity because it stands for an assumed unity called the “Indian
people” that is always split into two – a modernizing elite and a yet-to-be modernized peasantry”
(Chakrabarty, 1992:18). According to Chakrabarty, the result of the condition of the double bind
in the metanarrative of modernization is the invention of “Indians”, whose only mode of selfrepresentation is “mimetic”, or the mimicry of a certain “modern” confined to the logics of the
West.
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The struggle for the representation of indigeneity within modern politics has also been
discussed by Darren Ranco and colleagues (2011), who refer to the uncomfortable situatedness as
the cultural dilemma that indigenous peoples face when operating within the political structures
of the Nation-State. One the one hand, indigenous communities are forced to represent themselves
within the current structures in a way that is recognizable to non-Indians and the State. In the case
presented here, the indigenous figure emerged as an entrepreneurial campesino representative who
is literate enough to engage in the ways of the lettered world and forge a new social contract. As
Ranco and others aptly acknowledge, in order to have tribal political authority recognized within
the federal system, it behooves tribes (and peasant communities) to present themselves and their
programs in the terms of the modern state. Yet, on the other hand, tribes must maintain and prove
their distinct culture, or risk challenges to their authority to self-govern. The elusiveness of the
right to self-govern is precariously built upon the logic of the governance of the prior (Povinelli,
2011) – a figuring of tense that locates Indigenous governance as a way of the past, not the present
and surely not the future. Through this rationality, land claims are legitimized according to one’s
ancestral ties to territory and place. Performing and proving one’s cultural authenticity –
“performing culture”, in a way that garners political and ecological legitimacy – becomes a matter
of life and death, while leaving behind ones’ indigeneity simply opens space for hegemonic
advances in the ongoing process of dispossession in the highlands.19
Representations of the ‘Other’ and the Politics of Visibility

19

Here I am speaking of the ‘politics of recognition’, see Darren Ranco, The Ecological Indian
and the Politics of Representation. “For the Penobscot Indian Nation, as for many other Indian
nations, ecological legitimacy and recognition are matters of life and death” (2007, p.43).
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I have argued thus far that the role of highland peasants in the information sharing space
was performative, and performative in an otherwise capitalist-colonial performance. Let me be
clear, campesinos were not in attendance at the forum. They did not sit among the elite, scientific,
and bureaucratic audience members. They did not go on stage to present their knowledge claims
related to the place-based phenomenon, or even their immediate or future needs at the onset of
capitalist-climatic destruction, nor did I ever encounter them in the small group meetings or
workshops. Overall, after the few words spoken by the President of Catác within the first hours of
the International Forum, highland peasants did not speak again. Yet, while they were not heard
from, they were indeed seen.

Aside from the performance and marketing of “tradition” described prior, indigeneity and
a highland way of life was made visible through scholarly representations. Both in the beginning
and the end of the forum, the audience was treated to listening to words spoken in Quechua, the
mother tongue of Andean people. First by the President of Catác, and in the end by a notable
American Anthropologist of Peruvian culture. Somehow, the bookending of the forum with
Quechua signaled both credibility and legitimacy in the forum’s intentions and actions, in which
the Western-oriented practitioners (including Peruvian national elites) could claim local
engagement. The ‘local’ refrain was made again, and again. For instance, as another American
scholar, this time a Geographer, referred to the highland inhabitants of his fieldsite as “family”,
and projected images of them with himself, and his American wife and kids to the audience.
Somehow, saying a few words in Quechua, or showing images of oneself in a friendly embrace
with the natives, seemed to legitimize one’s knowledge claims of the Andean highland ecology.
These moments have prompted me to think otherwise about my own scholarly acts of

47

representation, and begs the question, is Western science so extractive that we must make such
compensating performances?

With the public consent of the President of Catác, forum participants could rest easier as
they presented distant highland ecologies through global knowledges of satellite images, models,
graphs, charts, and environmental risk assessments. It was as if Catác’s new contractual agreement
with INAIGEM somehow legitimized research to be conducted, not only on Catác’s community
lands, but across all community homelands with total disregard to time (before or after the
contractual agreement), and granted permission for campesinos themselves to become central
subjects and objects of the forum discussions. Through the politics of representation, indigenous
peasants were made visible throughout the International Forum, while simultaneously being
denied of any real voice or agency. This is juxtaposed to the high fluidity and social mobility that
state officials, engineers, international actors, NGOs, and Scientific researchers from around the
world demonstrated within the formative and political space that constituted the International
Glacier and Mountain Ecology Forum.

Through the language of statistics and expert wisdom, knowledge claims of the remote
Andean highlands, a place that many had only observed from inside their office spaces in Western
academies, were given standing and worked to create an ontology of highland vulnerability. This
approach to the art of world-making, similar to the endeavors of armchair anthropology, is
predicated upon an exercise of knowledge/power. Here, the accumulation of knowledge/power
requires bringing people into discourse, or similarly to consign them to a field of vision that
exercises the ‘God trick’ of seeing everything from nowhere (Escobar, 1994: 156). Donna
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Haraway’s concept of the ‘God trick’ has been used to understand the hegemony of Scientific
objectivity and this work is insightful when thinking about governance from above in the time of
climate change. Haraway states:

The eyes have been used to signify a perverse capacity – honed to perfection in the
history of science tied to militarism, capitalism, colonialism, and male supremacy
– to distance the knowing subject from everybody and everything in the interest of
unfettered power…The visualization technologies are without apparent limit …
Vision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all seems not just
mythically about the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to put the
myth in ordinary practice. (Haraway, 1988:581)

Development and progressivist projects of late liberalism have commonly moved forward
through an extractivist and oppressive exercise of knowledge/power via the ‘development gaze’
over observable, measurable, and knowable subjects. According to Escobar, the development
discourse maps people into certain coordinates of control. The aim, he explains, “is not simply to
discipline individuals but to transform the conditions under which they live into a productive,
normalized social environment: in short, to create modernity” (Escobar 1994: 156). In the context
of the Anthropocene, the developmentalist aim may still be to create “modernity”, but a specific,
resilient, modernity that can accommodate the ongoing capitalist-climatic disorder while
maintaining certain structures and functions of modern society.
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Those who Speak, Control the Discourse
The International Forum of Glaciers and Mountain Ecosystems, held in the summer of
2016, was far from the first “inclusive-exclusive” moment for campesinos in the spectacle of
modern politics. Taking a long view of power in Peru, I find that local peoples’ exclusion from the
forum reflects a systemic privileging of a certain type of knowledge, and the continuation of a
world-systems hegemony. Highland campesinos were not actually included as participants at the
International Forum because the forum was not about knowledges, and was especially not about
local ways of knowing, or ‘epistemologies of the South’ (de Sousa Santos, 2016). Rather, the
forum provided a space for the exchange of a certain kind of knowledge that stems from a EuroAmerican way of thinking about the world. The International Forum was a place for elite and
expert scientific wisdoms to influence, and to be influenced by, one another, as well as political
interests. According to de la Cadena, “how far local knowledge makes it […] depends on its
‘theoretical strength’, and this is problematic if by that we mean a knowledge process that extracts
general ideas out of specific meanings, and ignores the specificity in so doing” (2005:13).

The notable absence of highland peasants in the discursive knowledge exchange practice
was a clear signal that subaltern, or alternatively modern ways of knowing, being and doing are
not taken seriously within this (pre-)epistemic community. Sociologist Aníbal Quijano (2000)
describes this phenomena as the ‘coloniality of power,’ “a historical geo-political condition that
de-legitimizes nonwestern forms of making sense of the world, temporalizes them as pre-modern,
and thus sets them up for non-co-eval (cf. Fabian, 1983) representations” (de la Cadena, 2005: 14).
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Yet, if campesinos exist only as representational renderings in these discursive
entanglements, or are only able to be understood through ‘mimetic’ self-representations, then to
borrow from Spivak, Can the subaltern speak? According to Chakrabarty, “the antihistorical,
antimodern subject, therefore, cannot speak itself as “theory” within the knowledge procedures of
the university” or, within modern politics of knowing and designing worlds (1992:17). “Much
like Spivaks’ subaltern […], this subject can only be spoken for and spoken of by the transition
narrative that will always ultimately privilege the modern” (Ibid). Although the forum was held in
a center of Peruvian mountain culture, the onto-epistemic network through which a discourse on
climate change, conservation, and Anthropocene solutions in the Cordillera Blanca is constructed
and de-constructed is undoubtedly determined by a Western Science knowledge system in
partnership with the trans-state apparatus. Local peasant knowledges were not engaged, with few
exceptions of White professional men translating traditional agrarian practices of crop diversity or
local cosmology into a general theory that instills hope for fixing environmental issues caused by
modernity itself.

This is alarming when one is inclined to think that, “To speak, above all, is to possess the
power to speak”, and the “man of power” is the person who both speaks and is the sole source of
legitimate speech”. Clastre distinguishes between “masters,” those who speak, and “subjects,”
those who remain silent (Clastre, 1987:151, cited in de la Cadena, 2015: 45). This is an important
distinct reality for Clastre and other scholars of subaltern studies and calls into sharp relief the
uneven geography of power upon which climate change adaption theory and practice is emerging.

Representations of Distinction
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While the politics of representation are clearly a discursive practice, this political game is
also an economic activity. Like political-social projects for “progress” or “security”, the social
project of resilience cannot be disentangled from a global capitalist economy. In this way, I suggest
that The International Glacier and Mountain Ecosystem Form was a moment for the State of Peru
to not only better understand the subjects and objects of climate risk, but it was also a space for
flows of various forms of capital, including and not least of which, was symbolic capital.

Symbolic capital is a “special mark of distinction” that attaches to some place or name, and
has a significant drawing power upon flows of capital (Harvey, 2009:103). Within the discursive
practice of climate change and resilience at the International Forum, when symbolic capital was
leveraged it attached to representations of a vulnerable highland indigenous peoples and ecology:
the ‘campesina,’ the ‘glaciers,’ and the ‘Andes mountains’. These symbols are reflected, not only
in the name of the Forum itself, but across the promotional materials for the event, through the
performances of “traditional” song and dance, and the displays of Quechua speech, the mother
tongue of the highlands. As Harvey states, “…collective symbolic capital […] depends upon
values of authenticity, uniqueness and particular non-replicable qualities” (2002:104-105). Such
marks of local distinction were wielded not by the indigenous inhabitants of the highlands
themselves – though they may be the performers of culture – but rather Andean distinction was
wielded by the traditional guardians of symbolic and cultural capital – the cultural museums, the
universities, the class benefactors (tourism entrepreneurs), and the state apparatus. For me, and
likely for other scholars of critical thought, this raises issues of local disempowerment,
appropriation, and the commodification of local culture.
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Figure 2.1. Indigenous Representation at the International Forum for Glaciers and
Mountain Ecosystem Services. This image was the symbol of the International Forum of Glaciers
and Mountain Ecosystems occurring in Huaraz, Peru, August 10-13, 2016.

The image of a campesina woman with a baby in conventional Andean style took the cover
of folders, pamphlets, presentations, and internet advertisements as the dominant symbol of the
forum (Figure 2.1). In the background figured the mountain, the glacier, and the Andean condor.
Aside from a critical interpretation of the gendered landscape – the female body positioned innature, a-part of, and in rhythm with it – these iconic symbols of Andean cosmology feel a sense
of belonging within indigenous world-making. However, these symbols somehow feel
appropriated and commodified when extracted and used by the trans-local epistemic community
that has long oppressed and excluded indigenous ways of thinking, being and doing.
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According to Harvey, “the struggle to accumulate marks of distinction and collective
symbolic capital in a highly competitive world is on” (2009: 105). The resilience enterprise is
predicated upon resilience finance, an emerging market in which communities and socioecological systems compete for the title of “the most vulnerable” and thus, the most deserving of
State, international and non-governmental climate investments. The forum thus enabled a space
for the making and marketing of highland vulnerability, a form of capital that could be exchanged
for climate aid and foreign investment. In a world of increasing capitalist-climatic devastation and
where too many are the most vulnerable (e.g. the global poor, minorities, and the so-called “Third
World”), accumulation of symbolic and cultural capital by non-local arbiters becomes a political
strategy for Anthropocene survival and wealth generation by state, NGO and private firms.

The market for resilience investment appears to be predicated upon the commodification
of culture, where culture is commodified as a brand of distinct “heritage”, a marketing strategy
employed at the International Forum which produced a nostalgic affect through multiple sensory
experiences of “traditional” indigenous culture. This is not a new form of economic relations that
has only just arrived with global environmental change. Rather, ethnographic accounts of eco- and
cultural-tourism highlight similar processes of cultural commodification taking place outside of
the climate change context. During her work with Ghorka laborers working on Darjeeling tea
plantations, Sarah Besky critically argues in the case of “The Darjeeling Distinction”, that “in order
to sell tea, [plantation laborers] had to sell more than just tea – they had to sell a place, a taste, and
an experience” (2013:106). Plantation workers then not only produce tea, they perform culture for
the “heritage” tourists who come the long way to the high mountain tea estates seeking an
experience of “life in another time” (Ibid). Jim Igoe explains a similar phenomenon that he calls
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“Disneyfication”, or the commodification of a romanticized indigeneity to sell place in the tourism
markets (2004:15). Here, the point I am making is that representation of indigeneity at the forum
was not only a discursive practice of environmental control, but it also worked for capitalist aims
of wealth accumulation. Marks of distinction were commodified and sold to watching climate
financiers in this early stage of an emerging climate resilient market in the highlands.

Roots of Exclusion and Extractivism in Peru
The International Forum of Glaciers and Mountain Ecosystems held in the summer of 2016
was not the first “inclusive-exclusive” and extractivist moment for Peruvian Indinos in the
spectacle of modern politics. The important and critical work of anthropologist and Peruvian
native, Marisol de la Cadena, articulates a genealogy of social exclusion in Peru through three
temporal periods. She illuminates how the modern Peruvian academy was one of the crucial sites
of racial struggle that resulted in the social construction of Peruvian identities of race (1998).
“Conceptually, the struggle entailed a dispute over whether race was to be defined by external
appearances (mainly phenotype), or through such “internal” qualities as morality, intelligence and
education” (Ibid: 143). The debate, still continuous, began in the early 1900s and positions Limeño
(Lima) intellectuals against their provincial, and mainly Serrano (highland) counterparts.
Understanding this ongoing history is essential for making sense of the contemporary moment in
which multiple subjectivities are becoming, those of the re-configured State apparatus and its
subjects.

To paraphrase the thinking of de la Cadena (1998), first period racism in Peru (1910-1930)
was marked by the unified employment of ‘race’ as a central analytic category by both
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conservative and progressive parties. Yet, there parties emphatically rejected terminal biological
determinism, and instead coined a notion of race in which moral aspects prevailed. In the second
period (1930-1960), ‘race’ as a valid scientific concept was disregarded wholesale by both official
and oppositional intelligentsia (composed largely of educated Serrano intellectuals and
Indigenistas). The official discourse of difference shifted to the ambiguous category of ‘culture,’
while the oppositional intelligentsia chose a Marxist ‘class’ analysis – contributing to and drawing
largely from dependency theorists – as a tool from which to diagnose the country’s problems and
propose solutions. According to de la Cadena, class rhetoric reached its peak in the third period
(1960-1980), when leftist opposition dismissed both ‘race’ and ‘culture’ as ‘false consciousness,’
and the State categorized its population according to class lines (Ibid; 144). The implicit and central
element of this still ongoing discussion of race is the formation of the racial identity of the
Serranos, who the Limeños (Peruvian ‘White’ people) deemed inferior due to their highland
origins and brown skin color.

This continuous struggle to articulate social difference along race, culture, and class lines,
has shown itself, not as a neutral act, but rather as the struggle of naming and making the “Other”.
One outcome of the first period struggle was the silencing of the Serrano intellectuals, and the
undoing of their social position as ‘gente decente,’ or decent folks. Second wave outcomes, as race
was progressively a null and void category, emerged from social programs to alleviate conditions
of lacking education and poverty. In this second period, “Subscribing to positivism, dominant and
subordinate Peruvian academics assigned to scientific education an almighty power capable of
transforming anything, especially race” (de la Cadena, 2005:145). The sentiment of fixing the
conditions of the non-White Serranos was put so poignantly then by the Dean of the Faculty of
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Letters at San Marcos University, and leading positivist philosopher, Javier Prado, who
proclaimed: “Thanks to education, the contemporary man can transform his physical milieu and
even his race” (see R. Graham 1990 in de la Cadena 2005:145-6). As the recipients of positivistStatist educational programming, the intellectual mountain dwellers, or educated Serranos, stood
in defense of their “indigenous race” by encouraging literacy campaigns and the improvement of
Indian’s labour conditions “without however ‘altering’ the indigenous ‘soul’, considered the
deepest element of culture” (de la Cadena, 1998:148). Ironically however, their own social
movement, called Indigenism – an academic doctrine that made Serrano academics equal to
Limeños by stressing their intellectual achievements – also produced uneven outcomes, that
elevated an elite Serrano intellectual, whose own “unmarking” of inferiority was crucially
predicated upon a rejection of the mestizaje (mestizo) and an allegiance to the underpinning notion
that races have their proper place. Here, one’s own pathway to equality depended upon the
“whitening” of their mind and culture and their active engagement in the erasure of inferior
epistemologies and ontologies, thereby creating the inferior ‘Other’. One’s own rite of passage
through this process may earn social recognition or favor among intellectual elites, yet through
this process of identity construction, one is in the end, “cholo” – a kind of stigmatized identity that
refers to “ex-Indians, literate individual, who ha[ve] shed former superstition and ignorance” – the
indigenous intellectual (de la Cadena, 2015: 61).

The legacy of these practices eventually yielded a notion of the ‘intellectual’ whose
superiority was unquestionable and legitimized by his/her higher education. And the procedure
eventually generated what Marisol de la Cadena deems ‘silent racism,’ namely the practice of
‘legitimate’ exclusions in late liberalism, based on qualities of education and intelligence, while
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overtly condemning biological determinism. Therefore, when thinking through the politics of
inclusion and exclusion and the configuration of the epistemic community at the International
Forum for Glaciers and Mountain Ecosystems, it is essential to take this genealogy of social
exclusion in Peru into account. While inclusion and exclusion within the pre-epistemic and
epistemic network for the social project of adaptation in the highlands is not (perhaps) constituted
on biological categories of race (phenotype), it is currently determined by the guiding principles
of ‘silent racism’ and reifies the invention of an “inferior people” – the “uneducated” peasantry,
who are simultaneously the new ‘climate vulnerable subjects’.

Essentializing Subject Categories: From “Race” to “Resilience”
The classic categories of race, culture, and class, that have long been used in the struggle to
govern difference, are currently being reconfigured and employed in the making of a novel
subjectivity, that of the resilient subject and system – inclusive of both of human and non-human,
life and non-life existents. Since the project of climate change adaptation (the discourse by which
this new subjectivity is invented) is not a local or national effort, but a trans-national project
articulated with the international development enterprise, it is useful to understand the function of
these social categories beyond the Peruvian experience. Looking to development studies, Western
scientific experts have repeatedly been deployed throughout the world to address issues of concern
for the modernist’s notion of progress and prosperity. As problems were continually identified
(i.e. dependency, poverty-cycles, etc.), client categories were brought into existence. Chandra
Mohanty (1991) states that the work of development proceeded by creating group “abnormalities,”
or deficits such as the: ‘underdeveloped,’ ‘poor,’ ‘uneducated,’ ‘landless peasant,’ etc. What
scholars of the “Third World” have found is that such material needs of lack and inadequacy, when
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articulated within a development rationality, became instruments of power and control in a practice
of governing from afar (Escobar, 1995:42). Returning to the importance of visibility, Escobar
reminds us, “that the apparatus (the dispositif) is an abstract machine that links statements and
visibilities, the visible and the expressible. Modernity introduced an objectifying regime of
visuality […] that as we will see, dictated the manner in which peasants, women and the
environment were apprehended” (1994:155). New client categories were brought into the field of
vision through a process of enframing that turned them into spectacles.

Arriving with a global awakening to climate change and its associated impacts, the concept of
‘vulnerability’ serves as the latest categorization marker ascribed to highland inhabitants. Yet, in
light of the history of modernity, one must question, what are the effect and affects of this new
client category and social identity? What does it mean to be made vulnerable? What privileges or
punishments accompany this population category? And, who benefits from this social
categorization?

Reo and colleagues (2017) find that Native American and Indigenous studies scholarship
has increasingly problematized the vulnerability narratives used to characterize Indigenous
peoples’ experiences with rapid environmental change.21 From within these perspectives,

List of scholarly contributions from Reo, et al. (2017): B. J. Colombi, “Salmon and the Adaptive
Capacity of Nimiipuu (Nez Perce) Culture to Cope with Change,” American Indian Quarterly 36,
no. 1 (2012): 75– 97; N. Ferris, The Archaeology of Native- Lived Colonialism: Challenging History
in the Great Lakes (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2009); R. White, The Middle Ground:
Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650– 1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991); E. F. Hall and T. Sanders, “Accountability and the Academy: Producing
Knowledge about the Human Dimensions of Climate Change,” Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute 21, no. 2 (2015): 438– 61; B. Haalboom and D. C. Natcher, “The Power
and Peril of ‘Vulnerability’: Approaching Community Labels with Caution in Climate Change
Research,” Arctic 65, no. 3 (2012): 319– 27.
21
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vulnerability narratives are problematic as they can function to: 1) obscure the actions, strategies,
resources, and knowledge that indigenous groups mobilize to navigate environmental change; 2)
portray Indigenous groups as passive or helpless, hiding the agency of very active Indigenous
groups; and 3) portray Indigenous nations as dependent on settler colonial nation-states and nonindigenous parties for relief from environmental problems, which could lead to State policies that
interfere with Indigenous nations’ aspirations of self-determination (2017:203).

The so-called “resilient subject” is closely linked with the vulnerability subject, as an
ontology of vulnerability proceeds the making of resilient bodies, be they human or non-human.
One of the most well-articulated and pointed critiques of the resilient subject comes from Brad
Evans and Julian Reid, who argue that that “the resilient subject is a subject which must
permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the world, its structure and condition of possibility”
(2013:83). As the actors of The Social Project of Adaptation have arrived in the highlands,
campesinos are resilient subjects in the making. They are increasingly entangled with resilience
making practices and performances, and a “resilience doctrine” that asserts that “life now is in a
continual state of adapting to dangers and radical landscape changes said to be beyond their
control” (Evans and Reid, 2013). Whether figured as the uneducated, poor, or vulnerable, highland
peasants have been under developmentalist global schemes for “fixing” their modern
“deficiencies” for nearly a century.
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In the End
The forum continued for four days and into the weekend with fieldtrips into
the contested, post-colonial landscape of Huascaran National Park and indigenous
ecologies. Over the course of the forum’s events, I oscillated between social worlds,
holding interviews with campesinos in Quilcayhuanca about environmental
changes, challenges and solutions, as well as positioned myself as a participant
observer at the highly professionalized International Forum. Situated between
these divergent onto-epistemological domains over the course of several days was
enough to awaken me to the ongoing processes of dispossession and emergent
modalities of capture by which the Capitalist-State Apparatus is performing against
(but paradoxically always for) local forms of difference.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SOCIAL PROJECT OF ADAPTATION
It had been a year and a half since my first visit to Quebrada Quilcayhuanca, when I found
myself back in the highlands and reacquainted with Hernando Llullia. Hernando was on his return
trip down the Quebrada with a single cow when I saw him across the broad, flat valley floor. “She’s
pregnant”, he informed me, and he was bringing her back to the village to ensure her nutrition and
a safe environment for the soon-to-be calf. Campesinos often speak of the condors that attack the
newborns and injured cows and it is customary to take extra care and caution with the new moms
and calves. How campesinos find their cows and know the timing of their pregnancy however,
always seems to confound the claims made by park officials of “absentee grazing” – that is the
abandonment and lack of pastoral care for the cattle in Quilcayhuanca.

Hernando and I had developed a friendship and ease of conversational exchange with one
another over the years, which made our first conversation in a long while seem very familiar and
easy. He knew what I was researching in his homeland, he knew why I was walking the
Quilcayhuanca valley. I did not have to explain it or give any professional introduction. But,
Hernando also knew me as a mother. He had gotten to know my children and partner years prior
– thus, he was quick to inquire not about my research, but about my family. This “mother” identity
shaped my experiences with the campesinos early on, and had a humanizing effect that allowed
me to be received in an alternative way from my identity as “researcher”. Tired from what must
have been a very early start to his day, Hernando did not stay in the open quebrada to talk long.
Instead, he invited me to meet with him the next day at his home to discuss the changes occurring
in Quilcayhuanca.
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Before the sun was up the next morning I set out, clambering up the steep dirt roads to the
village of Llupa, until I found the home of Hernando. His family greeted me while the little ones
went in search of their father. A meeting with a working campesino was never a guarantee, even
with a set appointment. Their daily activities are shaped more by the weather, the fields, and the
animals than by the same rules of time held in capitalist-modernity. Fortunately, however, a short
while later the kids returned with their father. He was carrying a heavy load of corn stalks from
the field on his back – a clear reminder of the work that my research was interrupting and his
generosity in sharing his time.

Hernando knew the highland landscape well, and he noticed the ways in which it was
changing. Hernando held several jobs, as the owner of a small shop (located adjacent to his house)
and a mountain guide in the peak tourism months, but he was primarily an agro-pastoralist who
used Quebrada Quilcayhuanca as a pastureland for his family’s cattle, just as his father and his
grandfather before him. With this inheritance, Hernando had a generational awareness of the
environmental changes in Quebrada Quilcayhuanca, he recalls being there as a child and the stories
of cattle rearing and the landscape told by his elders. Since those times however, he informed me,
much has changed in the highlands:

“Since we have been only here, [since] we live here, we have seen the mountains.
Many like Churup, Huamash, basically all of them…Shacsh, Cashan… all the
mountains were white like they are now 20, 25, years ago. Since the climate
changed in the past, that is why we have lost all the glaciers in the mountains. Now,
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it has snowed for the last two, three, days, you can see it at least, right? Almost the
same as before. When we talk among friends, we say “hopefully it will snow for at
least a month or two months like it has now. How would that be? It could go back
to being the way it used to be”, that is what we say, [that is how we feel]” (Hernando
Ucharima, 17 January 2018).22

As the Cordillera Blanca warms faster and greater than any other place in Peru, Hernando’s
reflections, such as this one, are palpable with nostalgia. He often recants how things once were,
and seems to long for this disappearing landscape. There is a sadness, perhaps even grief, that is
thought and felt among the campesinos of Quilcayhuanca, and I would suspect of the campesino
inhabitants of the Cordillera Blanca more broadly.

As I have come to understand it, Campesino topofilia (love of place, (cf. Tuan, 1972) is
manifest in more than a longing for disappearing glaciers, it is a deep grief for the loss of life and
the loss of a way of life (the relational dimensions) in the highlands, that have been articulated with
the glaciers’ existence for millennia. With the onset of capitalist-climatic impacts, the socialrelations between a more-than-human sociality are radically changing across the landscape. And,
perhaps no other human-group is noticing this devastation in the Andes as much as the campesinos
– as they are those who are most immediately and intimately integrated into the social rhythms of
the mountain ecology.

22

I decided to include “that is how we feel” because for Quechua-natives the distinction between
thinking and feeling is not so clear. This has been described as an inseparable thinking-feeling
consciousness by Latin American scholars.
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A Focus on Water Issues
Like the rest of the warming Cordillera Blanca, Quilcayhuanca shares the inevitable fate
of the total disappearance of its head-water glaciers as soon as mid-century. Recent studies
indicate that glacier coverage has declined by more than 25% since 1970, average temperature has
increased 0.35-0.39oC/decade between 1951-1999 and that these changes are accelerating in a
nonlinear fashion (Bradley et al. 2009; Mark, 2002; Mark and Seltzer 2005; Racoviteanu et al.
2008; Urrutia and Vuille 2009; Vuille et al. 2008b). The glaciers supplying Quilcayhuanca are
now declared past peak melt, resulting in an increasingly reduced water supply each sequential
year of sustained glacier-retreat (rain and snow accumulation held constant) until the glaciers are
no longer existent (Polk et al., 2017). Although glaciers are but one component to the hydrologic
budget in Cordillera Blanca, their contribution to streamflow is said to be critically important,
especially throughout the dry season when rainfall is reduced (May-September) (Mark et al.,
2005). While accounts of glacier meltwater contribution are uncertain in Quilcayhuanca, studies
conducted in nearby quebradas of the Cordillera Blanca estimate that glaciers contribute up to 58%
of the annual mean discharge (Mark et al., 2005). During an interview with engineer (Ing.) Julio
Cieza, a glaciologist with the Autoridad Nacional del Agua (ANA), the National Water Authority,
in 2016, indicated that local technical experts find this estimate conservative and suspect that the
glaciers have historically provided an even greater relative meltwater contribution to the
watershed. Thus, as glaciers disappear in the Cordillera Blanca, issues of future water shortages
loom large for water dependent communities and sectors downstream.

While the disappearing glaciers leave behind towering dark mountains – haunting
reminders of a landscape past – it is not the glaciers, so much, but water, that has become a central
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policy concern and the focus of climate resilient development in the Cordillera Blanca. The
situation of climate-induced water scarcity in Quilcayhuanca is attributed to a dynamic situation
driven not only by an anticipated lack of water resources from the disappearance of glaciers, but
also by the phenomenon of water degradation that is similarly linked to anthropogenic climatic
change – albeit more indirectly. Unlike the impending water scarcity issues in the vast majority of
other Cordillera Blanca valleys, water scarcity in Quilcayhuanca is predicated upon issues of both
water quantity and water quality. The less overt issue of water quality compounds the problem of
water scarcity – accelerating it in-terms of time and severity – in Quilcayhunaca and the broader
Quillcay sub-watershed. Highland challenges related to the rapidly degrading water quality,
renders adaptation actions taken now not so much anticipatory, but reactive as inhabitants of the
valley have been enduring this geo-climatic-hydro-social phenomenon for decades.
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Figure 3.1. Capitalist Climatic Ruination in Quilcayhuanca. Acidifying waters and toxic ecologies
result from an increased loading of heavy minerals as previously frozen bedrock thaws and erodes under
the conditions of a warming world and rapidly retreating alpine glaciers. Photo by Author: taken in the
upper part of the Quilcayhuanca valley known as “Cayesh”. August 2016.

Quilcayhuanca and its neighboring valley of Shallap not only suffer a future of water
shortages due to rapidly retreating glaciers, but they have already lost significant access to safe
water due to the erosion and weathering of heavy minerals from newly exposed glacier bedrock –
a phenomenon also linked to the rapid glacier retreat and thus, anthropogenic climate change. This
complex social-ecological issue has resulted in the contamination of mountain waters, specifically
the acidification of the Quillcay sub-watershed which empties into the city of Huaraz and feeds
into the massive Santa River which courses throughout Peru. Engineer Nuñez, the Director of
Research in Mountain Ecosystems at INAIGEM in Huaraz, explained the situation to me in 2018,
stating:
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“First, there has been glacial retreat, which is an indicator of climate change.
INAIGEM has seen, that at the national level, glaciers have retreated 53.6% […]
since the monitoring began, around 1962. The effect of glacier retreat, specifically
in Quilcayhuanca, can be seen in the presence of acid[ifying] waters because the
rocks covered [previously] by glaciers have been degraded and the melting water
running produces acid water. In Quillcay [referring to the sub-watershed], we have
16 monitoring points of water quality, 9 are of bad quality and 7 of good quality.
Finally, the water [among the bad quality points] has a pH of 3 or 4 and that is too
acidic, it is not suitable for consumption, nor for irrigation. That is the most obvious
effects of glacial retreat and consequently water quality.” (Ing. Nuñez, INAIGEM,
17 January 2018)

While these climate impacts have already resulted in the loss of campesinos’ access to
traditional drinking, irrigation, and fishing waters, they also have far reaching impacts on Peru’s
engagement in the global economy. Thus far, the water has proven too acidic for mountain mining
operations to utilize and may prove problematic for commercial agricultural operations
downstream.23 Additionally, the highly acidic water poses multiple issues for the large urban
centers who depend upon clean glacier runoff for a variety of services.

23

The canals were dug and poured in with concrete by the Antamina Mine but they were abandoned by the
mining company and have never been operated due to the pH quality of the Quilcayhuanca waters. See
interview with Augusto Lliuya (2016).
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Although these distant impacts are somewhat speculative and still unfolding with a great
amount of uncertainty, the place-based impacts on campesino’s subsistence way of life has already
been felt and has materialized, with concrete implications for highland life. Discussing the water
quality issues with HernandoUcharima illuminated not only the material implications, but the
semiotic ways in which campesinos have been, and continue to be affected by the issue of water
degradation. Hernando reflected:

“Quilcayhuanca was clean before. It wasn’t contaminated; you could drink it. My
grandparents, my parents used to drink it […]. But in these last years it has changed
a fair amount. Some ten years ago it became contaminated I believe, because there
use to be trout too, there were in that river that descended Quilcayhuanca. In the
past, I was still going to fish. Before. [But] Now there simply aren’t any left due to
the minerals, because a lot of iron- rust I believe in Quilcayhuanca… Yes, this has
killed everything.” (Hernando Ucharima, January 16, 2018).

Here, in Hernando’s introspective quote, he again articulates both the loss of life and the
loss of a way of life, that he attributes to the acidifying Quilcayhuanca waters. In this way, listening
to Hernando is like walking through Quilcayhunaca. His words, like the landscape, summon a past
– that has not really past – into the present, and brings into focus the ongoing forms of killing in
the highlands – specifically, the emergent capitalist-climatic killing that has already silently and
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gradually taken hold in the agrarian landscape.24 As capitalist-climatic changes advance and
glaciers retreat, not only “change”, but death itself ripples throughout Quilcayhuanca.

The Art of Governing Anthropocene Survival
The role of government in adaptation to climate change is ambiguous at best. How to
govern and who should govern the socio-ecological and bio-physical changes occurring within the
territory of the State is not well understood, neither in Peru, nor in so-called First World contexts.
Yet, in Peru (like elsewhere), state authorities, those who deem themselves responsible for the
changes in the state’s land, population, resources and wealth – the guardians – are busily
responding to climate change by making new legal instruments, government agencies and transnational political alliances, new state subjects (e.g., the vulnerable), and new capitalist markets for
the exploitation of new opportunities.

This restructuring of structures – legal, economic, social, cultural and ecological – in order
to meet political ends (e.g., adaptation, resilience, sustainability), is precisely what Foucault calls
the art of governing, or governmentality. For Foucault, “Government is defined as the right
disposition of things, in order to meet convenient ends” (Foucault, 1994:208). Yet, the possibility
of the arrangement of things (i.e. social relations, behavior, knowledge, economies, etc.)
constituted what Foucault called the ‘problem of government’. That is, how does the State
actualize “what authorities want to happen, in relation to what problems and objectives, and

24

By forms of killing, I am pointing towards the structural violence of a global political economy
(both a cultural and capitalist mode of imperialism) whose reach is now completely hidden under
the veil of climatic phenomenon.
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through what tactics” (Yeh, 2005). Working through the problem of government often entails a
discursive process in which government sets up a problem (representation) to be addressed and
offers certain strategies (interventions) for solving/handling the problem. This process constitutes
the social construction of a political rationality, that is never “pure”, “neutral”, or “objective”, but
which simply re-presents a governing reality and legitimizes the governing responses to it (ibid).

The theoretical strength of applying a governmentality lens to the study of climate
adaptation is two-fold. First, it allows for an exploration of the techniques of power and their
outcomes in the field of governing climate impacts. Specifically, it allows for an analysis of the
governing tactics of late liberal society that are leveraged to remediate vulnerability to climate
change and/or make resilient communities. This, the management of climate change, satisfies the
govern prefix of the analytical frame, but govern-mentality goes beyond the management and
‘arrangement of thing’ and explores government as a “discursive field in which exercising power
is ‘rationalized’” (Lemke, 2001:191). Thus, the mentality suffix draws into sharp relief the forms
of knowledge and knowledge production that legitimize certain exercises of power and governing
outcomes. “This occurs, among other things, by the delineation of concepts, the specification of
objects and borders, the provision of arguments and justifications, etc.” (Lemke, 2001:191). The
art of government (governmentality) also includes, the making of “modern” or “rational” subjects
who in theory help to create and bring into being the modern (i.e. resilient) state. Michael Goldman
refers to the relations between the governing and the governed (2001:501) as “productive relations
of government” in which the co-production of regimes reclassify, redesign and reorganize
territorial rights and discourses of environmental truth.
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Yet, Goldman and my own interpretations of the governmentality frame differ from other
popular applications by economic geographers (Harvey 1996; Smith 1990), who position the
governmentality processes as a fait accomplis – an end that is accomplished without those affected
by it being able to resist or reverse it. Instead, I argue that the extent to which the governing
rationality – be it liberalism, neoliberalism, colonialism, or any other –ism – is adopted by and
enacted by the subjects of government, is not and cannot be assumed to be the end result of
governmentality. Instead of edging on what critics of critical thought call “discursive
determination” (Moore, 2000:658), I employ governmentality as indeterminate (this does not mean
“failed” or “incomplete” governmentality). Like other discursive practices, the governing
rationality inherent and fundamental to governmentality is co-produced. As Lowe (1991) asserts,
“discursive formations are never singular”. The terms of the discourse can be obliged, resisted or
subverted, and this does not deny that the governing rationality, narrative or discourse does not
matter and materialize in concrete ways. Rather, it is precisely how it matters. Like Goldman, my
application of governmentality does not determine a disciplined public but pays attention to the
“heated productive relations out of which new political, economic, and scientific rationalities are
borne, and become institutionalized, resisted, and everything in-between” (1999:501). In this way,
I find the application of governmentality helpful to understanding the process of “productive
government” from which new hegemonic tactics and discourses emerge and are enacted.

For Foucault, the ‘art of government’, “is essentially concerned with how to introduce
economy – that is to say, the correct way of managing individuals, goods and wealth”
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(Foucault:1994: 207).25,26 As climate change is considered a redistribution of goods and services,
wealth, and populations (Marino and Ribot, 2012), governmentality allows for insights into how
such socio-environmental change within and across state territories will be managed (governed).
Studies of environmental governance have illuminated the trajectory of governance approaches
from coercive, control and command; to decentralized; and still, to more recent approaches of
collaborative and hybrid governance (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). Yet, despite the mode of
governance, what Foucault called the ‘problem of government’ persists, and outcomes of
ecological imperialism continue to endure. This has prompted some scholars to suggest the need
for greater understanding of how “green neoliberal projects” find a common modus operandi that
brings together neocolonial conservationist ideas of enclosure and preservation and neoliberal
notions of market value, optimal resource allocation, and devolution of authority/responsibility
(Goldman, 2001: 501).

As I explored in Chapter 1, the historical articulation of various global powers and markets
in the Cordillera Blanca has led to a vexed, plural, and contested sense of sovereignty in
Quilcayhuanca – constituting historical and contemporary power asymmetries and territorial
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As Foucault argued, “the market was not a natural social phenomenon at all; and what is
incumbent on the state is to conduct a policy towards society such that it is possible for a market
to exist and function” (Foucault, 1991:41). Drawing on Rousseau, Foucault states that, “to govern
a state will mean, therefore, to apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire
state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and
all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his[/her]
household and goods” (Foucault,1994: 207).
26

Tactics of measurement, monitoring and control over state subjects depend upon making visible
and knowable what is to be governed. Thus, while recent critiques of neoliberalism are largely
bifurcated into analyses of governmentality – focused on the exercise of power through discourse;
and those focused on the commodification of nature (see Castree, 2008) this chapter strives to
work across these two bodies of critical inquiry, illuminating the dialectic of a discursive-material
world-making project.
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disputes. Anthropologist Mattias Rasmussen (2015) points out that, historically, State “fixes” to
disputes over resources and nature in Peru have traditionally been sought through land invasions
and ventures of conquest. In what follows, I apply Foucault’s governmentality frame to illuminate
how this traditionally colonial mode of “fixing” is not only traditional, but contemporary, as Stateled adaptation projects continue a series of land grabs in Quilcayhuanca most recently through the
social project of adaptation. I argue that State-led adaptation planning in the highlands is an
exercise of both neo-colonial and neoliberal governmentality. It a way of governing climate change
that is arguably voluntary and inclusive, exercised by a diffuse set of international, “state”
government, local and corporate actors emboldened by scientific legitimacy, and yet, further
entrenches centralized State control of land and resources, capitalist expansion, and the
dispossession of campesinos from their ancestral territories and ways of life.

With this interpretive analysis of adaptive responses to climate change in the Peruvian
Andes, my generalizable argument is that emerging social projects of climate adaptation are not apolitical or neutral to the politics of place, but rather are deeply shaped by historical and ongoing
asymmetrical power relations and inequality. This is a classic political ecology argument, closely
aligned with the PE of conservation (Igoe and Brockington, 2007; West, 2006, Escobar, 1998),
disasters (Oliver-Smith, 2013; Bankoff and Frerks, 2013), sustainability and development
(Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2017; Rademacher, 2011); but it also contributes theoretically and
empirically to the emergent and much needed political ecology of climate change studies (Eriksen,
Nightingale and Eakin, 2016; Goldman et al., 2018, Taylor, 2014).
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The Social Project of Adaptation: An Apparatus of Capture
For Quilcayhuanca, there is no single climate action plan to address the variety of climate
change challenges emerging across the valley. Rather, there is an ad hoc effort of burgeoning
projects and programs from myriad institutions and agencies all targeted for the quebrada and for
the larger sub-watershed of Quillcay, of which it is a part. Despite the diversity of institutional and
programmatic foci (i.e. human health, environmental education, agriculture, inter alia), the
complicated issue of water scarcity, resulting from changing precipitation patterns and rapidly
retreating glaciers, has become a central issue of concern for campesinos, urbanites, state agencies,
development NGOs, and scientific researchers alike. However, while water scarcity is a shared
matter of concern across a variety of adaptation imaginaries, plans and visions of how to best
respond to the environmental changes vary considerably across the diversity of political actors.27

Among the variety of imagined adaptation pathways, a state-led proposal for an ecosystembased adaptation (EbA) project, supported by a payment for ecosystem-services (PES) scheme has
emerged as a powerful and highly influential option across the political landscape. The bofedales,
or assemblage of alpine wetland species that appear in a scattered and patch-worked formation
across the valley floor, have become a central figure in the State’s adaptation imaginary as a green
technology for the capture and redistribution of Quilcayhuanca waters. Bofedales, like other
wetland systems, have unique and specialized ecosystem functions of filtering and purifying
“degraded” waters, as well as regulating the flow of water. In the case of Quilcayhuanca, the
wetland species assemblage uptakes heavy mineral content from the composition of glacier
27

My use of imaginary is informed by Charles Taylors’ “Social imaginary” and is defined at length
in Chapter 4. For now, it can be understood as synonymous with the concept of an adaptation
‘plan’, ‘vision’, ‘project’ or ‘scheme’.
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meltwater and works as a storage tank that regulates the timing and release of water flow. In this
way, the bofedales are potentially capable of: (1) remediating the worsening water acidity problem,
and (2) alleviating issues of water shortages. Additionally, the bofedales, like wetland systems
worldwide, are increasingly recognized and desired for their ability to sequester vast amounts of
carbon, reducing the total amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, and thus mitigating global climate
change. This service has led to a world-wide prominence of wetlands as valuable and marketable
“carbon sinks” (Mitsch et al., 2013; Mitra et al., 2005).

Due to these ecological services that the wetlands provide, the highland bofedales are
understood as a lynchpin, an important green technology, in a certain kind of adaptation imaginary
– that is, the Capitalist-State Adaptation Imaginary. Here, the assemblage of wetland species in
Quilcayhuanca are of increasing capital value to a loosely aligned and fluid group of State,
regional, and local government agencies, as well as conservation and development NGOs, for their
ability to aid in the realization of the State’s desired policy ends – the making of resilient
communities.

The Capitalist-State adaptation imaginary is critical to understand both discursively and
materially, as it is a worlding vision (utopian, or otherwise) that has gained legitimacy and
credibility among a heterogeneous group of actors. To be clear, the “State”, as I have defined it
throughout this dissertation, is not a monolithic entity, but a diverse composition of uneven and,
at times, unlikely actors, agencies, and institutions, corporations, citizens, etc. that are loosely
aligned by their allegiance to the a certain kind of adaptation imaginary – one underpinned by
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rationalism (positivist Science), capitalism and globalism.28 Laura Ogden puts forward a similar
interpretation of the “State” in her landscape ethnography set in the Everglades. For Ogden, the
modern state apparatus works to “control resources and peoples through profoundly complex
architecture of administrative agencies, quasi-governmental organizations, and a variety of nested
and overlapping private-public partnerships” (2011: 33-34). The capitalist-state then is most
broadly conceptualized in this way as “an organizing, centralizing, hierarchizing machine that
transforms activity into work (labor), territories into ‘the land,’ and surplus value into capital.”
(Ogden, 2011:22). The assemblage of actors that constitute the ‘Capitalist-State’ in the Social
Project of Adaptation that is targeted of Quilcayhuanca and the sub-Quillcay watershed are of
course not static, but to-date include: National Water Authority (ANA); National Ministry of
Environment (MINAM); Regional Government of Ancash; EPS Chavín; CARE (INGO); The
Mountain Institute (TMI); Allpa-Peru (NGO); National Superintendence of Services and
Sanitation (SUNASS); Huascaran National Park (NPH); National Service of Natural State
Protected Areas (SERNANP); National Research Institute of Glaciers and Mountain Ecosystems
(INAIGEM); National Forest and Wildlife Service (SERFOR); Ministry of Agriculture and
Irrigation (MINAGRI-Agrocultura); University of Zurich and the Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation (SDC); and the, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
While these constitute the actors that have collaborated together thus far in promotion of the
adaptation plan, under the new law under the Ministry of the Environment for market-based
mechanisms regarding ecosystem services (Ley No 30215), campesinso communities and user

28

States like cultures, people and territories, are hardly monolithic entities, rather are a
composition of plural apparatuses (see, Althusser, 1971; Trouillot, 2001; Ogden, 2011).
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groups are also required to be included in a management committee with this diverse group of state
actors prior to any PES program implementation.

The Commodification of Nature
The State’s gaze is now firmly set on harnessing the bofedales for their ecosystem services
as a green adaptation pathway into a future of water insecurity. Yet, the process by which the EbA
project can be realized is indisputably through the capture of territory and the commodification of
nature. That is, the capture and conversion of the bofedales into productive body-labor (i.e.
“services”) and their by-products (i.e. clean water) into capital value, usable within a PES
program.29 Under a new capitalist-climatic regime in the highlands, the value of vital resources

29

As of 2016, there are more than 300 PES programs around the world, which have been
described as key components in a neoliberal agenda (Fletcher and Büscher, 2016), resulting
primarily in three outcomes: commodification, privatization and the retreat of the state. However,
scholars have increasingly documented that most ‘actually existing PES programs deviate
substantially for the market-based-model that inspired them (Fletcher and Büscher, 2016,
McElwee et al. 2014). This has led to a call for analysis of the particularities (Dempsey and
Roberston, 2012; Gomez-Baggethum and Muradian, 2015; Hahn et al, 2015; Van Hecken et al.
2015a, 2015b) and conceptual tools marking the “degrees of neoliberalism and marketization” in
PES plans (McElwee, 2014). For example, Farley and Costanza suggest that PES does not
necessitate commodification, and can be based on reciprocity rather than conditional monetary
incentives (2010:2063). In this way, there is no risk of “crowding out” intrinsic motivation (i.e.
incentivizing through payments, when there is non-monetary incentive already). Farley and
Costanza suggest that: “In practice many PES schemes are essentially based on reciprocity
already, in that they provide payments up front, often in the form of extension, in the hopes that
recipients will reciprocate by protecting or restoring ecosystem funds [services]”. The PES
scheme for Quilcayhuanca, I think, resembles a PES plan based on the traditional peasant –
State relations of reciprocity and agrarian extension. That is, as the State extends non-monetary
services, often through environmental education, surveying, and “care”, and in exchange
campesinos are expected to respond reciprocally, through “rational”/”educated” choices regarding
grazing, crop cultivation, home building, path maintenance, etc. The PES scheme for climate
adaptation is being designed similarly, as the State extends its control and care over highland
glacier waters, and instils hope for “participatory” and voluntary efforts for cleaning-up the waters
and restoring the grasslands. In this way, the campesinos are expected to reciprocate by
discontinuing their pastoralist activities in the valley. Enforcement of new property rights, de facto
or de jure, are an additional expected role in this market-based government intervention. Taken
altogether, I find that the PES scheme in Quilcayhuanca is both neo-liberal and neo-colonial,
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seems to be increasing. Clean water, what was once an abundant resource and a public good in the
Quillcay sub-watershed, is now being explored for its additional capital value through state
surveys of users’ (typically urban and peri-urban) “willingness to pay” for clean and not degraded
water under a new environmental regime of scarcity and technological optimism.

As this dominant capitalist-state adaptation imaginary is discursively shifting and
crystalizing, market-based logics for the provisioning of clean water in the contemporary crisis of
environmental change are becoming visible. When discussing the arrangement of things (people,
resources, etc.) within a PES scheme designed for Quilcayhuanca, I was informed that the project
will not be just one project but will consist of many smaller projects, all with a shared goal of
restoring the degraded bofedales and de-acidifying mountain waters. Inherent in the making of
such adaptation projects is the need for financial capital to support bioremediation and restoration
efforts. Several flows of capital are possible, from global to local banks, loans, grants, and user
taxes. Yet, regardless of where the upfront capital originates from, a global or local economic core,
the distribution of capital is destined to fund various projects to restore and recover the alpine
wetlands in Quilcayhuanca and the Quillcay sub-watershed – increasing the functionality of the
green technology for better water quality. Meeting with Rosaline Bernard (Interview, 14 January
2018), an NGO informant who was working closely with various formal state agencies and private
sectors corporations on the making of the PES scheme, I was informed that the potential for a PES
project based on local water user’s fees (a water tax) was becoming increasingly viable:
Rosaline Bernard: “there is a population downstream that can recompense the population in the
high part – the ones that are living with the ecosystem and who can take care of the ecosystem –
to increase ecosystem services” […] “The study says [referring to an economic study in 2014] that
operating both through market-based mechanisms, and outside the market through a colonialty
of power.
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the population of Huaraz agrees to pay $1 more each month to do some project in the high part of
the valley to conserve the ecosystem [bofedales].”30
Jamie Haverkamp: “… where does the money go, does it finance the project?”
RB: “it’s not so clear. PES in Peru started in 2015 with the first law of MINAM, so now there are
like 15 cases in Peru, but it is very new, it is growing.”
JH: “So, ideally the payment would go to the community [campesinos – the users of the
ecosystem]? Yes?”
RB: “So, the thing that I want to say is that nothing is for sure, nothing is definite. It’s like
everything can move… we don’t know. We can have different possibilities.”

After several interviews with a variety of actors working on the PES project, it was clear
that the PES scheme in the making, was in-becoming and the terms and rules were not yet finalized.
Rosaline’s ambiguity about the structure of the market elements (who pays, who receives
compensation, and for what) suggest that the project may, or may not, actualize all the strict
qualities of a conventional capitalist market. Yet, this does not suggest that what is in-design is not
a PES program, but rather bolsters recent empirical scholarship that argues “actually existing PES
programs deviate substantially for the market-based-model that inspired them” (Fletcher and
Büscher, 2016, McElwee et al. 2014).

McElwee and colleagues find that PES programs and policies vary widely in focus and
scope, but “share in common a goal of using economic incentives (either for positive
environmental services like habitat preservation or for negative environmental externalities like
pollution) in the hopes that the market provides a more efficient, less expensive policy outcome”
30

In this quote Rosaline is referring to a technical report by the Ministry of Environment (MINAM):
Alarcón, J.A., et al. (2014). Valoración Económica Para la Mejora de los Ecosystemas de
Bofedales del Entorno de la Ciudad de Huaraz. Ministerio del Ambienta, Noticia Técnica 8, Lima,
Peru.

80

(2014:423). These economic exchanges most often take the form of monetary payments – but can
also be non-monetary, in-kind payments (i.e. reciprocal exchange) – which provide non-monetary
incentives from the users of ecosystem services to those who provide them (McElwee et al. 2014;
Farley and Costanza, 2010).

While the project for Quilcayhuanca is discursively in-becoming, the “examples” of the
scheme that were consistently provided to elucidate the adaptation vision held by an organizing
elite and influential set of state, NGO and corporate adaptation actors – the capitalist-state
assemblage – consistently centered around exchanges for the reduction or eviction of grazing
practices from the alpine wetland-grassland landscapes. As Rosaline and I continued on during our
interview, she provided more clear insights into this adaptation vison, stating:
RB: “… each month the population of Huaraz can give $1 each. […] This amount of money that
we can get every month can help to do small projects, for example, to help the people who graze
their animals within the valley … they can help the campesinos to do some projects outside the
park. […] For example, to do grassland production […], so that we get better grass [pastures]
outside the park. Obviously, if we have better grasslands outside the park, they will put their
animals outside the Park, and the wetlands [bofedales] will be better. That’s a little bit of the idea.”

What Rosaline suggested harkened back to another interview a year and half prior with
Sandro Lopez, a representative with INAIGEM, who was also involved in the design of a PES
scheme for the Quillcay subwatershed. For Sandro, the problem of government within the PES
program was in finding out what exactly a head of cattle was worth to campesinos. Sandro explains
that there are people working on this: “they are trying to make other proposals to make the
exchange of cattle and things alike. There is one other thing we have to explore, and it is how
much the cattle is like a resource for the comuneros [pastoralists] themselves, and how much it is
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a symbol… especially considering the potential for trading.” Sandro continued, stating the
rationality of such a program even made sense for campesinos, it was in their best interest
regarding resources and tourism:
“with the possibility of implementing a scheme, like for every head you take out of
the protected area, you will have one outside that area in the buffer zone, but with
another type of pastures so that you have more resources at the end of the year.
From the resource perspective that totally makes sense. But from the symbolic, […]
that’s going to be much harder to assess. But in the end, it could be challenged
[speaking of property rights marked symbolically by cattle and the usufruct rights
extended to campesinos during Agrarian Reform]. […] Those are the questions we
have for now, because it cannot work that way. I mean, in a sense you cannot have
that much cattle inside the quebrada. It’s even going against their own interest in
the sense of tourism. Many tourists complain that there were supposed to be wild
animals and I just see horses and cows. For that, I would not have traveled so far.
And there’s a lot of wetland animals in the pictures and there only a few places like
that, and then it [Quilcayhuanca] is just degraded and instrumental.” (Lopez,
INAIGEM, 17 August 2016)

Sandro and Rosaline are two active and influential voices in the designing of the PES plan.
Their common vision is representative of a capitalist-state adaptation imaginary that is currently
unfolding in Sub-Quillcay watershed, one in which clean water provisions are predicated upon the
conservation of bofedales, which necessitates or demands the eviction of pastoralism for
Quilcayhuanca. In both their accounts of the PES scheme, campesinos are “helped” by the $1
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monthly user fees which go to fund grasslands restoration projects specifically situated below their
traditional and ancestral grazing lands, which lay within the boundaries of the National Park. This
PES design is understood through an economic-rationality as a win-win scenario for all involved.
It enhances the grasslands for highland campesinos (albeit away from their ancestral lands) while
simultaneously incentivizing their removal from contentious land within Huascarán National Park
– thereby reducing territorial conflicts and expanding the reach of the capitalist-state apparatuses.
With the absence of cattle from the Quilcayhuanca valley, it is suggested through political rhetoric
laced with scientific evidence, that the bofedales will be restored and downstream users will benefit
from improved water quality.

The making of capital value from non-economic things (i.e. the bofedales functions) and
relations is precisely what makes this not just a ‘state’, but a ‘capitalist-state’ adaptation imaginary.
Capitalism is understood here as “a translation machine for producing capital from all kinds of
livelihoods, human and nonhuman” (Tsing, 2015:133). The State’s arrangement of new capitalist
markets for non-capital goods (bofedales services) allows for the extraction of capital value (profit)
from sites of climate change ruination. There is, perhaps, no other machine so effective in
converting all things and social relations to capital value and extracting this capital from new fields
of opportunity. However, similar to critiques of agrarian reform and disaster capitalism (discussed
in chapter 1), I caution against the outcomes of such capitalist-state improvement schemes which
have proved locally devastating in the past – reifying power hierarchies and social inequalities.
As this chapter articulates, what the State allows capitalism to do, threatens to (re)condition the
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conditions of ongoing and future precarity and reproduce social vulnerability to climate change
across the Peruvian highlands.31

The Capitalist-State adaptation imaginary is an ecosystem-based adaptation project with
the broad aim to alleviate the worsening conditions of water scarcity in the highlands and is
predicated upon a neoliberal governmentality, seen clearly through the PES policy on which it
hangs. Although the inclusion of a market-based mechanism in an adaptation design alone does
not render the State-led program neoliberal (Fletcher and Büscher, 2017), the modality of the
State’s intervention, not as a control-and-command regime per se, but as an organizer of markets
for the achievement of welfare and survival, is precisely what does.32 It is the qualitative way in
which the state intervenes, not the lack of state intervention, and the expansion of a capitalist value

31

What I am arguing here is similar to the production of “Sacrifice Zones” found in the extractivism
literature. Julie Maldonado suggest these are sites where livelihood or ecological devastation is
permitted or even encouraged for capitalist extraction.
Sacrifice zones, are territorial
assemblages of life and non-life that are deemed expendable for a common social good.
32

For a clear definition of what is neoliberal, See Povinell (2011), Fletcher and Buscher (2017),
and Foucault’s 1980 lectures on Governmentality. For neoliberalism outside the market, see Li
(2014). Popular notions of neoliberalism suggest that Neoliberal forms of environmental
governance are seen when “state-centered ‘command-and-control’ policies are intended to be
replaced by ‘market-based instruments’ (MBIs) seeking to incentivize sustainable resource
management in the absence of direct regulation (Heynen et al. 2007; Büscher et al. 2014)”
(Fletcher and Büscher, 2016:224). However, my point in this section does not wholesale adopt
this framing of what is neoliberalism in this frame, rather I stress Lemke’s more nuanced framing
in which the neoliberal State not only takes on new MBIs as governing tactics but still maintains
centralized control through retaining traditional functions – albeit, usually in more subversive
ways. Therefore, like Povinelli’s meditations on Foucault’s theory of power – biopolitical power
does not evolve from or deny sovereign power, rather, biopower, discipline power and sovereign
power are distinct modes of governing all co-existing within Late Liberalism and the Neoliberal
State (Povilnelli, 2011). Neoliberalism therefore does not necessitate a cancelling out of other
state enactments of power (Povinelli, 2011), nor does it have to imply a weakening of a centralized
state.

84

regime, that suggests a neoliberal approach to environmental governance (adaptation) in the
highlands. This way of governing is described well by Lemke (2001: 201), who explains that:

“the state in the neo-liberal model not only retains its traditional functions, but also takes
on new tasks and functions. The neo-liberal forms of government feature not only direct
intervention by means of empowered and specialized state apparatuses, but also characteristically
develop indirect techniques for leading and controlling individuals without at the same time being
responsible for them. The strategy of rendering individual subjects ‘responsible’ (and also
collectives, such as families, associations, etc.) entails shifting the responsibility for social risk
such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc., and for life in society into the domain for which the
individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of ‘self-care’.”

The shifting of responsibility for life in society from the responsibility of the State into a
problem of self-care is characteristic of neoliberal governmentality, broadly conceived. In the
remainder of this chapter, I explore the political rationality underpinning the EbA project in
Quilcayhuanaca that similarly shifts the responsibility for social adaptation to climate change from
a provision of the State and registers it as a problem and responsibility of those most vulnerable.
As I try to illuminate the dominant state-led adaptation imaginary, it becomes evident that through
a new governing rationality in the highlands – adaptation to climate change – an energized
need/demand for displacing highland campesinos from their ancestral homelands is resurging.
Therefore, the work of this chapter is not only deconstructing the apparatus of capture (mechanism
and tactics), but the ideology with force (rationality) which gives moral legitimacy to the
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intertwined neoliberal/neo-colonial project – The Social Project of Adaptation that is unfolding in
the highlands and likely beyond.33

Adaptation as a Governing Rationality & the Making of Responsible Subjects
As the Capitalist-State adaptation imaginary goes, the bofedales will be most productive,
and will thus have the greatest potential for “successful” adaptation outcomes – and, surplus capital
– if they exist in a “healthy” and optimally functioning ecological state. Yet, since the 1970’s and
with the establishment of Huascarán National Park (HNP), the intermixed grasslands and bofedales
ecology has been far from what the State imagines a healthy ecology to be. Instead, the bofedales
have been understood as “degraded”, with a fluctuating 52% of its coverage classified as “poor”
for decades.34 Conservation efforts that attribute poor grassland/wetland health to campesinos’
activities on the land have ensued with financial support and mandates coming from not only
SERNANP, the national authority of protected lands, but also from UNESCO (the United Nations
specialized agency for educational, scientific and cultural matters) due to the cultural heritage site
– the Huascarán Biosphere Reserve – that overlays and extends the national park boundaries.

A narrative of “overgrazing” and a “weak” land ethic can be found in official
correspondence between HNP and UNESCO just a few short years after their respective

33

This begs a question of how. How is it that a neo-colonial project is made socially and morally
acceptable? Although only in design stages, how is it that adaptation decision-makers are
entertaining the possibility of restricting the access of the poor to traditional subsistence ways of
life and their indigenous ecologies, as a means to climate adaptation ends?
34
This is cited from the referenced information promoted on a government flier for raising public
awareness of the socio-ecological conditions in Quilcayhuanca. Specifically, Samuel Soto, 1980
is cited in-text. However, I have not been able to locate the original study cited.
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establishments, in 1975 and 1977. Since the superimposing of conservation enclosures upon
indigenous (communal) lands in the Cordillera Blanca, traditional ways of life have become
criminalized through the governing logics of sustainability and conservation – what has been
identified elsewhere as a “green-” or “eco-governmentality” (Yeh, 2005; Goldman, 2004).
According to UNESCO, factors that negatively affected the newly enclosed commons in 1987
included: “ground transport infrastructure, illegal activities, legal frameworks, livestock
farming/grazing of domesticated animals, major visitor accommodation and associated
infrastructure, and fires” (UNESCO, 1987). With these pressures documented, UNESCO
proclaimed that HNP “is under a variety of threats” and awarded financial support to Huascaran
National Park for the training of park wardens and the implementation of the Park’s management
plan that would remediate such issues.35 Since the establishment of HNP and the Biosphere
Reserve, campesinos have come under constant surveillance from a supra-national governance
regime that condemns their very way of life, viewing it as environmentally detrimental, an
impediment to modernizing progress in Peru, and calling for its reduction or elimination. Despite
decades of ongoing fortress conservation efforts in the Cordillera Blanca, many agrarian
communities have maintained their traditions of agro-pastoralism – the grazing of cattle and sheep
in the Quebradas of what is now the enclosure of HNP. Though agropastoralism continues as a
“traditional” or “alternatively modern” way of life in the highlands, it is always going against the

35

The
archived
report
can
be
found
at
UNESCO’s
website:
https://whc.unesco.org/archive/1987/sc-87-conf005-inf1e.pdf. The report finds that among other
things, contentious legislature that would lead to a devolution of management authority and
management problems including “overgrazing of domestic sheep, excessive burning and
poaching by the military” are all detrimental to the National Park and Biosphere Reserve aims. In
closing, a total amount of $35,400 USD was approved by UNESCO in accordance with these
findings and awarded to NPH in 1987, in support of mitigation efforts.
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mandate and visions of the national and trans-national State authorities – a way of governing that
anticipates the exhaustion of social difference.36
The resurgence of the tired “overgrazing” refrain within a formal and dominant adaptation
imaginary serves as a powerful mediator, and I argue a hegemonic instrument of adaptation
possibilities. Approximately three decades after the initial charge against overgrazing, the
conservation narrative consistently (re)surfaces in a mobilizing climate change adaptation
imaginary woven together by scientific expertise, development wisdoms and State planning. In
this way, before climate adaptation interventions even materialize, they are already tied-up with
ongoing territorial struggles and processes of dispossession that have long threatened to evict
campesinos from their ancestral homelands and eliminate their agro-pastoralist ways of life for
nearly half a century.

Resurgence of Old Territorial Refrains
Territorializing refrains of land degradation figure prominently both in the State’s riskhazard approach to vulnerability assessments (problem framing), as well as in the designed
adaptation solutions and treatments that strive for greater resiliency in the highlands to climate
impacts. With each passing year, the dominant Capitalist-State Adaptation Imaginary is bolstered
through research studies, environmental awareness campaigns, and new legislature. What began
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Here I am recalling the interview with the director of HNP who at the time told me that he
anticipates the end of pastoralism in the Park within a matter of decades. It was as if he was just
waiting out the campesinos in a slow process of erasure/cultural genocide. Not so much a forceful
killing but a disavowal that allows their death. This is also closely linked to Povinelli’s meditations
on neoliberal forms of “making live and letting die”; she states that, “softer forms of letting die as
opposed to making die will do. They will be allowed to continue to persist in the seams of
neoliberalism and late liberalism until they exhaust themselves” (2011:95).
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as an adaptation imaginary is now mattering and materializing in the naming of the environmental
change problem, intervention actions, and subject formation. The resurgence of the overgrazing
refrain in particular, I suggest, has been among the most salient truth-claims in the prevailing
neoliberal governmentality and the reterritorialization (capture and commodification) of
Quilcayhuanca by the State. The following quotes, from a variety of State officials working across
three different agencies, highlight the recurrence of the refrain in the problem framing of
adaptation planning for Quilcayhuanca:

[Interview 1] “... so we focused on livestock, when doing the risk assessment, one
has to rank threats holistically, find the most important, deglaciation or
degradation. In this case, the cattle activity has become the biggest threat.” […]
“…this degradation started with the Spanish conquest, until now, about 300
years, so we have reached the brink of disaster, collapse, that is the greatest threat
[to highland life] including the reduction of snow layers, etc…, etc…, and water
stress. […]. In this case, the cattle activity, this type of animal is the greatest
danger […]. It has its ways of remediation, [though], such as reducing the
number of animals.”
(Sr. Lucio, Ministry of Agriculture, Agrocultura, 13 August 2016)

[Interview 2] “As a positive strategy [to climate change], we have water
harvesting and protection of “bofedales…”. [This] requires ecological work, first
cattle raising must be responsible because cattle sometimes ruin the “bofedales”,
now we are working with improved pastures and reorganizing. Some areas for
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“bofedales” are being fenced in, unfortunately we have to proceed in a more
authoritarian way, we are fencing in the land in order to keep out the cattle and
avoid damages.”
(Sra. Gomez, Regional Government of Ancash, Department of Health, 21 July
2016)

Interview after interview with State informants about environmental changes in the
highlands yielded more claims and visions of this kind. As the above quotes from officers
of regional and national government reflect, the greatest threat to highland survival, in the
State’s view, is campesinos’ way of life, not the intrusion of climatic change impacts; and
surely not capitalism. Often, I found myself wondering if state actors were even discussing
adaptation to climate change in some of our interviews, as an allegiance to conservation
programming already seemed too engrained in their responses. When I would push this
inquiry, informants often assured me that this was completely about climate change. Again,
it was the ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) plan that linked land degradation and wetland
restoration to the dangers of glacier-melt and the associated acidifying mountain
hydrology. The linkages between land degradation, vulnerability and successful adaptation
through wetland restoration/conservation, were readily made through the logics and
language of the Capitalist-State Adaptation Imaginary.

However, the State’s political rationality is not accepted by all. Campesinos today often
refute the science-based claims made by the State, just as they have for the last several decades.
This kind of resistance to the State’s environmental narrative, I contend, exceeds the logics of
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ecological economics’ self-interested, rational actor, who cannot or will not see past short-term
private gains, and instead represents a moment when the subjects of the environmental rule know
the ulterior motives of the so-called climate adaptation intervention – those that are exploitive and
colonial – and thus, see through the illegitimate calls for them to behave in so-called
environmentally-friendly ways.37 Seventy-year-old Augusto Lliuya, a campesino of the Toyocota
sector of Quilcayhuanca, illustrates in the quote below the discontinuities between the State’s
claims of environmental degradation and campesinos’ on-the-ground reality; and he refuses to give
power to the Capitalist-State adaptation imaginary by becoming subject to it, and thus, behaving
in accordance to its demands. Instead, Augusto asserts an alternative view, stating that:

“When the national park was created, rural local people who had been
living within the protected area were told to continue with their customs
and to use the land normally, and we did so. Now there is a lot of talk about
overgrazing, which means there are more animals than grass, and so we
have problems with the national park. We constantly argue. We are 240
villagers in Quilcayhuanca. They talk about overgrazing but why? The
director of Huascarán National Park cannot prove that. In the end, we had
more… for example, we had 60, now we have 20, others had 50 and now
they have 5 or 10. Thus, there is no overgrazing. The biggest problem has
been climate change, which has effected several parts and grass doesn’t
grow anymore because of dryness. So, that’s the problem we have always
had with the Park. So, we will continue using the land because we live from
37

See Pam McElwee (2018:22) for a similar argument in the making of environmental subjects
and resistance.
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those animals, it’s part of our family maintenance, they have to sell their
animals to provide their children with education, food, health, house and
more. That’s all their income, nothing else.” (Sr. Lliuya, Toyocota, 8 July
2016)

For Sr. Lliuya and other Quilcayhuanca campesinos, an inverse relationship between a
reduction of cattle in the quebrada over the last several decades (since the establishment of HNP
and the foreclosure of the haciendas) and the continued increase of grasslands/bofedales
“degradation” suggests that, perhaps, campesinos and their livestock are not the issue. Contrary to
the prevailing narrative in the Capitalist-State Adaptation Imaginary, campesinos suggest that
“climate change” has been the greatest problem for multi-species livability in Quilcayhuanca,
including the bofedales ecology, and not the presence of cattle. Yet, despite campesinos’ lived
experiences and local knowledge regarding the issue of environmental change in the highlands,
the state’s EbA plan and its narrative of land degradation remain the institutionalized view among
state apparatuses, as well as the political rationality that underpins formal climate adaptation
planning.

Studies of environmental governance have already illuminated the critical role that
environmental narratives play as one tactic through which State plans and policies are legitimized
and achieved – tactics for the making of a political reality/rationality. Such storylines are described
as oversimplified abstractions of a socionature problem that are constructed to facilitate decisionmaking. Leach and Mearns (1996:446) state that, “narratives are explicitly more programmatic
than myths, and have the objective of getting hearers to believe or do something”. By making
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“stabilizing” assumptions to facilitate decision-making, narratives serve to standardize, package
and label environmental problems so that they appear universally applicable and to justify equally
standardized, off-the shelf solutions (1996:446).

For governmentality scholars, the employment of environmental narratives is a tactic in the
process of “problematization”, a discursive framing in and framing out, of the complexity of
relations constituting the environmental issue at hand. Anthropologist Pam McElwee states that
the creation of a social, environmental, or social-ecological policy problem is not a self-evident
process, but rather a process of problematization that requires three things: first, nature must be
defined as an object of intervention; second, the problem must be visualized usually through the
production and circulation of maps; and third, the process of environmental change (i.e.
“deforestation”, “overgrazing”, etc.) must be named (McElwee, 2018:14).

In the Peruvian highlands, between 2016 and 2018, an environmental educational
campaign was instituted by the heterogeneous assemblage of State actors, accomplishing precisely
these three problemitization requirements: i) rendering nature as object, ii) visual mappings, and
iii) naming of the environmental change problem. The State, including government, NGO and
foreign donor actors, circulated a three-part educational series to the residents of Huaraz and
Independencia – the urban and peri-urban users of the Quilcayhuanca waters. The circulated trifold brochures were populated with information about the Quillcay sub-watershed including:
climate change impacts; resiliency building solutions, specifically the PES scheme; and lastly, the
“problems” threatening adaption solutions and resilience in the highlands. The information was
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presented to a general public audience via colorful charts and statistical references, as well as
through a colorful cartoon mapping of the Quillcay landscape (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2. Ecosystem Services in the Quillcay Sub-Watershed and its “Problems”. The third
pamphlet in a three-part series put together by the heterogeneous assemblage of actors formally
including: EPS Chavín, USAID, SDI, TMI, SUNASS, INAIGEM, SERFOR, Allpa-Peru, ANA,
the Regional Government of Ancash, SERNANP, HNP, MINAM, CARE, and the University of
Zurich. The pamphlet is designed as an environmental awareness campaign for the urban
consumers of the Quilcayhuanca Río. When asking campesinos, none of them had encountered the
mailed fliers.

The image above, titled “Servicios ecosistémicos en la subcuenca Quillcay y sus
problemas”, or, Ecosystem services of the Quillcay sub-watershed and their problems (or barriers),
is the third and last tri-fold pamphlet of the environmental education campaign. Besides the long
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lists of ecosystem services (rendering nature as object) including: the regulation of water; the
maintenance of the water quality; the capture and storage of carbon; the provision of food, water
and fiber; and the capture and storage of carbon, among others; the flier details six persistent threats
to these anthropocentric ecological provisions. In this way, this mapping of the sub-Quillcay
watershed, its three quebradas (Cojup, Quilcayuanca and Shallap), and selected parts of its
ecology, renders nature as objects and campesinos as subjects who are in the way of building a
resilient

future.

This

environmental

campaign

maps

in

the

discursive

political

reality/representation that the Capitalist-State wants to make publicly known and visible through
scientific-truth claims, while mapping out the complexity of environmental change and the
inconsistencies and controversies charged against this political imaginary. As critical geographers
have long argued, “landscape”, and its visual representations (i.e. paintings, maps, etc.), refer not
only to the relationship between different objects caught in the viewer’s gaze, but a representation
of a specific way of looking and knowing the world-in-view (Rose, 2008:172).

Reflected in the above mapping of the Quilcayhuanca landscape is an ideology, a neoliberal
governmentality, that asserts and privileges a certain way of knowing the highland landscape. In
this way, the environmental campaign is a technology of knowledge/power-production that
operates by naming objects of state-capture and barriers to be overcome – a political reality that is
legitimized as the reality in the highlands. McElwee reminds us that, “Maps are key to
environmental rule […]. The production of seemingly objective maps that represent biophysical
reality is in fact a largely political process” (2018:16). She continues that, “Technologies of
knowledge-production often seep into technologies of rule and conduct-shaping and the two
cannot be easily separated, as ‘the activity of problematizing is intrinsically linked to devising
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ways to seek to remedy it’” (2018:16). In this way, I argue that
the map, as a technology of knowledge/power-production, is
understood as an important tool to guide climate adaption in the
highlands, discursively foreclosing on a plurality of visions,
while privileging a one-way governing rationality for climate
adaptation through its a-political rendering of the “natural”
objects and “social” subjects in the highlands.

Studying the State’s representation of the Quilcayhuanca
landscape allows us to understand the institutionalized framing
of the “problems” confronting the EbA plan and anticipate
proposed remedies. The six “problems” labeled throughout the
environmental awareness campaign include (Figure 3.3):

Figure 3.3. Problems in the
Quillcay Sub-watershed. Servicios
ecosist´micos en la subcuenca
Quillcay y sus problemas pamphlet.
“Débil cultura del agua” refers to the
weak water culture – a disregard for
the value of water exhibited by
campesinos’ poor water conservation
practices; “Erosión” refers to
landslides; “Contaminación natural”
refers to the acifidication of
Quillcayhuanca waters from the
greater exposure of glacial bedrock;
“Mal uso de agua” refers to
campesinos poor water use practices;
“sobrepastoreo” refer to patoralist’s
practices of overgrazing; and,
“Contaminación por aguas servidas”
refers to issues of wastewater
contamination by both urban and
rural mountain inhabitants.

1)

“débil cultura de agua” (a weak water culture),

referring to the State’s perception of campesino and urban
user’s disregard for the value of water and their poor
environmental ethic;
2)

“Erosión” (erosion), referring to the erosion of the

mountain landscape;
3)

“Contaminación natural” (natural contamination),

the name given to anthropogenic climate impacts of glacierretreat and associated effects of water acidification;
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4) “Mal uso del agua” (bad water usage), refers to a group of negative activities, performed
primarily by rural campesinos, including: washing clothes in the river and tributaries,
disposing of trash in the river, introducing agro-chemicals into the watershed through
agrarian practices, and the contamination of the river by livestock feces;
5) “Sobrepastoreo” (overgrazing), names the problem of campesinos overuse of pasture lands
and the trampling effect on the bofedales; and lastly,
6) “Contaminación por aguas servidas” (contamination of water services), referring to the
contamination of highland waters by the lack of wastewater treatment facilities in the rural
villages, as well as the downstream direct wastewater inputs to the major Santa Río (the
Santa River) from urban sites.
Four out of the six disturbances to a healthy ecology and the production of ecological goods
and services are associated with campesinos and their agropastoralist activities. While, on the other
hand, capitalist-climate change impacts of rapid glacier retreat and its concomitant issue of water
degradation are de-politicized, naturalized through the assigned label of “contaminación natural”,
or natural contamination.
In this reading of the Quilcayhuanca landscape, the State’s desire for a pristine and
optimally functioning bofedales ecology is complicated, primarily, by the pressures of the highland
campesinos, and the need/demand for adaptation is shifted from a problem of climate change to a
problem associated with the behavior and livelihoods of the climate vulnerable. In a forceful and
public resurgence of the environmental narratives of land and water “degradation”,
agropastoralists are now portrayed as the antagonist in the State-Capitalist adaptation imaginary,
understood as a disturbance to the highland ecology, operating destructively on the landscape as
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opposed to belonging relationally within it, and thus preventing the potential success of the
dominant adaptation project. In the Capitalist-State adaptation imaginary, campesinos are
constituted as subjects in complicated ways, via their traditional development role as peasants and
the rural poor, and as those most “vulnerable” to the changing environmental conditions (the true
victims of climate change); but then again, as those who stand in the way of the State’s adaptation
interventions due to their “backwards” and “destructive” land-use practices. Regardless of which
categorical label campesinos are ascribed to (e.g., the “poor”, “venerable”, or “threat”), all
figurings of the campesino are seen as in need of fixing and intervention.

My concern with the narrative of environmental change that envelopes adaptation actions
in the Cordillera Blanca, is a concern for the discursive and ideological rendering that legitimize
the dispossession of campesinos from their ancestral lands. Throughout my iterative visits over a
three-year span of time in Quilcayhuanca, I found that the narrative of overgrazing was resurging
and stabilizing itself in the context of the State’s adaptation planning. This recurrent narrative
carries with it the territorializing refrain of “degradation”, a kind of landscape motif that has long
legitimized authoritative intervention in conservation zones around the world (Leach and Mearns,
1996) and lurks in the contentious historical making of the Huascaran Biosphere Reserve and the
National Park.38 Like popular environmental narratives emerging from ecological systems
thinking in the 1960s and 70s that served to legitimize colonial conservation efforts (e.g., Garret
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons), the resurgence of this narrative in Peru’s adaptation policy
continues a neo-Malthusian anxiety of exceeding the lands’ inherent carrying capacity and argues
38

For “refrain” see Deluze and Guattari (1987) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia; or Roland Barthels, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments (New York: Hill and Wang,
1978) for “figures”; or, for a synthesis of “refrains” and “figures” and an ethnographic account see
Laura Ogdens’ Swamplife (2011, Chapter 3).
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that there are simply too many cattle, horses, sheep and donkeys in the quebrada for the wetland
ecology to maintain a stable state, let alone flourish. When brought in alignment with the moral
order to ensure survival in Anthropocene times, this problem framing necessitates the total eviction
of campesinos from, or reduced access to, the Quilcayhuanca landscape for the greater good of
social survival. In exchange, campesinos are led to believe that they will also benefit from fresh
drinking water and greener pastures, yet, there is no profit sharing or guarantee of ecological goods
from the PES scheme that extends to the campesinos in exchange for restructuring their subsistence
practices, communal lands, systems of reciprocity, and giving-up their land-based sovereignty (de
facto). In fact, there is no guarantee or social contract for Quilcayhuanca inhabitants at all, but a
good faith sentiment that State adaptation plans will indeed benefit them too, once they voluntarily
and quietly leave their homelands.

Projects of Capture and Dispossession
The Capitalist-State adaptation plan is a redistributive policy of services, goods and wealth.
Specifically, the neoliberal governmentality leads further away from a communal land tenure
system (be it occupied by the enclosure of Huascaran National Park) in Quilcayhuanca, and toward
a restricted access regime that extracts capital from a commodified nature for state accumulation
and territorial expansion. If the main achievement of neo-liberalism has been redistributive rather
than generative, as David Harvey suggests, “then ways have to be found to transfer assets and
redistribute wealth and income either from the mass of the population towards the upper classes
or from vulnerable to richer countries” (2006). This mechanism of redistributive wealth, referred
to by Harvey as, “accumulation by dispossession”, by which he means “the continuation and
proliferation of accumulation practices that Marx treated as “primitive” or “original”, including:
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commodification and privatization of land by forceful expulsion of peasant populations,
conversion of various forms of property rights into private property, suppression of rights to the
commons; commodification of labor power, among others (Harvey, 2006:43).

This study is not the first to identify ongoing processes of ‘accumulation by dispossession’
under recent environmental governance regimes. Such treatments have led to a proliferation of
political economy and political ecology scholarship that illuminates land and resource grabs
through rationalities of “conservation” (Leach and Mearns, 1996; Benjaminsen and Bryceson,
2012, Doane, 2014), “biodiversity” (Escobar, 1998), “mitigation” (Liverman, 2009; Brown, 2013)
and “adaptation” (Sovacool, Linnér and Goodsite, 2015). “Green grabbing”, as it has come to be
known, is a classical revival of Marx’s “primitive accumulation” under a new legitimizing
discourse of sustainability, that continues processes of dispossession of the poor and marginalized
from their territories, wealth and resources, and the accumulation of these things among the elite
class. 39

39

For “primitive accumulation” I am drawing on Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012:336) who
explain: “… the consequences of conservation practice may be seen as another example of
‘primitive accumulation’ as described by Marx (1976). In primitive accumulation, Marx included
processes such as commodification and privatisation of land, the conversion of communal
property to private property and the suppression of rights to the commons. His definition of
‘primitive accumulation’ was ‘the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of
production’ (Marx 1976, 875). In a rural development context, this implies expropriating land and
resources used by smallholders and thereby also creating a reserve of cheap labour. The classic
example of this process is, according to Marx, the enclosure of the commons in England that later
provided labour for industrialization.”
According to Harvey (2003, 149), ‘primitive accumulation as Marx described it, “. . .entailed taking
land, say, enclosing it, and expelling a resident population to create a landless proletariat, and
then releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation”. Since
accumulation is an ongoing process, Harvey (2003) proposes the term ‘accumulation by
dispossession’ to describe current processes. The introduction of this term has sparked a
renewed interest in the combination of dispossession and capital accumulation in development
studies as well as in studies of capitalism in the Global North.
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Conclusion
As the case of Quilcayhuanca shows, capitalist-climate change is not the only force
reconfiguring socio-natures in the Andes, but neoliberal adaptation projects are simultaneously
transforming life worlds and socionature relations with devastating effects on the poor.
Geographer Dianna Liverman states that, “This move to commodify nature and market its services
is a massive transformation of the human-environment relationship and of the political economy
of regions and landscapes” (2004:734). While learning to compose ourselves with climate change
will require transformational change, it is essential to understand who or what is required to
transform and why, so to avoid repeating extractive and colonizing missions that have already so
brutally transformed and reconfigured indigenous ecologies world-wide. While I argue that the
dominant adaptation plan is neoliberal—extending a hegemonic capitalist occupation in
Quilcayhuanca, it must also be understood as a colonial act, as it legitimizes a new wave of land
grabbing and dispossession in the highlands, and denies highland indinos any viable options for
survival in Quilcayhuanca. Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen (2016) have previously pointed out
that, “Whereas civilizing colonialism relied on states to govern indigenous peoples, modern
governmentality [and I would suggest neoliberal governmentality] depends on self-reliant and
empowered indigenous agents who govern themselves” rationally according to the ordering of
laws and markets (Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2016:187). In this way, campesinos of Quebrada
Quilcayhuanca can be seen as confronted with the dilemma of discontinuing who they are (become
rational, resilient subjects and benefit from clean water), or worlding their worlds in a campesino
modality that is culturally rooted and place-based, but abandoned by State care. The task then, for
campesinos who resist their own erasure from the Quilcayhuanca landscape, is to find a way to
endure against, or with, capitalist-climatic change and the coming neoliberal adaptation
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interventions. In this way, the story of neoliberal governmentality in the Quilcayhuanac remains
open. It is not a closed circuit of an operating hegemonic rationality and disciplined bodies as
structurally-deterministic analysis may have it. Rather as the Social Project of Adaptation is still
in stages of becoming, it remains to be seen whether or not campesinos will accommodate the
incoming neoliberal rationality, or if they will maintain their resistance to it.

102

CHAPTER 4
THE ONTOLOGICAL POLITICS OF PLURAL ADAPTATION IMAGINARIES
“the world is made up of multiple worlds, multiple ontologies or reals that are far
from being exhausted by the Eurocentric experience or reducible to its terms”
(Escobar, 2015:15)
“Worlding is a contested, arduous, and not entirely coherent process and never
takes place in a vacuum without connections to other ways of worlding. Yet the
connections do not cancel their radical differences. Radically different worlds
are being enacted in front of our noses, even if they now involve computers and
the Internet, along with older (which does not mean unchanging) other
nonhumans! And while they might be taking place in front of our noses, these
enactments are not spectacles geared to achieve the ulterior purposes that our
categories allow us to imagine (control of resources, political positioning, and
so on). They are doing worlds themselves.”
(Blaser, 2013:559)
It has become increasingly promoted since the ontological turn in social theory that the
notion of a world made up of many cultures is not quite accurate, but rather that the world is
composed of a multiplicity of worlds, that each enact worlds, realities, or ontologies, differently
(Escobar, 2018; Blaser, 2013; Mol, 2002; Goldman et al., 2018; de la Cadena and Blaser, 2018).
Ways of knowing about reality (the way things are) that are born from a particular place and a
particular time, are always incomplete, partial – situated knowledges (Haraway, 1991) – that
cannot, and should not try to become a totalizing way of understanding the world – or more
precisely, the world multiple. Yet, this is precisely what hegemonic rationalities do. When
universals, such as Science, Capitalism, and modern Politics travel into alternative worlds of
radical social difference the implications of imperializing worlding rationalities and technologies
has proven catastrophic (and brutally so). In a postcolonial frame, this tragedy is known as the
enactment of the coloniality of power, which is tied-up with Eurocentrism – “a hegemonic
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representation and mode of knowing that claims universality for itself, derived from Europe’s
claimed position as the center” (Escobar, 2018: 94).

Aníbal Quijano’s (2000) concept of colonialty (addressed in greater depth in the
Introduction and Chapter 2), is a central feature in which the categorization and hierarchical
classification of difference enables the suppression, devaluing, subordination, and even destruction
of forms of knowledge (epistemologies) and ways of being (ontologies) that do not conform to the
dominant form of modernity. Scholars have illuminated the ways Eurocentric models of
classification became the crux of ‘civilization’, ‘modernity’, and later on ‘development’
throughout much of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Escobar, 2018; de la Cadena, 2016). As
Escobar simply states, “there is no modernity anywhere without this coloniality”. Yet, if we take
Escobar’s assertion seriously, and The Modern Project (of which, resilient development and
adaptation may be very much included) is entangled with and enacted through a coloniality of
power, then current adaptation projects pose a real threat to carry out colonial harms, reproducing
vagaries of “colonial difference” (i.e: us/them; nature/culture) and inequalities. Furthermore,
adaptation that is a vehicle for Modernizing ends, social engineers a future devoid of radical socialcultural diversity. John Law (2015) refers to this homogenous future worlding as the One-WorldWorld , “a world allegedly made up of a single world, that has arrogated for itself the right to be
the world, and thus subjects all other worlds to its own terms, or worse, to non-existence” (Escobar,
2015:15).

At the turn of Anthropocene epoch, “resilience” has become a globalizing and widely
traveled concept, radiating from a variety of disciplines, including: psychology, ecology,
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anthropology, engineering, among others (Schipper and Langston, 2015).40 Yet, despite the
interdisciplinarity of the concept, resilience remains firmly rooted in Western traditions of thought.
When this rendering the political project of resilience become the way to adapt to climate change
impacts across the world and hegemonically forecloses on local, autonomous or alternative modes
of adaptation, this rationality becomes, The Social Project of Adaptation. I suggest that, the social
project of adaptation, is a social construct comprised of rationalist, colonial and capitalist
traditions – all universals that have asserted a totalizing hold over reality through claims of
objectivity, “progress” and a capital value. Importantly, not all “Western” adaptation efforts
constitute a totalizing project – a project that is always tied-up with traditional development and
modernist aims, however, it is the view of the author that climate resilient development or
development-adaptation is positioned in a precarious space in which reifying the colonialty of
power is all too possible.

Arturo Escobar (1994; 2018) is not the only scholar to link development to The Modernist
Project (Esteva and Perez, 2001; Sivaramakrishnan and Agrawal, 2003; Harvey, 2006), and I am
not the first to suggest that climate resilient development is also rooted in these same cleavages
(Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006).41 Moreover, as critical development and political ecology
scholars work to correct for the “development as usual” approaches inherent in adaptationdevelopment practice, ethnographic work and indigenous studies still illuminate the coloniality

40

Resilience, as used within climate policy, stems from two dominant schools of thought: ecology and
disaster risk reduction (Schipper and Langston, 2015)
41
On linkages between modernization and development, Sivaramakrishnan and Agrawal (2003) state:
“Harvey reminds us that the core aspiration of modernity ‘was to use the accumulation of knowledge …for
the pursuit of human imagination and the enrichment of daily life’. […] If modernity is the figure to which
social theory unavoidably refers itself, development is the prime index we use to assess efforts toward
modernization. Development, in its various guises, has surely been the most powerful influence structuring
social and economic transformations in the non-Western world in this century” (2-3).
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within (Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2014; Evans and Reid, 2013; 2015; Whyte, 2016). For
Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen it is through tactics of “exclusive inclusion” that colonial
patterns continue through collaborative climate adaptation efforts (2014). What makes adaptation
colonial for Lindroth and Sinevaara-Niskanen is the demand/need for indigenous peoples to adapt
without any viable life options: a biopolitical tactic of “making live” a certain way – assimilate
and become modern/resilient or “letting die”— simply put, “adapt or die” (2014:181). Kyle Powys
Whyte also makes similar observations about formal responses to climate change, stating that:
while ‘colonialism’ is not a term many nonindigenous people typically use even in climate
activism, it is the academically rigorous term for describing an ongoing political relationship
between indigenous peoples and colonial occupiers, and sheds light on an indigenous
understanding of what climate justice is really about and what solutions are required (2016:4).

From the colonial to development encounter, universals prevail with distorting effects on
local communities. In a reflexive attempt to mitigate colonizing and distorting outcomes, work
across multiple worlds for the sake of climate adaptation or resilience planning often claims
“collaboration”, “participatory” or “co-designing” approaches that promote processes of
consensus building and knowledge integration – a practice of commoning that seeks common
ground, commensurable values and sameness (Blaser and de la Cadena, 2017; Veran, 2013).
However, as equitable as such approaches may appear, acts of commoning are never neutral, rather
they require us to think again about post-colonial encounters and their ethical substance. If we are
to engage collaboratively across the so-called “north/south” divide for the task of building a livable
world together, to collaboratively enact ways to adapt to or mitigate climate change, then we need
to craft ways of working together across difference, that themselves do not assert a One-World-
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World doctrine, but are open to infinite possibilities, that are grounded in place-based practices
and that “acknowledge and respect difference as something that cannot be included” (Law,
2015:128). So far, current collaborative and inclusive engagements have had varied and mixed
results as to the extent to which they level or exacerbate power-differentials through hierarchies of
knowledge/power.

In this chapter, I provide a critically reflexive account of my own attempt to operationalize
the resilience concept and its pre-determined categories through a political tool for commoning
across three divergent worlding imaginaries colliding within Quebrada Quilcayhuanca: a
campesinos adaptation imaginary, a capitalist-State adaptation imaginary and an NGO
adaptation imaginary.43 The original intention of the research was to use the Hybrid Resilience
Framework (HRF) produced by Engle and Colleagues (2014) as a way to bring multiple and often
conflicting perspectives of what constitutes resilience in to a meta-dialogue for commoning ends
of consensus building and the empowerment of local and marginalized views. Like the designers
of the Hybrid Resilience Framework, I also shared in the liberal dream of finding commonality,
synergies, and agreement across competing and oppositional adaptation imaginaries in a contested
landscape. I employed the framework in order to bring a plurality of adaptation imaginaries into
dialogue with one another – with the ulterior motive of “empowering” an otherwise silenced and
marginalized local imaginary in what was proving to be a hostile adaptation decision-making

43

Contrary to my conceptualization of the State throughout this dissertation, as a fluid and
heterogeneous group of trans-local actors who champion the dominant Social Project of
Adaptation, in this chapter, I parsed-out NGOs from the State—and thus, the majority of the
international development perspective from that of the formal State government of Peru.
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context.44 However, after undertaking this project, it has become glaringly obvious that the project
of knowledge integration for empowerment aims is highly problematic and contentious – burdened
by everything from technical to ontological issues (Goldman et al., 2018; Daly, 2016) and powerasymmetries (Nadasdy, 1999).

In what follows, I strive to illuminate the shortcomings of such an approach and argue that
outcomes of genuine inclusion, in which radical social difference can stand on its own terms,
cannot be achieved through tactics of making difference same, and thus the project of integrating
alternative ways of knowing into Western rational frames. This critique is not intended as a
strawman argument of the HRF and its designers’ situated-construction of it, such endeavors are
far from a constructive contribution; rather my intention is to illuminate a broader political and
ethical discussion around the politics of knowledge co-production and collaborative adaptation
planning and design. In the end, I bolster critiques made about “exclusive inclusion” (Lindroth and
Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2014) and the ‘coloniality of power’ (Quijano, 2000), which continue
through integrative and participatory decision-making approaches. While activities are already
underway within the development community to improve climate change adaptation decisionmaking (Engle et al. 2014), I put forward a call, not for “improvement” per se (i.e. more
information, and technically better models, frameworks and indicators), but rather a decolonization
of The Modernist Project – as the climate resilient development project – by way of a Pluriversal
proposal (Escobar, 2018).

44

Data collecting to inform the framework was conducted during fieldwork in 2016 and 2018 – via
interviews, questionnaires and a participatory workshop with local to national actors that all have
a stake in formal or informal adaptation planning within the Quilcayhuanca valley. The various
data methods used and stakeholders consulted allowed for triangulation of data across and within
three distinct political groups in Quilcayhuanca: campesinos, State officials, and NGOs.
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Towards a Plurality of Adaptation Imaginaries
While chapter three employed the term adaptation imaginary as synonymous with an
adaptation vision or pathway, the concept, as I intend to use it, is this, but not only. Specifically,
my use of ‘adaptation imaginaries’ draws upon Charles Taylor’s social imaginaries. This is
similar to imagination, as an imaginary has not yet materialized, but is cognitively held and
discursively exercised. Yet, it is more than a set of ideas, it implies an attitude, a method of thought
with force. For Taylor, “the social imaginary is not a set of ideas rather, it is what enables, through
making sense of, the practice of society” (2004:2). The imaginary goes beyond how people
perceive their realities to how they perceive themselves in relation to socionature, and the
normative expectations that underpin these visions. When an imaginary is infiltrated with a sense
of moral order (‘progress,’ ‘security,’ or ‘resilience’) it can transform with new idealizations and
legitimize new social practices (Taylor, 2004: 29). An imaginary is thus, a set of normalized and
socially legitimized ideologies of moral order that is both shaped by and shapes particular times,
cultural contexts and social worlds.45,46

Adaptation imaginaries function similarly to representative storylines that mediate worldmaking projects (e.g., adaptation and development), discursively limiting what is possible to do
and think. In the context of climate change, narratives and adaptation imaginaries both “co-

45

I prefer to use adaptation imaginaries here instead of adaptation rationality, which I understand
as similar to the description above, specifically to signal to something that has yet to come into
being but is held in cognitive and creative spaces of becoming.
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construct particular pathways: alternative possible trajectories for intervention and change which
prioritize different goals, values and functions, and address incertitude and dynamics in different
ways. Which pathways are chosen and which are not can have profound material and distributional
consequences” (Leach, 2008:4). Leach argues that “Building pathways to Sustainability implies
recognizing and highlighting less dominant alternative pathways […]; remaining open to a
multiplicity of pathways rather than closing down around particular ones, and being explicit about
the trade-offs and the politics involved” (Ibid). By paying attention to multiple adaptation
imaginaries instead of adaption pathways, I am attempting to allow for a similar analysis but also
attempting to expand the analytical field of vision beyond an assessment of technically and
economically-deterministic pathways and seemingly commensurable ‘trade-offs’, to fold in the
ideological, ontological and colonial difference.47

Though I had not come across Leach’s argument before conducting fieldwork, thinking
through the space of the multiple is precisely what this exploratory constructivist methodology
strived to accomplish. Specifically, in this chapter, and throughout the entirety of the dissertation,
the challenge has been to hold in tension the multiplicity of imaginaries and practices that enact a
plurality of worlds that together co-constitute Quilcayhuanca’s past, present, and “climate

47

Helen Verran and Michael Christie’s thinking on imaginaries is useful to articulate the
ontological folds within the “imaginaries” concept. They contend that: “Working imaginaries are
narrative and image, metaphor and analogy. They frame and explain; they are stories and picture
that figure, prefigure, and refigure relations. As such they indicate that working knowledge
traditions might be interrupted and subverted, leading to slowing down (Stengers, 2005). With
slowing down [what I call “opening up”], working imaginaries emerge more clearly as metaphysical
commitments and the means of articulating such commitments. The unique assumptions that lie
at the core of all knowledge traditions are felt as both limits and possibilities, and with that comes
a chance for developing futures different from pasts” (Verran and Christie, 2014: 58). Further
readings here discuss “postcolonial databasing” as opposed to colonial methods of archiving and
databasing that are still firmly entrenched in modern planning and policy practice.
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resilient” future. By using adaptation imaginaries (plural) I am drawing attention to the multiplicity
of ways by which adapting to, or becoming with, climate change impacts are imagined, and thus
potentially enacted, in the highlands. While chapter three outlined the elite and dominant
adaptation imaginary (governing rationality) targeted for Quilcayhuanaca and the Quillcay subwatershed, this chapter strives to understand a plurality of worlding imaginaries at play, and the
synergies and divergence among them. Moreover, in a kind of activist-researcher spirit, the study
sets out with the intention to mobilize a particular subaltern imaginary – that is, adaptation
possibilities as imagined by Quilcayhuanca campesinos – within what has thus far been a closed,
elite and “expert” driven political decision-making space for building a resilient highlands.

Resilience and the Hybrid Resilience Framework
“Activities are already underway within the development community to improve
climate-change adaptation decision-making. In these related efforts, a focus on
building resilience is an important objective, one that resonates with development
objectives. Compiling and applying indicators will help development practitioners
consider resilience in projects, plans, and decision making. Exactly how to do this
is a challenging, but important task.”
(Engle, de Bremond, Malone and Moss, 2014:1296)

The gathering of multiple adaptation imaginaries across a range of socio-political actors
was done by drawing upon the design of the Hybrid Resilience Framework (HRF) (Engle et al.,
2014) (Appendix 1). In June of 2016, I traveled to the World Bank in Washington D.C. and met
with one of the architects of the HRF to explore the frameworks’ use and potential as a decisiontool in sites of contestation and social difference. Through a process of knowledge integration, the
architects of the framework put forward a “hybrid” decision-making tool as an effective instrument
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for arriving at “climate-smart”, or climate resilient, development choices among competing
alternatives, values, and knowledges. In this way, the HRF is a political tool for climate resilient
world-making via methods of knowledge integration. Unlike ‘resilience’ as a descriptive tool, the
resilience framework is not merely intended to elucidate insights into how people interpret climate
change impacts and prioritize responses to them, but rather as a political instrument, the HRF seeks
to aid decision-makers in adaptation decision-making (policy and planning). The HRF is
specifically intended for “developing indicators that analysts might select as useful for particular
places or sectors” and “lays the groundwork for an assessment framework that can make future
development and adaptation choices more resilient” (Engle et al., 2014:1295).

The HRF was selected among a host of other possible frameworks (see Schipper and
Langston, 2015 for a review of indicator-based frameworks) to operationalize due to its
compatibility with and preferences for participatory approaches, and for its “hybrid” modality,
including: i) an ability to work across qualitative and quantitative data, ii) an ability to cut-across
social and ecological binaries, and lastly, iii) an ability to integrate divergent systems of knowledge
(Engle, et al., 2014). For Engle and colleagues, “All this [integration of knowledges] leads to a
proposed hybrid approach for indicator development that includes both qualitative and quantitative
information and a set of common indicator options that can be adapted to particular places, settings,
or time periods (2014:1297). For the framework designers, “such an approach can facilitate
comparison and learning in a way that accommodates a diversity of situations and contexts”
(2014:1297), meaning that this hybrid framework is an attempt to improve upon ready-made and
off-the-shelf projects through a combination of both generalizable (i.e. comparable) and locally
engaged information. Thus, the decision tool is specifically designed to bring divergent forms of
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climate change knowledge, from the local to the global, into a meta-analysis – through which a
meta-dialogue and thus a meta-language is possible. My decision to operationalize the HRF was
not so much to inform policy through more place-based and accurate knowledge, rather it was
predicated upon the possibility of fostering the integration of local knowledges into modern
politics for the possibility of developing more ethical and locally-attuned climate adaptation
options.

In this way, I chose to employ the HRF as a counter-hegemonic tool that could enable
campesinos to have a voice in the identification and selection of viable adaptation options for
Anthropocene livability.48 However, as this chapter illuminates, this form of political inclusion
and “empowerment” – the integration of a campesino adaptation imaginary into modern adaptation
politics – constituted a process of translation that extracts, compartmentalizes, and distills local
ways of knowing and being into a palatable policy discourse that is blind to ontological and
political underpinnings (Nadasdy, 1999). The project of integration then failed to amount to a
project of empowerment and instead reified the ontological occupation of the OWW. Marisol de
la Cadena’s suggestion that, “the lettered world [modern] (which is now peopled also by
indigenous politicians and intellectuals) continues to be the hegemonic translator of other partially
connected worlds, particularly if these are a-lettered [a-modern]” (2015:62), has profound truth in
this case. As de la Cadena contends, and my particular experience affirms, the offering of inclusion
through integration was not a neutral or a-political act, rather inclusion on its own terms was

48

By “voice” I am specifically implying political freedoms, see Sen, 1999. Development as
Freedom. “Freedom is not only the ultimate end of development; it is also a crucially effective
means” (Sen, 2001:506).
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contingent upon becoming “modern” (lettered), and making a break with one’s political and
ontological differences.
The concepts of ‘adaptation’, ‘resilience’ and ‘sustainability’ forged the dominant
adaptation policy discourse in the highlands. As scholars have already pointed out, these global
concepts are widely circulated among literate publics, academics, and policy circles (Goldman et
al., 2018), thus, this finding was not surprising. Yet, these concepts, with their attached meanings
from Western science, were not always recognized in the same way among State, NGO and
campesino actors of Quilcayhuanca. While some concepts travel well across “modern” and
“alternatively modern” worlds, I often found myself subbing-in alternative synonyms during
interviews and conversations with campesinos that could generate approximate meanings.
However, the ontological dualisms of rationalist traditions (i.e. nature/society and life/non-life)
were never fully undone, and thus even with translation, these concepts reified a Eurocentric and
techno-scientific logic.

Regardless of the translation challenges, I selected resilience and the HRF as tools for
gathering a plurality of adaptation imaginaries. Across a variety of contexts, my definitional
framing of resilience ranged from a more formal SES definition that decision-makers were familiar
with to an informal framing as the ability to become with climate change while maintaining a good
life (a notion that shares affinities with the popular Andean philosophy of Sumak Kasway).49,50

49

Socio-ecological Systems (SES) thinking frames resilience as the “capacity of a system to
absorb disturbance and reorganization while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially
the same function, structure, and feedbacks” (Walker, Hollings and Carpenter, 2004).
50

Sumak Kawsay in Quechua, and Buen Vivir in Spanish, is an Andean philosophy for living well.
See, Altmann, P. (2017). Sumak Kawsay as an Element of Local Decolonization in Ecuador. Latin
American Research Review, 52(5), 749–759. DOI:http://doi.org/10.25222/larr.242
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This framing was derived from co-produced interpretations of the resilience concept that emerged
from interviews and a participatory adaptation workshop with agro-pastoralists of Quilcayhuanca.
Applied in this way, resilience has been understood as a boundary object, defined by Star and
Griesemer as “objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the
several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. [...]
They have different meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common enough to
more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation” (1989, 393).51

Thus, as a boundary object (Star & Griesemer, 1989) or as a “fluid” object/actant
(Carpenter et al., 2001), ‘resilience’ was intended to be operationalized in a malleable way, shifting
shape as it traveled across cultural and policy domains, while still maintaining strength in a
common meaning with which the term was associated (Goldman et al., 2018). Resilience, as a
conceptual tool, that could be co-produced with diverse sets of actors, proved a useful starting
point for cross-cultural dialogue. However, the employment of resilience as a political decisiontool (i.e. the HRF), proved highly problematic. Specifically, the structural-functionalist framing
and categorical logics derived from rationalist roots, and which gives the Hybrid Resilience
Framework policy efficacy, and allows it to function as mechanisms for the reduction and

51

Perhaps this methodological choice for employing resilience and the HRF was ignorant given
the strikes against resilience thinking, including: it offers only technocratic solutions framed within
capitalist logics (Welsh, 2014); it is a scientific vocabulary for market-based approaches (Nelson,
2014); and, it enacts a neoliberal ideology (Joseph, 2013; Reid, 2014).
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repackaging of local onto-epistemologies into a structure of ontological dualisms (nature/society)
and positivist knowledge categories (to the exclusion of local cosmovisions) .52,53

The Rationalist Construction of Resilience
Foundational to the HRF are five, expert-derived, categories of resilience that the authors
of the framework systematically determined were representative of the various theorized
determinants of resilience across a wide range of studies. These categories were arrived at through
expert elicitation, and included represented views in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). According to Engle and colleagues (2014), the five structural categories (parts)
that function together to enhance or undermine a resilient world (whole) include:

1.

Governance and security

52

Simply put, structural functionalism is a conservative paradigm with a macro view of complex
systems in which parts are compartmentalized according to Cartesian logics and all parts serve
a function in solidarity for the reproduction of the whole.
53

By rationalism, I am talking about a Western intellectual tradition referred to as rationalist,
Cartesian, and objectivist, which is often associated with terms such as mechanistic (worldview),
reductionist (science), positivist (epistemology), and more recently, computaionalist (model) (see
Escobar, 2018:80). It has also been associated with logocentricism, “or the belief in a logical truth
as the only valid grounds for knowledge about an objective world made up of things that can be
known” (Ibid). Important to our discussion, rationalism is understood as the philosophy of thought
that structures ontological dualisms (i.e. nature/culture, mind/body) which modern politics,
institutions and practices are built upon.
Rationalism is a modernists rationality — the common sense of our cultural wisdoms. For Val
Plumwood, “the ecological crisis we face then is both a crisis of the dominant culture and a crisis
of reason, or rather, a crisis of the culture of reason or of what the dominant global culture has
made of reason” (Val Plumwood, 2002:5). “Rather than relying on ‘the same elite culture and
developmentalist rationality that led us in to this mess” in the first place (i.e. the green economy),
Plumwood advocates for a form of nondualist, noncolonialist rationality that resituates human
practices within ecology, and nonhuman within an ethics of respect and responsibility (also see
Escobar 2018: 95).
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2.

Natural resource systems

3.

Social systems

4.

Economic systems, and the

5.

Built environment/infrastructure

Although Engle and others declare these categories representative of their meta-analysis
findings, they also emphasize the need for flexibility and contextual relativity when boxing-in the
context-specific and dynamic concept of resilience. In other words, some categories may or may
not be relevant across different sites, and thus the efficacy of such category-indicators require
grounding them in place-based evidence that engages local people, and preferably participatory
approaches with those most affected by the environmental changes (Engle et al. 2014).

Historians of Science and critical scholars have found that categories and the categorization
of knowledge has long been articulated with the development of capitalism, colonialism, and state
structures (Foucault 1978, Verran, 2013, Verran and Christie 2014; Quijano, 2000, Nadasdy,
1999). According to these scholarly views, a globalizing spread of Eurocentric ways of thinking
have been transmitted via codes and categories into the so-called global south and non-Western
centers in qualitative way that colonize diverse ways of knowing (epistemologies) and being
(ontologies). For Nadasdy, “[T]his compartmentalization has profound effects on how people can
think about knowledge and the ways in which it can be used” (Nadasdy, 1999:5) – meaning that,
“epistemologies of the South” become oppressed or subalternized within new hierarchical rational
and categorical way of thinking that claim authority in designing worlds (past, present and future).
Therefore, the invitation to re-design the HRF categories, put forth by the HRF architects, could
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have profound implications for what can be said and thought and how adaptation is then enacted.
I argue that, in this discursive act of inventing, selecting and re-arranging categories lies a
productive space for designing otherwise and de-colonially (Escobar, 2018; Verran and Christie,
2013).

If the categories are community-determined, using local knowledge system as opposed to
the pre-determined expert-derived categories produced solely by Scientific academics and
traditional practitioners of rationalist thought, then I maintain optimism that resilience, and its
defined categories and indicators, can be place-based and reflective of alternative knowledges and
worldings. This effort leads to postcolonial possibilities. As Helen Verran puts it, “Learning to
recognise and value such difference, learning to refuse the step which requires a colonising
reduction to a shared category, and acceptance that we may not be metaphysically committed to a
common world, is what is involved in cultivating a postcolonial impulse” (Verran, 2013:144) – or,
in other terms, a de-colonial approach to North-South collaborations. In this way, the HRF may
have potential for achieving an authentic inclusive collaborative design, or co-design process, but
the project would have to actively engage difference at the level of ontological design (Escobar,
2018), thereby allowing fundamental cognitive constructs (i.e. nature/culture), to be overhauled
by what have long been seen as “beliefs”, “superstitions”, or “cosmologies” of the localized kind.
This is different from traditional and expert design, where Cartesian rationalism and professionally
oriented domains over-determine categories and cognitive domains for what is possible to think
and say (Manzini, 2015).
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For Escobar, the most important design is ontological: “It constructs an intervention in the
background of our heritage, growing out of our already existent ways of being in the world, and
deeply affecting the kinds of beings that we are [and can possibly become]” (2018:116). Thus,
ontological design is an invitation to de-/re-construct our most fundamental assumptions about the
way things are, to make visible the long history of Eurocentrism within the dominant modernist
ontology and to allow for other ways of knowing and being to co-produce, or even lead, futuring
as opposed to defuturing possibilities.54 This goes beyond epistemic or technical improvements
made to the traditional techniques and tools for design (policy and planning) and development. It
requires engaging in a philosophical discourse that is both reflexive and political. Doing
ontological design enables the possibility for thinking/doing adaptation otherwise and the
development of new tools, which are fundamental to generate actions that foster possibilities from
multiple adaption imaginaries, rather than reconstitute the hegemony of the One-World-World.

Although ontological design is a much needed area of exploratory research and practice,
re-designing the categories of the HRF to reflect local onto-epistemologies was beyond the scope
of this study, and presumably impossible when the objective of the project is integration, and
specifically, knowledge integration for policy-maker end-users. While ontological design is of
critical importance, and I would argue specifically, the re-design of a traditional modernist
ontology underpinned by what Latour (1993) calls the Modern Constitution, the adaptation project
writ large remains situated within power-structures in which decision-making is not so much
influenced by the models and designs from below, but from above, and specifically of those crafted

54

For Fry, defuturing is the systematic deconstruction of possible futures by the structured
unsustainability of modernity. Futuring in contrast, is intended to convey the opposite, a future
with futures (Fry, 2015; also see, Escobar, 2018 for further discussion).
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within a particular legitimate policy discourse. As Goldman and colleagues state: “local
knowledges and experiences of climate change matter but are not often acknowledged in official
discourse and are misrepresented in instrumentalist “co-production” projects” (2019:9).

Therefore, when the “subaltern does speak” (cf. Spivak, 1988) and makes its visions and
designs of some account in modern climate politics, it has little option other than to enter-in
misrepresented. Given the two options – to go unnoticed within decision-making circles, or be
included via misrepresentation – this study moved forward with employing the expert categories
of the HRF, instead of redesigning categories from the bottom-up that were less likely to garner
political legitimacy. In this way, ontological design and decolonial methods were not attempted
but a project for knowledge integration was; and this is precisely why I believe this employment
of the HRF has not and cannot achieve ends of authentic inclusion and political participation.
Contrary to my research intentions, taking this approach to the co-production of knowledge proved
to be more extractive than empowering, beginning without campesinos inclusion in the
construction of resilience meaning and categories and thereby leading with and concluding by
privileging techno-scientific solutionism and a globalizing adaptation discourse, as opposed to
mobilizing imaginaries of the localized kind.

A Method of Integration
“we do not need a totality in order to work well. The feminist dream of a common
language, like all dreams for a perfectly true language, or perfectly faithful
naming of experience, is a totalizing and imperialist one…”
(Haraway, 1991: 173)
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Adaptation actions in Quebrada Quilcayhuanca will be undertaken within a zone of
contestation, an uneven landscape of power that is home to multiple cultures (modern and nonmodern) and multiple natures. Therefore, the quest for synergies between the disparate adaptation
imaginaries produced by antagonistic stakeholders, was thought to be one way to begin finding
adaptation solutions and options that cut-across social differences and facilitated a common
adaptation dialogue, yet the approach taken problematically drew upon an uncritical process of
knowledge integration.

Embarking on the activist-turn in my participatory-activist research, I employed the expertderived categories of the HRF. A questionnaire (Appendix H and Figure 4.1) was developed to
gather adaptation imaginaries held by literate adaptation actors from NGOs and diverse
Government bodies, and a participatory workshop with primarily illiterate campesinos of the eight
sectors (communities) belonging to Quilcayhuanca was held on Sunday, August 14, 2016. The
questionnaire was given during interviews with participants, who often took a day or two to
complete and return results to me. On the other hand, the 20 campesinos in attendance to the
participatory workshop and I collaboratively identified indicators of resilience that were
representative of the local adaptation imaginary throughout a four-hour workshop. These results
were triangulated with semi-structured interviews among State, NGO, and campesino participants.
Yet, regardless of the method used: interviews, questionnaires or a participatory workshop, the
categories (the parts) of resilience (the whole) remained constant for comparison and
generalizability. This necessarily served as the first stage of knowledge integration, in which
diverse knowledges were brought into a Scientific framework for adaptation decision-making.
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Figure 4.1. Data Gathering Instrument for the Hybrid Resilience Framework. The
questionnaire deployed consisted of five qualitative questions, a blank ‘resilience categorical
wheel (above), and demographic information. The six sections of the resilience wheel represented
Engle et al.’s five categories of resilience: environmental, social/cultural, economic, political and
infrastructure and one more category for “other” responses that did not seem to fit within the
structural logic. Participants populated the resilience wheel with their ideas of what the
characteristics of a resilient Quilcayhuanca landscape would include.

Within the categorical bins provided, participants indicated what factors might foster a
resilient Quebrada Quilcayhunaca to the ensuing climate change impacts. The responses were
systematically recorded, brought into a qualitative database, and coded. The qualitative analysis
constituted a processes of distillation (Nadasdy, 1999), in which like things were grouped together,
assumptions were made about meanings, and data-bytes were assigned a short label after an
iterative cycle of inductive, categorical, and pattern coding. Coding is an analytical art, and
although it was done inductively and with Nvivo codes (when appropriate), complex meanings
made up of histories, social relations, and cultural details, failed to be captured by the assigned
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codes, or “noun-chunks” that name the identified “resilience indicators”. The outcome of the
integration process led to the production of comparative tables (Appendix I) and a relational map
(Figure 4.2) for the visualization of the synergies and divergence across the plurality of adaptation
imaginaries.

Figure 4.2. Mapping of Adaptation Imaginaries. This visual illustrates three adaptation
imaginaries: the campesino imaginary, the government imaginary and the NGO imaginary.
Arrows indicate connections across the imaginaries. Each imaginary consists of five different
colored nodes, each representing a different resilience category: blue is ‘environmental’, green is
‘economic’, red is ‘social’; purple is ‘governance’ and yellow is ‘infrastructure’. Total
participants included: 20 campesino, 5 State, and 6 NGO informants.

The relational mapping above represents a “space of potentiality” (cf. Povinelli, 2011)
where infinite adaptation possibilities – represented through divergent adaptation imaginaries –
can be visualized. The map displays three partially connected and partially autonomous adaptation
imaginaries: the Campesino Imaginary, the State Imaginary, and the NGO Imaginary. Each
imaginary is populated with all the gathered participant responses of resilience indicators relative
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to each group. The colors of the ‘resilience categorical wheel’ deployed in the questionnaire
correspond with the colored nodes within the map of adaptation imaginaries. In this way, each
imaginary can be read on its own across the five categorical domains of resilience: governance &
security (renamed “political” in purple nodes), natural resource systems (renamed “environment”
in blue nodes), social systems (in red nodes), economic systems (in green nodes), and infrastructure
(in yellow nodes); or, in-relation to another imaginary.

In this visualization of colliding adaptation imaginaries and adaptation possibilities in a
space of potentiality, arguably enables the identification of both divergent and synergistic
indicators of resilience in Q. Quilcayhuanca. As an example of divergence, I found no political
(purple nodes) indicators held in common across the three imaginaries. Campesinos tended to talk
of a collaborative adaptation process, whereas government officials stressed political indicators
that emphasized stronger climate and biodiversity regulation, capacity building (i.e. enhanced
knowledge) and top-down approaches to adaptation through regulatory grassland management and
securitization of climatic-hydrological risk (i.e. GLOFs); and still yet, NGOs put forward
indicators favoring bottom-up or community-based adaptation approaches. Like the plethora of
indicators of divergence among the three adaptation imaginaries, analysists can also make quick
inferences from this map about the indicators in common. Examples of synergistic adaptation
indicators included: “healthy grasslands and bofedales”; “diversified livelihoods”; “green
infrastructure” (specifically referring to water harvesting or water storage technologies); the
inclusion and use of “traditional ecological knowledge”; and “environmental education”.
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Overall, this qualitative methodology makes possible the integration of local knowledge
into a global knowledge and policy discourse. However, as Nadasdy (1999) has rightly pointed
out, the project of integration, problematically requires processes of categorization and distillation,
in which things of divergent worlds, must be rendered same, or same enough, so to be brought
together into a meta-category/discourse. In order for things of difference to fit within the predetermined categories of sameness, difference is not accommodated on its own terms, rather it is
reduced and repackaged – stripped of its radical difference – producing the remainders, “residuals”
or “excess” (Povinelli, 2011; de la Cadena, 2015).

In a critical interpretation of the process of knowledge integration, comparisons across
reductive sameness and commensurable values is possible; however, the method employed did
not, and arguably cannot, render local worldings visible, nor create enabling conditions for
adaptation imaginaries of the localized kind.55 Rather, whole aspects of campesino’s experience
and realities fell outside the established categories of scientific resource management. As Nadasdy
puts it: “A whole array of stories, values, social relations and practices, all of which contribute
substance and meaning to aboriginal people’s relationship to the environment, must be “distilled
out” … (1999:7) – and, were indeed distilled out of the campesino adaptation imaginary before it
could be incorporated into the institutional framework.

55

Ontology is a way of worlding, a form of enacting a reality. It is critical to stress, however, that
the understanding of reality being postulated here is one that, building on some versions of STS,
bypasses the nature/culture (or subject/object; material/ideational) divide to arrive at a materialsemiotic formulation (see Haraway 2008; Latour 1999; Law 2004; Mol 1999). This means that we
avoid the assumption that reality is “out there” and that “in here” (the mind), we have more or less
accurate cultural representations of it; and that reality is always in the making through the dynamic
relations of hybrid assemblages that only after the fact are purified by moderns as pertaining to
either nature or culture.
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Thus, while the concept of resilience was indeed fluid and malleable across campesino,
State and international NGO participants, I found that the predetermined categories of the HRF are
precisely the mechanism through which a hegemony of impossibility – that is, the foreclosure of
adaptation possibilities otherwise, is enacted. The expert categories of a resilience model (i.e.
“governance/security”, “natural resource systems”, “social systems”, “economic systems”, and the
“built environment/infrastructure”), not the fluid concept of “resilience” itself, constitute the
discursive machinery through which localized realities, practices, knowledges, values, etc. are dislocated, distilled into “noun chunks”, and translated into a standardized global policy vernacular.
Matters in common, such as “healthy bofedales and grasslands”, “environmental education”, and
“TEK” are things that both oblige the modern political discourse (and can thus be mapped into a
resilience framework) but also exceed it, making “residuals” (Povinelli, 2011) or “excess” (de la
Cadena, 2015).
Following Foucault, to think discourse as mere spoken or written words forming
descriptive statements is to enact the mistake of representationalist thinking. Discourse is not what
is said; it is that which constrains and enables what can be said. In doing so, discursive practices
define what counts as meaningful statements […]. In the Foucauldian tradition, “discursive
practices are the local sociohistorical material conditions that enable and constrain disciplinary
knowledge practices such as speaking, writing, thinking, calculating, measuring, filtering and
concentrating. Discursive practices produce, rather than merely describe the, “subjects” and
“objects” of knowledge practices” (Barad, 2003: 819). Thus, the operationalization of the HRF,
like other knowledge integration projects before it (Nadasdy, 1999) are discursive practices
filtering and constructing representations and abstractions of radical social alterity and shaping
worldmaking (i.e. adaptation) possibilities through asymmetrical power-relations.
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According to the intention of the HRF designer’s however, the framework did seek to
accommodate social “difference” – the resilience indicator “mis-fits” – through an offering of a
category called other. However, I suggest that the design of the HRF falls short of its intended
hybridity aims, and the bin for “other[s]” was not able to capture onto-epistemological difference,
only commensurable differences that were destined for modernist interpretations of analysts and
decision-makers. From the start, that which could be said or written within the framework, had to
conform to a certain worldview. Radical social difference, that is, alternative knowledges and
ontologies held by Quilcayhuanca campesinos, remain hidden, or even entirely outside of the
expert-derived resilience framework – they are thus the matters within and the matters of excess.
Paying attention to what the categorical-logics of the HRF cannot accommodate, the unspoken
and incommensurable values, I argue, is the beginning of breaking out of the constraints of a
singular mode of knowing and being – subverting the hegemonic praxis of the One-World-World
(Law, 2015). This necessitates a critically reflexive approach that enables us to think about
adaptation otherwise and futuring possibilities.

Matters of “Excess”
Though this chapter constitutes but another critique, I have tried not to deconstruct too
much, but have rather attempted to make the case above for how resilience and its frameworks
may be useful for interventionists (designers, development workers, planners, etc.) who strive to
work collaboratively across cultures, social strata, and political scales. Indeed, the above tools are
not without decision-making value in certain contexts and deployed in certain ways. However, I
argue that when applied uncritically (meaning without beginning from the modern/colonial
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difference) and in the context of north-south encounters, such seemingly a-political frameworks
can and do reify the hegemony of traditional design and modernity’s ontological occupational
hold.

In the remainder of this chapter I pay attention to the things that are represented within but
also exceed the discursive field of the resilience framework. While these things (framed as
“indicators of resilience”) are seemingly incorporated into and presented within the Hybrid
Resilience Framework, I argue that they are not only re-presented, but rather that they are reduced
and repackaged into what is a distortion of the original “local knowledge”, thereby rendering them
“knowable” and “seeable” but only through their misrepresentation in a “modern” political
discourse. Through integration projects predicated upon “exclusive inclusion” politics (Lindroth
and Sinevaara-Niskanen, 2016), the categorical residuals, or excess, is simultaneously co-produced
within the HRF and unaccounted for as incommensurable values that don’t map easily onto a
modern political resilience design.

In what follows, I build upon Geographer Emily Yeh’s (2016) critically reflexive review
of her positivist attempt to employ an agent-based model for thinking through pastoralism
resilience along the Tibetan Plateau. Yeh provides a problematique for such scientific endeavors,
in which “systems” (power and politics), “knowledges”, and “ontologies” are problematically
unaccounted for within a Social-Ecological-Systems view (a rationalist epistemology). Yeh
illuminates what I refer to as matters of excess, that is, bundles of things that problematized the
co-production or knowledge integration project in her project. I share similar concerns with Yeh
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and other scholars (Goldman et al. 2018), in regard to these matters of excess, which I unpack in
the following two sub-sections.

Power and Politics
Appearing within the resilience category of “environment”, the indicator, “Healthy
Bofedales and Grasslands” was a highly recurrent variable both within (with frequency) and across
the plurality of adaptation imaginaries. The common vision for a healthy highland
grassland/wetland ecology in Quilcayhuanca seems to be of central importance among State, NGO
and campesino informants and participants. Yet, despite what appears as a highly synergistic
resilience indicator within the HRF, and thus, a potentially feasible objective for adaptation
planning, the topic is highly political and contentious. Working toward a shared objective of a
“healthy” bofedales and grassland ecology is being enacted in a multiplicity of conflictual ways
(as discussed in Ch.3), and is perhaps the locus of struggle across the plurality of adaptation
imaginaries converging in Quilcayhuanca.

The ensuing friction between a plurality of partially connected and highly contested visions
of what “healthy bofedales and grasslands” are, and how to achieve this resilience goal, is obscured
in the project of integration. Reduced to a shared code, radically divergent adaption imaginaries
are rendered same. Although multiple natures are not represented in the HRF, and this is
problematic in this case, the point that I am highlighting here is the omission of power and powerrelations. As Yeh suggests, “the representational form of SES [the same theory underpinning the
HRF] privileges proximate rather than underlying structural and historical processes […thus,]
relational power, interest, multiple social identities, and interplay of structure and agency are
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difficult to represent and thus easy to lose sight of” (2016:4). The HRF’s inability to move beyond
proximate causes and accommodate root causes of vulnerability (i.e. power-relations, colonialism,
capitalism, extractivism, etc.) into the co-production of climate adaptation knowledge and futures
– even when taking a participatory approach – is a critical failure that is likely to result in the
(re)production of uneven development and social vulnerability across the highlands.

Like other scholars have already pointed out (Yeh, 2016; Goldman, et al. 2018), resilience
frameworks tend to obfuscate the political systems and historical processes that, according to
political ecologists, play a fundamental role in the construction of vulnerability and resilience.
Instrumentalist approaches to the co-production of knowledge, those that seek to produce “useful”
knowledge for the governance of society, are notorious for a practice that tends to ignore how
“knowledge, power, and world-making practices are mutually reinforcing” (Goldman et al.
2018:6). The implications of a-political and a-historical renderings of resilient worldings are
drastic, risking the reproduction of old and new environmental and social harms that condition
precarious natures and subjectivities. While proximate causes and solutions are easily identified
by naming a resilience indicator, the deep structural causes, such as colonialism and capitalism,
are left unnoticed and unaccounted for in the HRF. However, omissions of this kind do not mean
that political implications are not felt on the ground, instead it is through the making of this excess
that power-imbalances and social inequalities are further entrenched. While this point has been
made evident by other studies of climate adaptation practice (see, Noxolo and Featherstone, 2014;
Daly, 2016; Goldman et al., 2018), I also want to capture it here, as Campesinos’ livelihoods have
become criminalized through the narratives driving the Capitalist-State’s adaptation imaginary
(see ch.3), and specifically the need/demand for “Healthy Bofedales and Grasslands”.
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While the equivocal homonym – the resilience indicator – renders difference same, I
contend that the substantive meaning embedded in the Camepsinos adaption imaginary for a
“Healthy Bofedales/Grasslands” is not the same as that held by the State nor NGOs. And these
differences, left unaccounted for, have grave political, cultural and material implications for the
campesino inhabitants of Quilcayhuanca. As resilience scholars have long argued, the normative
assumptions of resilience projects must be adequately addressed. Any reading of resilience must
question the resilience of what, and for whom. This is because resilience at one scale, or for one
world, can simultaneously reduce or diminish the resilience at another scale, or for another world
(Carpenter et al. 2001). Therefore, attention to the power-relations that inform the co-production
of indicators and the always partial reading of indicators must be accounted for.

Onto-epistemologies (Ways of Being and Thinking)
Moving on from matters of excess within the domain of power and politics, I would like to
now consider matters of the epistemological and ontological sort that also cannot be fully reduced
into and captured by the techno-scientific logics of the HRF. While it is arguably important to
maintain a definitional division between what constitutes the epistemological and what is
ontological (Goldman et al., 2018), I am combining the two here, into a domain of ontoepistemology. This is because, while participants discuss knowledge or ways of knowing, it is
nearly impossible to strip-away the ontological underpinnings (implicit, or explicit) attached to
these statements. Therefore, I suggest that the division between what is a matter of ontology and
epistemology, at least in this case, should not be maintained, as the erasure of ontology from the
discussion of climate knowledge would simply explain away the radical difference.
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“Traditional Ecological Knowledge”, or “TEK”, is another seemingly synergistic indicator
of resilience, appearing within and across the three adaptation imaginaries. As a synergistic node,
it would appear as though there is intergroup consensus for the use and integration of traditional
ways of knowing within resilience planning, and that this would likely enhance the likelihood of
“climate-smart” adaptive governance. This view is not only reflected in the HRF but is widely
promoted from the corners of resilience theory, adaptation practice and Indigenous peoples. Yet,
the notion of TEK is not without its tensions. “TEK” is full of misunderstandings and
equivocations (Ingold and Kurttila, 2000), falsified as “pure” – without global connections
(Agrawal, 1995), and the project of integration is laden with power-imbalances and at-times, has
been understood as a form of structural violence that extracts and dislocates knowledge from its
knower (Nadasdy, 1999).
Yet, what conditions enable “TEK”, a counter-hegemonic tool for indigenous
empowerment ends, to be rendered “TEK”, a discrete and static object that exists as an artifact to
be “isolated, documented, catalogued, and integrated into science” (Goldman, 2019:7), and for
scientific and instrumental political ends? The different notions of what constitutes TEK, how they
are (re)presented through the HRF, and thus how they become enacted (instrumentally or
otherwise) by adaptation planners and decision-makers, is precisely the matters of excess that the
HRF cannot accommodate nor make legible. In what follows, I argue that TEK, as a resilience
indicator, is problematically reduced to a knowable, monitorable, and measurable object,
dislocated from the place-based practices and knowers that render this knowledge system
meaningful. Worse yet, when TEK is integrated into science for environmental rule, it becomes
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another biopolitical tool for a neoliberal governmentality — a means for conducting the conduct
of indigenous peoples.
Tim Ingold and Terhi Kurttila (2000) distinguish between two enactments of TEK may be
helpful to illuminate the radical difference that exceeds the HRF. For Ingold and Kurttila, TEK
can be distinguished between what they call “MTK”, or traditional knowledge when enframed by
a modernist discourse, and “LTK”, the renderings of traditional knowledge as generated in the
practices of locality (2000). Though risking another over-simplified binary, this framing is useful
to illuminate the onto-epistemological differences that are rendered invisible by the equivocal
homonym – “TEK”. The differences, are not just for definitional clarity or technical accuracy
regarding what is TEK, rather there are material, political and ethical implications depending on
which rendering comes to matter and is enacted. When TEK becomes a discourse of the State,
critical scholars warn against the troubling ways in which this can result in the exploitation and
appropriation of indigenous knowledge as commodities within a global knowledge economy
(Goldman et al, 2019:7) and can reify the hegemony of the One-World-World in “non-modern”
worlds (Law, 2015).
TEK appears within the HRF as an indicator, or characteristic, for building a resilient
Quilcayhuanca valley and sub-watershed. While the “TEK” concept appears across State, NGO
and Campesino imaginaries, it does so in different ways. The concept’s appearance within the
State Imaginary is minimal, while it features popularly among NGO informants. However, within
the campesino imaginary, the phrase “traditional ecological knowledge” is not actually used by
campesinos at all, rather, agro-pastoralists’ references to traditional or contemporary local
knowledges, a campesino “pensamiento” and “old” ancestral practices as ways of becoming
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resilient to climate change are translated as TEK for the sake of comparison and knowledge
integration within the HRF.

Expressed in the State and NGO adaptation imaginaries, TEK is akin to Ingold’s
description of MTK, and is generally understood in-terms of information bites or technologies that
have instrumental use value in the co-production of knowledge for climate change adaptation. In
this way, TEK is indeed understood as a discrete and stable (unchanging in time and form) object,
entirely separate from a Modern-Scientific knowledge, and usually belonging to the
campesino/indigenous past. Sr. Mendez, a government representative for the Department of
Agrorural, articulates the need for TEK in climate adaptation work this way:
If we look at the soil, the farmer no longer manages the soil […] the soil is
exhausted and consequently it produces less. If we start using chemical fertilizers
which we know are saline substances that kill the microflora of the soil, this also
makes the soil poor. So, it’s necessary to raise people’s awareness about what they
used to call Pachamama, Mother Earth, because they used to take care of their
land, but now that word seems to have lost weight, they don’t care about their land
anymore […], more people are migrating to the city, we see some abandoned lands,
or if they are sowing, they are doing it wrong, or also doing inadequate crop
practices. (Sr. Benjanín Tito, Agrorural, 27 July 2016)

While Sr. Mendez’s comment can be critiqued for an overt neoliberal governmentality and
the “denial of coeval” (cf. Fabian, 1983), what I find disturbingly novel about this statement is that
through a frame of “local traditional knowledge” as MTK, this onto-epistemology has become so
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dis-placed from its place-based origins, that it is now the property of the State and consequently
the prerogative/obligation of non-local actors to teach TEK, and specifically, to teach it to the
highland campesinos. In this rendering of TEK as MTK, local knowledge is alienable and extracted
from its producer/knower through the performance of the ontological occupation of the OWW.
Instead of asserting TEK as a knowledge produced through relational practices of the localized
kind, TEK is now the discourse and property of the State.
In a similar vein, Sr. Velasco, Director for a local office of the International NGO CARE
argues the importance of TEK for adaptation and resilience building, and through a rationale of
“integration” sees his role as the “savior” of this old “traditional” technology, and for instrumental
use in the contemporary crises. Velasco states:
“Adaptation measures to climate change are not necessarily new technologies,
they are also measures from other periods, what we do is to recover them and
make them available and perhaps improve them, but as I said, […] it's always
about rescuing, identifying what actions they have been doing over the course of
many years that they have been adapting, in order to see how we recover these
cultures, these customs, [that is what] integrated management is about.” (Sr.
Felipe Velasco, NGO Director, 18 July 2016)
Articulated in both the State and the NGO adaptation imaginaries, TEK took on a meaning of a
“lost” or unearthed knowledge from a period past. Again, the “denile of coeval” is palpable in
these statements, and mantras from salvage anthropology resound. As long as these visions of the
MTK kind become empowered, materializing into practices and projects for climate adaptation,
TEK cannot be a vehicle for asserting ways of knowing and being of the localized kind – it will
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not result in the empowerment of a “Native Resilience” – rather, local knowledge as MTK is an
artifact of the past, and viewed this way will continue to authorize the State and its experts as the
keepers of this onto-epistemology.

TEK within the campesino imaginary is different, however. Contrary to Sr. Mendez’s
claims, local practices of the “traditional” kind are indeed those of the so-called lost art of caring
for the land; and moreover, they are not all forgotten to a romanticized indigenous past. As Esteban
Nicanor, an elderly campesino, described the difficulties of unseasonal and unpredictable frosts to
me one afternoon in Llupa, this “care” was conjured up. Esteban explained to me his agrarian ways
of adapting or coping after a terrible frost, saying that:

“Of course, where the cold snap hits things are ruined, but if there is a small section
[that survives] - with just that you can sustain yourself with food, with what’s left
over. And also, that which is injured by the cold sprouts again if it’s still young. If
it’s mature it can’t anymore.” […] “If everything was ruined, we turn the soil over
and replant [in the original place- meaning that they care for what survived]. That
is our way of doing things here.” (Esteban Nicanor, 17 January 2018)

Nurturing what remains, a relational and mindful practice of caring for and nurturing the
crops, is a feature in the current “traditional” knowledge that the State does not recognize, but that
is an enactment of the core relational ontology – a campesino way of worlding with Pachamama,
even if not always by that name. Prayer and spiritual offerings are other enactments of this
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relational ontology that are also dismissed by the State as “fatalistic” or superstitious “beliefs” and
are seen as having no place in building a resilient future.
“Prayer is what we do when we have no other way” – campesinos who attended the first
participatory workshop informed me. Prayer, as an adaptive strategy was a recurrent theme in the
campesino adaptation imaginary, but is quickly dismissed or reduced to “fatalism” in development
discourse, understood as “wishful thinking” and “maladaptive” (Le Dang, Li, Nuberg, and Brewer,
2014). As Le Dang et al. state, “[farmers] are less likely to intend to adapt when they are subject
to wishful thinking, the denials of climate change risk, and fatalism. A belief in fate, in the
protection from God, and the denials of effectiveness of adaptive measures obviously lead to less
adaptation intention” (2014:20). While ecological economics puts forward an inverse relationship
between adaptation action and a “belief in God”, I would like to propose an alternative
understanding grounded in ethnographic moments. Prayer, instead of “inaction”, is the enactment
of a relational ontology when this ontology is extended beyond a OWW ontology. In this way,
prayer is not fatalistic at all, prayer is hope, and specifically hope in hopelessness. Practices of
prayer and spiritual offerings that constitute acts of hopeless hope by Quilcayhuanca inhabitants
are understood as “a way of making a way out of no way” (W.E.B. Du Bois, 2004). The reduction
of this ontological difference to a label of “fatalism” is to make the mistake of ontological
occupation, asserting a modern rational ontology (with its own “beliefs” rooted in objectivity and
techno-optimism) over all others.
One January afternoon, while visiting the home of Paola – a campesino woman who I had
become good friends with – she began to speak about “pensamiento” and specifically about an old,
or traditional, campesino way of thinking in the highlands. The traditional “pensamiento” as Paola
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called it, “was about relationship with Pachamama and relationship with each other” – it was (and
continues to be) a relational ontology that fosters “thinking-feeling with the Earth” (see Escobar,
2015).56 Paola’s summoning of Pachamama into our conversation arose through her reflection on
the increasing need for plata (money) – due to the breakdown of alternative support systems in the
highland – to get things done around the house and fields. Like the State official, Paola also
distinguished the present and future tense as different from that of only a decade or two prior.
Before, she recalls, “there was always enough support for one another”. For Paola, the weakening
of communal relations with each other (human and nonhuman) has increased dependency on cash
earnings and is closely linked to a new generation of afflicted relationships with Pachamama.

As Paola put it, “without Pachamama, we would not exist […] and, so we give thanks and
we share with our families and friends” (Paola, 2018). She reflected on giving thanks (“prayer”),
though not through pagos de la tierra per se, or other iconic symbolic Andean rituals, her silent
offerings were none the less to the source of all life in the highlands: for the mountain waters and
crop harvests that the LTK suggests Pachamama provides. For Paola, Pachamama is the force that
runs through all beings in the highlands, with no distinction made between life and nonlife,
between nature and society. As Paola spoke, I understood Pachamama, not only as Mother Nature,
as the State official had earlier suggested, but as a relational and agentive force across all those
belonging to and dwelling en el campo and in this world.

56

The terms sentipensar and sentipensamiento, feeling-thinking, are reported by Colombian
sociologist Orlando Fals Borda (1984) as the living principle of the riverine and swamp
communities of Colombia’s Caribbean coast. They imply the art of living based on thinking with
both heart and mind. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbJWqetRuMo. Sentipensamiento
was later popularized by the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano as the ability found among
popular classes to act without separating mind and body, reason and emotion (see, e.g.,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wUGVz8wATls).
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That which can be interpreted and expressed from noun-chunks within the HRF – “TEK”
– does not and cannot come intact with this complexity. As a resilience indicator, “TEK” does not
name which framing, an MTK or LTK, will become enacted. Therefore, the equivocal difference
remains hidden, such differences that will enact radically different world-making practices, from
those of reciprocity, nurturing and care to other practices of extraction, occupation, capitalism, and
techno-engineering. This, the erasure of difference, is the problem of discursive practices, one
must always be aware of what is said, yes, but ever more so, aware of that which cannot be.

Such onto-epistemological matters of the campesino kind are arguably that which exceed
the HRF logics. Alternative worldings (ontologies) are often not predicated upon Western
Cartesian logics, and thus the binaries of human and non-human, life and non-life, and culture and
nature, do not hold. Thus, how is it possible to box-in alternative animated worldings and relational
ontologies into Western categorical frames predicated upon a “nature” and “society” divide? And,
how can the HRF “environment” accommodate Pachamama and take seriously relational adaptive
strategies of “prayer”, “nurturing” and “care”? How can things of a sacred epistemic landscape
enter into the HRF and inform the politics of adaptation decision-making?

The equivocal differences are the matters of excess that exceed the HRF, and when made
visible they reveal the ontological politics underpinning adaptation projects. However, these
ontological tensions are not new within adaptation efforts, or even development, rather they are as
old as Enlightenment thinking and colonial occupation itself. Gustavo Esteva (2001) and
Guillermo Bonfil have written on a similar phenomenon of multiple ontologies within an occupied
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Mexico landscape. Esteva articulates an ontology of deep Mexico, “Mexico Profundo”, as a way
of being that is juxtaposed to the compulsive obligation imposed by the Capitalist- State Mexico
Imaginary that seeks to ‘develop’, or ‘modernize’, into the likeness of the Western model.
According to Esteva (2001:122):
“…in the cosmology of deep México, no such drive exists. Those who live in this
Mexico cannot conceive of an escape to the future. Some groups preserve a
traditional mentality that makes the past destiny and transforms the future into the
eternal repetition or a return to origins. Increasingly, though, the majority of them
avoid breaking with the past without tying themselves to it, giving historical
continuity to tradition without making it static.[…] They know they cannot exist
without a vision of the future, but they do not pretend to control that future: instead
of the arrogant expectations of modern man, based on the assumption that the future
is programmable, they maintain hope, well aware that these may not be fulfilled:
they nourish them to keep them alive but without holding onto them” [my emphasis
added].

Conclusion
In light of universalizing traditions radiating from European centers and ongoing colonial
acts, I argue that scholars and practitioners of resilience must grapple with the Eurocentricism of
“resilience” as a world-making (i.e. “worlding”) design that asserts a certain onto-epistemology
as a global way of knowing and being. In this way, finding decolonial approaches to adaptation
and development (among other modernist projects of late liberalism) is essential for building just
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and sustainable futures. Decolonial activists and scholars who have not abandoned development
altogether suggest new ways for working together in difference, and a praxis that renders the
modernist tools (i.e. models, frameworks, concepts, etc.) plural, opening them up to multiple ways
of knowing and being, so that there is a decentering, a de-privileging, of Eurocentrism’s hegemonic
authority.

In this way, I am not arguing that “resilience” cannot be used as a heuristic tool and a
“boundary object” with malleable meanings constructed by diverse ways of knowing and being,
rather, what I am arguing is that when this conceptual tool becomes a tool for political ends (a
technology of government) it must grapple with the profound epistemological and ontological
issues that it has yet to address in order to achieve liberal claims of inclusivity and participatory
equity (Leach, 2008; Cote and Nightingale, 2012; Goldman et al,. 2018). To date, the work on this
has considered the issue of applying a single epistemology across multiple systems (i.e. ecological
theory and principles applied to “human” systems) (Cote and Nightingale, 2012), but adaptation
and resilience scholarship are only just beginning to really problematize the integration of multiple
epistemologies and multiple ontologies in world-making practices (i.e. adaptation-development).
This goes beyond efforts for interdisciplinary research or science-policy boundary work, and
instead requires a kind of radical pluralism that takes the notion of the world multiple seriously.

Taking a cue from Arun Agrawal, I encourage us to push off fears of relativism, which “are
prompted more by perceived dangers to academic turfs than any ‘real’ relativist threat” (1995:427).
“Genuine synthesis” across multiple knowledges and world-making practices is highly encouraged
in the view of this author. What is not supported here are the current efforts made in the name of
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sustainability, resilience, and vulnerability that fail to open-up for radical difference, and in doing
so perpetuate a legacy of coloniality that moves by the categorization and hierarchical
classification of things around Eurocentric mental constructs that name “reality” (Quijano, 2000;
Escobar, 2018).57 This requires a situating of rational thinking, a decentering of Science as the
ultimate arbiter of Truth for a universal real, and reorienting Science to the sciences (plural), as
simply situated knowledges with great descriptive and explanatory power, but as nothing more
and nothing less than situated knowledges. For Cote and Nightingale (2012:481), “fundamentally,
situating resilience research requires moving away from an inference approach whereby abstract
institutional criteria (such as flexibility, diversity, connectivity) are determined in advance and
tested on the ground. Rather, principles of resilience must be drawn out of situated systems where
socio-cultural issues and social relations of power mediating environmental decision-making are
observable” (Cote and Nightingale, 2012: 481). This methodological correction requires an open
approach all the way down, meaning participatory research that is simply extractive will not work.
Rather an open approach that is inductive (rather than deductive) and requires work with
participants before any categories of resilience are designed is essential. In the reflexive example
provided here, the expert derived categories of resilience are precisely what renders this
participatory research study extractive and without the participants, as well as what carries out the
work of coloniality in new forms of the modernist project.

My argument is well rehearsed in post-colonial scholarship. That is, the hegemony of
impossibility that accompanies the ontological occupation of a One-World-World has been and
57

Quijano’s theory of coloniality is a powerful demonstration of the ills of Eurocentrism through
an analysis of “race” as a mental construct radiating from the West and instituting new categories
and classification systems that enabled violence (genocide) via legitimized racism. What the
coloniality of the power enables is a killing of alternative ways of knowing and being.
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continues to be catastrophic in North-South encounters. This occupation reduces difference and
eliminates that which it cannot fathom. In order to avoid the re-articulation of processes and
experiences of domination in contemporary adaptation planning and policy (design), it is argued
that it remains of critical importance to invite subaltern/indigenous58 groups to decision-making
spaces (Persons et al. 2016). However, this cannot be taken as a simple task of populating predetermined categories of resilience or sustainability, but rather, to (re)imagine the entire futuring
project itself, and to take seriously alternative ontological renderings, world-making visions and
“epistemologies of the South” (de Sousa Santos, 2016). This call is widely found across
postcolonial studies, indigenous methodologies, and the environmental justice scholarship; yet, it
has not been well articulated across the body of climate adaptation literature.

If cultural relativism has any lesson for sustainability and international development, it is
that it is and always has been problematic to impose conceptions of reality and morality – what
constitutes good or the good-life – universally across all social heterogeneity. As Escobar argues,
“It is no longer the case, as neoliberal globalizers would have it, that one can only contest
disposition and argue for equality from the perspective of inclusion into the dominant culture and
economy” (Escobar 2001:169). Rather, positions of difference and autonomy are increasingly
becoming valid, and it’s here that we might find a new hope for a reasonable pluralism (Ibid).

Reducing all world-making projects to the logics, values and visions of capitalism,
liberalism, rationalism, colonialism and the rest, would be to allow for the continued hegemonic

58

“Indigenous” is used here to signal all groups of social alterity that do not have such a powerful
category to work from… ‘local’, ‘native’, ‘traditional’, ‘ethnic’, ‘minority’, quite simply all peoples
who have existed on the periphery or outside of “capitalist-modernity”
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rule of the OWW. Instead, new proposals are being put forth to encourage construction of the
Pluriverse, as opposed to a universe. Such proposals encourage thinking and doing otherwise, with
a commitment to de-colonial efforts and pathways for the emancipation of epistemologies of the
South (de Sousa Santos, 2016). When taken in the context of North-South collaborations, and
climate change and adaptation efforts in particular, the pluriversal perspective challenges
traditional development and design to become capable of entertaining a plurality of worlds,
knowledges, perspectives, and experiences, so future worlds are both resilient and attuned to the
particularities of place. Such adaptation designs must be done without privileging the OWW and
thus reifying its ontological occupation and further entrenching power imbalances and social
inequalities.
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CHAPTER 5
COLLABORATIVE SURVIVAL AND THE POLITICS OF LIVABIILITY IN
TRANSITIONARY TIMES
“Once started, the collaborative process takes on a life of its own, summoning up
new possibilities, each of which creates new knots of translations – all with their
collaborative frictions and concomitant new productions.”
(Marisol de la Cadena, 2016: 226)
As part of the participatory action research (PAR) methodological sequence, a second
collaborative adaptation workshop was organized with campesinos and included diverse actors
from the adaptation epistemic network.59 The multi-stakeholder collaborative adaptation workshop
took place on April 29, 2018, and brought together six representatives from five government
agencies, one development-NGO and eight campesinos to a gathering co-organized by Sr. Pablo
Pachari, President of the users’ association de Quebrada Quilcayhuanca and myself. The coorganized, multi-stakeholder, adaptation workshop was enacted through a PAR methodology with
the intention to co-learn and co-design (conceptualize and produce) climate adaptation options
otherwise – empowering marginalized adaptation imaginaries in what has been a decision-field
dominated by modernist design and developmentalist-adaptation visions. The workshop itself was
also a deliverable in an ethical obligation to my research participants, specifically for those whom
a peer-reviewed publication was an inappropriate exchange for their generous involvement in this
study.

The collaborative event began at 8:30AM and ran over its scheduled end-time of 12:30PM
by an hour. The turn-out of state representatives to the workshop was encouraging, a result of
59

For research design and methods see Appendix A
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researcher-participant relations over several years and networking through door-to-door
solicitation, waiting in offices and lobbies, and frequently emailing officials the weeks prior to
inspire agency representatives to attend our controversial, grassroots, and inconveniently
scheduled Sunday morning gathering. When over half of the government agencies solicited
gathered in attendance, I was both relieved that I did not fail the campesinos and somewhat
shocked that the State and NGOs (the trans-local climate adaptation actors) had seemingly come
to work with campesinos to address adaptation needs that mattered at the (sub)local scale. On the
other hand, far fewer campesinos than were anticipated participated in what was intended to be a
campesino-led conversation for climate change adaptation. Instead, Pablo, who had solicited two
representatives from each of the eight sectors of Quilcayhuanca, figured the risks of working with
the state weighed too great on campesinos’ decision to attend (Interview, May 1, 2018) – risks that
I would only come to understand after the workshop. In the end, there were only four men and four
women (not including Pablo) from the eight solicited sectors, only half of the total campesino
representatives from Quebrada Quilcayhuanca.

Once the workshop began, welcoming remarks were given by both Pablo and myself,
introductions were made by all, and the impetus of the workshop – as a “collaborative dialogue”
for creating climate adaptation options in support of campesinos’ ways of being in the Andes and
futuring visions – was clearly stated. Despite the impetus, the collaborative adaptation workshop
moved in another direction.
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Friction in Collaborative Engagements
A gripping stillness took over the room as the side-chatter, the settling of
workshop participants in their seats, and the sipping of tea and coffee came
abruptly to an end.
Silently, we listened. Quickly, the refrain came.
We listened for all too long, as two State officials harmonized in melodic statemaking arias. Wielding words that cut through a palpable energy of participation,
and truncated the rhythms of collaboration.
Chins down, eyes to the floor, campesinos endured the sharp tongue of State
officials. Nothing new, but rather a recommitment to the blaming, shaming, and
othering of highland pastoralism.
The discursive one-way attack was made possible through mounting science-fact,
truth claims of “overgrazing”. An onto-political view, proclaiming that those who
think and live in marginality are unmistakably those that must change for modern
society to survive its own climatic ruination.
Forging their political alliance, the representative of Agrorural and the former
director of HNP passionately promoted the narrative that adaptation in
Quilcayhuanca requires eviction of cattle and the foreclosure of traditional ways
of life. Effectively rupturing any possibility for co-livability.
I too heard the refrain and recognized all too well the act of structural oppression
in front of me. Pablo’s eyes would not meet mine, he had turned inward: silenced.
He was not going to end or refute the affront. Because, in his own words, “if some
is slandering me… without proof of what I see, [what can I do]? Sometimes when
facing this, saying it face to face is worse, one ends up fighting”.
With my heart racing and anger rising, I drew the boundary. Speaking, perhaps
out-of-place, out-of-turn. Did this expose my light skin privilege? Or, was it my
“response-abilty”? There was no counter-truth claim to be made, but a demand
for dignity not so much for being human but in-spite of being human – a
relational and ethical obligation for collaboration.60

60

(Quotes from post-workshop interview with Pablo Pachari, May 1, 2018, my

translation)
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When this moment of palpable friction had passed, Pablo and I reflected on the
workshop happenings. He lamented, “…first was the representative of Agrorural, who said
there were too many animals in the valley, and they’re damaging it. But, they don’t see
reality as it is. We saw where that oxide [sites of heavy mineral leaching] comes from,
there’s no cattle there. So, he’s talking about being realistic, but we are the ones who live
and see it daily. […] I’m looking at numbers but its not really like that. Sometimes they say
that they are the leaders and they earn money from the government and they can do many
things they want without taking in into account reality and without being there. So that’s
why usuarios don’t welcome state employees during assemblies, it’s different when you’re
an employee and get money from the state [to plan for adaptation/survival], [it’s] different
to sacrifice yourself […] and even endure [attacks] saying ‘we’re going to reduce, evict
that campesino.’ But, if they evict them, where can they go? How are they going to survive?
This is but only a job for the State officials, nothing happens, but we [campesinos], we
become more poor” (Pablo Pachari, May 1, 2018).

This vignette illuminates a moment of friction (Tsing, 2005) during a collaborative
encounter for survival in times of climatic ruination. The weaving of a multi-voiced, reflexive
narration by Pablo and myself is a view from a specific vantage point, a window into the messy,
relational and political dimensions of collaborative survival, or collaborative adaptation.61 Friction
61

I write this vignette from the collaborative adaptation workshop to allow for an example of the
“relational wager” between the State and the Other that Povinelli has captured in Economies of
Abandonment (2011). The relational wager is the erosion of the will to be otherwise, the slow
structural tactics of exhausting a culture and people. Against a history of oppression, what was
first co-produced from the relational engagement between campesinos (in their silence) and the
State (in its dominance), was the entrenchment of a hegemonic discourse of overgrazing that
explained away all conditions of vulnerability and precarity in the highlands and transcended
politics itself, as it shut down space for social alterity and dialogue across difference. The
discourse asserted a single causal reality upon all life and death in the highlands that failed to
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is what Tsing (2005) defines as, among other things, the collaboration between disparate partners.
As the analysis above argues, collaboration is not a neutral act, rather it is a space for potentiality
along an axis of livability and killing. Yet, for Tsing, autonomous survival is not an option, “purity
is not an option”; rather, “It is unselfconscious privilege that allows us to fantasize – counterfactually – that we each survive alone” (Tsing, 2015:29). “Collaboration is work across difference”
and this is not the innocent diversity of self-contained evolutionary tracks. Instead, the evolution
of our “selves” is already polluted by histories of encounter; we are mixed up with others before
we even begin any new collaboration, and worse yet, we are mixed-up in the projects that do us
the most harm (Ibid). Working in collaboration with one another for adaptation ends that do not
(re)produce structural violence and oppression requires paying attention to and working through
our shared histories of extermination, imperialism, and all the rest. (Tsing, 2015).

The Struggle for Survival in Capitalist-Climatic Ruination
What is it to struggle for survival in late liberalism’s climate change politics? The daily
struggles of the people that have to survive in hostile contexts in an exclusionary society, these are
silent struggles (Scott, 1984), and they are the type of struggle that I encountered while
participating in the collaborative adaptation workshop. Even when designed from a bottom-up
space and with emancipatory intentions, it proved to be an exhausting and exclusionary effort for
the subaltern group, the campesinos. Although I was the acting facilitator, in some ways I was deaf
and mute. I could make-out only some of the dialogue and I often could not say what I wanted to

account for the reaches of a global political economy. Drawing from this problem-framing, the
solution for campesinos’ survival was then predicated upon the discontinued use of ancestral
lands as communal pasturelands. Yet, this social project over its more than 50 years of
persistence and in its current form as an “adaptation strategy,” has never been a viable option for
highland campesinos.
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say (both conditions on account of a lack of language proficiency in Spanish and Quechua). This
positioned me similarly, in some ways, to many of the participating campesinos, who understood
enough Spanish to hear the oppressive patriarchal slander and recognized quickly that they could
not speak legitimately in this space of hierarchical knowledge/power.

Despite the best of participatory intentions for and with campesinos, the workshop still
privileged Western ways of knowing, being, and doing. Like the campesinos, I could not
understand everything spoken, but I too heard and felt the systemic oppression through the
resurgence of the State’s criminalizing overgrazing refrain. The refrain came fast and stern, like
the quick reprimand of an angry parent. Still, within the first hour of the workshop, the discussion
of climate change impacts in Quilcayhuanca was diverted to the shaming of those that overgraze,
and a narrative that perpetually blamed them for conditions of vulnerability and precarity in the
highlands. As two state employees, who self-identified as “friends,” continued their berating and
paternalistic rant, the President of the Quilcayhuanca usuarios committee, Sr. Pablo Pachari, hung
his head, his eyes covered by his worn and weathered hat, his entire being withdrew inward –
becoming the visual embodiment of what it is to be in a silent struggle. Feeling the affective
outcomes, the psychological and emotional intangibles of this “contaminating encounter,” I was
sure of what I had only heard prior through word and second-hand accounts, that campesinos’ very
way of life – their cultural distinction – continues to exist against an oppressive and dominating
force, a coloniality of power, that runs through liberal State discourses (including development,
climate change, and conservation). This moment serves as a reminder that “[c]ollaboration is not
neutral or even always positive. Collaborations are moments of coordination with each other in
which situations of livability – or killing – is realized” (Tsing, 2015:158). Climatic ruination
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necessitates discursive engagements of collaborative survival, yet, as Povinelli states, “if a social
otherwise is to emerge from the potentialities of this ordering of governance, then it must find a
way of persisting and enduring in these late liberal ways of making life, making die, and letting
die” (Povinelli, 2011: 29).62

A Quest for Alternatives
It is important to note that ending pastoralism in the quebrada was not the only adaptation
response strategy put on the table during the collaborative workshop. It emerged early on, and in
noticing the structural oppression attached to this vision, other participants (including noncampesino participants) and myself worked to steer the discussion in alternative directions.
Though the refrain was persistent and present, other adaptation strategies were brought forward.
Yet, no options were promoted from a highly localized onto-epistemology. Nothing from the
campesinos’ adaptation imaginary (i.e. ‘nurturing residuals,’ the ‘MINKA,’ or ‘Pachamama’) was
presented in this space. Instead, the two seemingly alternative adaptation responses that took hold
were projects for sensibilization and bioremediation – both of which tacitly design a future with
restricted or discontinued pastoralism.

62

Even when death itself may be the shared outcome between sovereign and liberal forms of
state violence, Povinelli writes: state tactics of late liberalism “would not be recognizable as state
killings. As Foucault rightly observed, the state rarely exercises its right to kill. Instead it directs
life, letting those who wish to swim against the tide to do so until they cross a line or exhaust
themselves” (2011: 118). Most opposition to alternative social projects (i.e. post-capitalism and
alternative development) happens in a different way from sovereign authority and drawn and
quartered bodies. It happens through an authorless wager, “that very few people [only a modernarchetype] will be able to continue to persevere in the face of prevailing material obstacles” [e.g.
climate change, famine, disease, poverty, oxidizing water]. So, the [relational] wager is made to
wait until an alternative social project exhausts itself, produces marketable values, or becomes a
serious threat to late liberal [society]” (Povinelli, 2011: 118-119).
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Climate adaptation responses that invoke projects of sensibilization were promoted by the
representative from Agrorural, Ing. Cesar Mendez, who lead with the argument that adaptation to
climate change is first and foremost a social-cultural project. Before material and technical projects
from “above” can commence, the regional officer proposed that both institutional barriers and
social issues within agricultural society must be addressed. For Ing. Mendez, cultural and
institutional barriers to climate change adaptation should be addressed through central and local
government actions that promote decentralized institutional arrangements and foster
environmental awareness among water and grassland users (collaborative workshop, 2018).
Engineer Mendez commented that, “there are state institutions that take some steps to do this type
of work, the last example was Sierra Azul,” who instructs alternative sowing and harvesting water
practices at the head of the basin, however, “the root [of the problem] is not being worked on,
which is the social-cultural part. If the social part is not solved, even if we have millions and
millions of dollars, we are not going to solve the problems” (collaborative workshop, 2018).
Themes of social and cultural change tacitly and overtly invoked by government participants
included such things as cultivating a new environmental ethic and value regime among
campesinos, that is, to be brief, more consistent with modernist values, beliefs, knowledges and
practices. Not surprisingly then, projects that champion changes to the highland culture of water
use were not met with much excitement among the campsinos. Such rhetoric is all too familiar in
postcolonial territories – as it embodied prior projects for cultural assimilation, agricultural reform,
modernization and conventional development.

However, there was sustained and multi-stakeholder enthusiasm for the proposal of
bioremediation. While still a technology of Science and a travelling adaptation idea from Western
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ways of knowing, campesinos expressed considerable interest in this green-engineering project
that worked with the localized multispecies assemblage in Quilcayhuanca to restore the quality of
water in the valley. The project was brought forth by an NGO through storytelling materials – a
video recording of a success story for remediation project that worked well in a neighboring valley
where the community endured a similar situation of water acidification resulting from rapid glacier
melt. Although the video was only a representation of the campesino community’s experience, it
allowed campesinos of Quilcayhuanca to interpret, in their own language and with their own eyes,
a similar struggle, and what appeared to be a viable life option. 63

The NGO representative spoke little of the project, but offered it as a collaborative
something that “we can do” nonetheless. Such a commitment to action, something that moved
beyond another study or investigation in this research fatigued community, was a powerful and
bold claim. The bioremediation project was, noticeably, a futuring design that appealed to the
usuarios of Quilcayhuanca. Yet, when the conversation became more serious, when the adaptation
imagining was materializing into adaptation action, no one but the NGO (operating from different
apparatuses of finance and mandate), was willing to hold the project. While many State actors
expressed interest and even produced their own ecological research for bioremediation in
Quilcayhuanca, the point of shared interest quickly deteriorated to a game of hot-potato, with
everyone claiming a lack of financial or institutional capacity for implementation and pointing to
other government institutions as those “responsible” (holding authority) for such work.64

63

The bioremediation project took place in the community of Cordillera Negra of the Cordillera
Blanca, just south of Quebrada Quilcayhuanca
64
For example, when the Regional Government of Ancash was singled out as the financial
institution for such a project, they agreed that this would normally be within their authority, but
there was institutional gridlock with the devolution of this power from the centralized governmental
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As the workshop came to a close, campesinos were left with few, and very modern and
scientific options for collaborative survival – or, better said, they were left with “the historically
produced hegemonic conditions of impossibility” (see de la Cadena, “Anthropos-not-seen”).
Though some adaptation strategies were discussed, they all emerged from a single ontology (a
capitalist-modern worldview) and the problem framing of ‘overgrazing’ (spoken or tacit). For de
Sousa Santos the problem is not that alternatives are lacking in the world, rather, “What is indeed
missing is an alternative thinking of alternatives” (2016:20) – an ontological re-ordering of things
to be sure. The first world has privileged a first-world way of knowing, or Science (with a capital
S) way of knowing the world. This Scientific way of knowing asserts truth claims and dominates
all other ways of knowing. But the world is much broader than what is captured by a Western lens.
If indeed the diversity of the world is infinite, as Santos argues, and this diversity encompasses
very distinct modes of being, thinking, and feeling – ways of conceiving of time and the relations
among human beings and between human and non-humans – the endless possibilities of alternative
life are wasted in the One-World-World. The failure of Western academics and development
practices is that they do not identify such alternatives, and do not, or cannot register them when
they are presented. Instead, when the “Anthropos-not-seen” make themselves of some account in
modern politics, their contributions are not valorized as valid contributions towards constructing a
better society.65 Contributions made by ‘Epistemologies of the South’ rarely count in dominant

authority, the Ministry of the Environment (MINAM), which prohibited their involvement at this
time.
65
“Anthropos-Not-Seen” is proposed by a foundational thinker in the political ontologies field,
Marisol de la Cadena. De la Cadena draws our attention to the Anthropos-not-seen and draws on
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s concept of equivicoations and Rancier’s definition of politics to
describe this phenomenon. Anthropo-not-seen, “is a world making process through which
heterogeneous worlds that do not make themselves through the division between cultural humans
and natural nonhumans – nor necessarily conceive as such the different entities in their
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world-making practices because they do not fit within the categories and values of the Western
world, rather they are devalued as non-rigorous and labeled ‘superstitions’, ‘opinions’, and
‘subjectivities’ (de Sousa Santos, 2016:20); as if Western science has a pure and objective hold on
reality. Practices of solution finding to serious problems across the world has moved forward along
this front for all too long, and it was the intention (although perhaps, failed project) of this PAR
methodology – the gathering of plural adaptation imaginaries and the collaborative adaptation
workshop – to find ways to mobilize onto-epistemologies otherwise (Povinelli 2012) in modern
politics of climate adaptation in the Andes.

A Collaborative Reflection
Two days after the workshop, and after a long day of potato harvesting, Senior Pablo
Pachari traveled into Huaraz to meet with me. It was an unusually difficult day for him to reach
me in barrio Jose Olaya as he was coming from a location higher and deeper in the mountains, and
as the colectivo drivers were taking the day off, recognizing el Dia de los Trabadajores
(International Worker’s Day). I was surprised to see Pablo arrive to our meeting, and had even

assemblages – are both obliged into that distinction and exceed it. The Anthropo-not-seen is both
the will that obliges that distinction and destroys the obligation, and the excesses to that will.” The
Anthropo-not-seen is an obvious reference to the Anthropocene, our contemporary geologic “time
of man” in which humans are capable of planetary destruction. And the suffix is a pun on ‘scene’,
turned into ‘seen’ and gesturing to the politics of representation. De la Cadena’s intention is to draw
attention to what are historically produced hegemonic conditions of impossibility, a shared intention
with Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Thus, the concept conjures up the antagonistic partners and their
antagonistic relationships within modernity. The Anthropos-not-seen, has a two-fold purpose, to
critically recognize modernist mandates of what it means to be human, and second, as relation, the
Anthropo-not-seen allow us the focus on – often through organized processes of destruction and
deteritorrializing, sometimes through benevolently offered assimilation – the silent war which
continues to wage against entities and world making practices that ignore the separation of entities
into nature and culture. Anthropos-not-seen speaks of those who did not abide by the mandate of
a division between nature and culture and that exceeded it. And, the antagonistic relationship
between those who exceed it and those that oblige. (For more description, see de la Cadena,
Rethinking Difference lecture [accessed at] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0cHsVjdvkCs).
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called him earlier offering to either make the trip myself or to reschedule when the buses were
running. He did not want to wait though, and preferred to meet in Jose Olaya. He was clearly tired
after the long travel, much of which was by foot. We ate fruit and drank tea while we reflected on
the collaborative adaptation workshop.

When I asked Pablo how he felt about the workshop, his answer was seemingly indirect.
He offered more of a parable than an answer. His response, a stream of consciousness, went from
one example of State and Campesinos encounter to the next. He highlighted such things as the
municipality’s tax collection, tourist fees generated from within campesinos ancestral lands, and
the lack of reciprocal investment in the local infrastructure. As I listened, I heard his response as a
genealogy of recent State-campesino relations leading up to the workshop, and situating it within
a living historicity of extractive-colonial State making practices. For Pablo, the workshop signaled
another moment of State abandonment.

Reflecting on this collaborative gathering together allowed for insights into the perpetual
condition of abandonment and the processes of erasure of modernity’s coevals, the inhabitants of
Quilcayhuanca, of the Cordillera Blanca, of the Andes, and of comparable subaltern contexts
across the world. Because a campesino world does not want to be made into the same world as
the modern world, the campesino world will be left to its own devices of survival or death. What
is apparent is that there is no support from a capitalist-modern state for livability/adaptation
otherwise. And, because it appears to be a matter of choice, no one can be accused of any acts of
killing. Instead, if I might claim any form of State violence, it is a weakening of the will to be
otherwise.
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From my own partial perspective, the collaborative adaptation workshop failed to amount
to social innovation, transformation, or the empowerment of a subaltern adaptation imaginary. It
did not become a happening for alternative forms of survival, rather it remained the sum of its
parts and nothing more than an exercise of conventional development, and a rather academic one
at that.66 It produced no immediate material outcomes, no promise of projects or drafting of action
plans. Instead, it was a participatory effort that led to another (re)articulation of a hegemonic State
ideology and the enactment of a dominant onto-epistemology.

Yet, as any scholar of collaborative engagements can tell you, the story does not end at
this. Rather, in the words of Marisol de la Cadena (2016: 218), “What results from collaboration
are matters of continuous negotiations that exceed intents, initial or outgoing; they branch out into
a larger process that includes agents far beyond immediate participants”. Thus, collaborations
create unintended alliances and connections between dissimilar peoples and worlds; they can also
produce transformations (Ibid). Transformation can occur as “[c]ollaborations draw attention to
the formation of new cultural and political configurations that change, rather than repeat, old
contests” (Tsing, 2005: 161).67

Through a Gramscian ‘optimism of will’ and a campesino philosophy of hopeless hope –
that hope still exists when one can “turn over the soil and nurture what remains” (Interview,

66

For “happenings” see Tsing, 2015
Although I am only drawing directly from Tsing and Marisol de la Candena here, the notion of
co-design for transformation towards sustainability has become of great interest to Global Change
researchers beyond this circle of anthropologists (see Moser 2016. Can Science on
Transformation transform science? Lessons from co-design. Current Opinion in Environmental
Sustainability, as well as the entire Special Issue).
67
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Esteban Nicanor, 17 January 2018) – I have strived to push beyond the outcomes of torn-up shreds
and patches offered through a deconstructivist critique. This means looking hard for openings of
potential livability in the cracks of hegemonic defuturing practices, moving beyond the vignette of
foreclosure, and unearthing and nurturing the possibilities for co-livability. Juxtaposed with the
critical rendering of collaborative adaptation above are the responses for the post-workshop
surveys. After the end of the seemingly oppressive gathering for collaborative survival, all fourteen
workshop participants declared their preference to continue on with adaptation efforts through
collaborative actions. And, ten of the fourteen co-collaborators identified the workshop as “very”
or “extremely” useful for responding to environmental change in quebrada Quilcayhuanca, as well
as the broader sub-watershed of Quillcay.

After the workshop, the campesino adaptation imaginary (according to Timiteo) remained
indeterminate, a condition of hopeless hope that does not claim to know what will be or how to
solve it, but rather is consistently fixed on working through collaborative engagements with human
and non-human others. The imaginary is not fueled by an aggressive passion in pursuit of fixing a
socionature but focused patiently on relational practices between actors of the ‘territorial
assemblage’ of Quilcayhuanca. Specifically, Pablo speaks of working collaboratively with codesigners from the participating institutions that had listened and responded to campesinos’ needs
and brought forth futuring possibilities (i.e. bioremediation without eviction), as opposed to the
defuturing projects (i.e. those that emerge from an overgrazing refrain) of old State-making
design.68 For the second time, I was surprised by this unwavering commitment to, or perhaps,

68

For ‘Territorial assemblage” see Laura Odgen, 2011. Swamplife
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radical acceptance of, making Anthropocene livability through collaboration – an engagement
even with those most conflictual and adversarial partners – in Quilcayhuanca.

Collaborative Adaptation for Transformational Becomings
As a globally produced phenomenon with localized impacts, the great capitalist-climatic
disruption promises to bring forth a series of uncertain events in which divergent worlds meet.
Learning to work together across social difference (ontological, epistemological, cultural,
linguistic, and ideological) in order to survive capitalist-climatic ruination will not be easy. Yet, as
my research participants have taught me, and as argued recently in social theory, “without
collaboration, we die”[…,] “collaboration, ugly and otherwise, is the human condition” (Tsing,
2015:pg).

The topic of collaboration has recently gained attention among scholars of global
environmental change (Ziervogel, Pasquini and Haiden, 2017; Moser, 2016 and see entire SI
collection). Collaboration and co-design are found prominently emerging across at least five
scholarly domains and are interpreted and carried out in myriad ways. However, collaboration in
the context of adaptation, ‘collaborative adaptation,’ or ‘multi-scalar adaptation,’ is increasingly
recognized as an adaptation approach that has transformative potential (O’Brien, 2017).69
Adaptation for social transformation is a complex nexus of ideas and discourse as both adaptation
and transformation remain contested concepts within a plurality of divergent understandings
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See O’Brien’s research proposal online at:
http://www.sv.uio.no/iss/english/research/projects/adaptation/news/adaptationconnects_updated
_project_description.pdf
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(Pelling, 2011; Fazey et al. 2018).70 Yet, consistently found across the generations of adaptation
scholarship has been the argument that incremental adaptation – “in which existing practices are
adjusted to make them better suited to changing conditions” (Few et al., 2017:2) – is insufficient
for survival in transitionary times (Kates et al., 2012; Few et al., 2017). Increasingly, the
presumption that transformational change – innovating new ways of being that renders social
organization other than what it is – is necessary to adjust or adapt to climate impacts is gaining
normative ground (Moser, 2016; Few et al., 2017). Transformation in this way is often associated
with discourses of “bringing about major change”, of making structural changes to society (Few et
al., 2017:2).

Found within recent scholarship, specifically feminist, indigenous, and critical
Anthropocene studies, is a view that our current epoch, or planetary transition – this, the age of
Man – signals a moment of all more intensive and pervasive capitalist-modernist global occupation;
as well as a global awakening to, and a radical opportunity for, overturning or exiting the structural
conditions that (re)produce defuturing futures and disutopias71 (e.g. extractive, patriarchal,
industrial, and colonial mindsets). Geographer and adaptation scholar Mark Pelling argues that,
“Climate change adaptation is an opportunity for social reform, for the questioning of values that

70

Transitions and transformation are not the same, but are used often interchangeably. The
distinction is made that transition is a subset of the later and is not a defined goal in and of itself
(Pelling, 2011:73). “Transitions and transformation processes in societies, or subsystems thereof,
change profoundly in terms of structure, institutions, and relations between actors. After a
transition, the society, or a subsystem, operates according to new assumptions and ‘rules’
(Jerneck and Olsson, 2008: 176, cited in Pelling, 2011: 73). Distinguishing between transition and
transformation, Pelling states that transformation is ‘an extreme case where profound change
alters the distribution of rights and responsibilities and visions of development across society”
(2011:74). The difference lies in the transitionary visions (claiming rights within existing regimes)
and transformational (replacing established political regimes with new rights compacts) outcomes
(Ibid).
71

See Kyle Whyte, Our Ancestors’ Disutopias
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drive inequalities in development and our unsustainable relationship with the environment”
(2011:3). While there persists a notion of the ‘good Anthropocene’, that is, the one that can be
controlled and exploited by familiar civilizational tools, there is a sweeping suspicion across a
diversity of critical thought that these are the myths of “‘ecomodernists’ who use the master’s tools
to refurbish the master’s house” (Tsing, 2017:16; Escobar, 2018; de Sousa Santos, 2016). The
problem is that such tools only reinforce capitalism, elite technology and canonical philosophy.
Even outside of social critique, environmental history and spiritual ecology, this notion has also
taken hold within the more radical-thinking of the transformational adaptation literature (Pelling,
2011; Fazey et al. 2018). Recently, Fazey and colleagues argue in the journal Adaptation and
Development that, “While scientific and technological advances have produced many benefits,
many current global challenges cannot be resolved solely by the same kinds of approaches that
created them. Instead, structural, social and cultural changes will be needed across societies,
including reconsideration of deeply held beliefs, assumptions and paradigms, and those about what
it means to be human (O’Brien, 2011; O’Brien & Sygna, 2013)” (Fazey et al. 2018: 197-198). When
adaptation works for these deep transformational ends, it is indeed a political, ethical, and
epistemological act, but not only. It is also profoundly working on an ontological plane; it is
ontological design that is calling for significant redesign of the modernist paradigm (specifically,
Cartesian philosophy, modern Science, and extractive capitalism) (Escobar, 2018:46).

The Political Ontology of Transformational Adaptation
As the scale and pace of destruction continue to expand through the massive
extractive operations need to keep the capitalist industry system going, these
issues take on added meaning. Environmental conflicts are often ontological
conflicts; patriarchal capitalist modernity entails the ontological occupation of
the existential territories of human and nonhumans; and people’s struggles are
thus ontological struggles. Hence the importance of placing design within its
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ontological politics, including the negotiation of what counts as political and
real.”
(Escobar, 2018:218)

In what Escobar has called the ‘ontological turn’ in social theory, design, policy and
planning have been drawn into conversation with ‘political ontology’. For Escobar design is
understood as world-making projects, and world-making is fundamentally ontological. “To plan, to
design, is an ontological act that leads to objects, tools, and even services that bring about particular
ways of being, knowing and doing” (Escobar, 2018).72 Ontologies are “philosophies of being”
(Tsing, 2017:15), they are held notions that constitute an individual’s reality about life, death and
non-life, as well as histories and future possibilities.73 The agentive making of histories, futures and
thus, nowness, requires the ability to engage ontologically. Discovering or “disclosing new ways of
being, of transforming the way in which we deal with ourselves and with things” is the most basic
unit of ontological transformation (Escobar, 2001:167). Adaptation is specifically a rationality for
re-worlding, it requires thinking and at times transforming how we interact with each other and
with “nature”. Yet, adaptation decision-making is rarely identified in-terms of “ontological design”,
‘world-making’ or ‘(de)futuring’ projects.74 The point here is that, adaptation to environmental
change is an ontological practice, and adaptation that embraces transformational ends of
modernity’s beliefs in ‘growth’, ‘progress’, or ‘what is human’, is a practice of world-making that,

72

Also see James Scott, Seeing Like a State, and Manzini’s theorizing of design
While this body of literature remains nascent, it has been faulted for maintaining human
exceptionalism, by multi-species theorists. However, in her excitement for this emergent scholarly
thought, Tsing suggests that, though all life forms may not make philosophical ontologies, all life
forms make ontics, and thus by focus on Hellen Verran’s concept of ‘ontics’ we can discuss
political ontologies among multi-species assemblages.
74
Here I am thinking of previous arguments from an anthropology of development, specifically,
“the making of the Third World” (Escobar, 1994); as well as gesturing to Tony Fry’s Futuring
design philosophy (2009, 2004)
73
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knowingly or not, engages in ontological politics, and is thus, arguably capable of engaging social
change at the roots of ways of being, thinking and doing.

Theories of change are central to conceptualizations of social change and transformation
(Pelling, 2011). Social change and transformation are often associated with bottom-up action,
through discourses of resistance to hegemonic tactics and oppressive norms, and in support of placebased innovation. Social innovation niches at the local scale are set in contrast with the dominant
socio-technical regime operating at the meso-level, and the larger macro-level of socio-political
organization. Mexican development critic, Gustavo Esteva (2015), distinguishes between three
forms of resistance and their concomitant methods of change: ontonomy, heteronomy, and
autonomy.
1. Ontonomy – when norms are established through traditional cultural practices; they are
endogenous and place specific and are modified historically through embedded collective
processes.
2. Heteronomy: When norms are established by others (via expert knowledge and
institutions); they are considered universal, impersonal, and standardized and are
changed through rational deliberation and political negotiation.
3. Autonomy: when the conditions exist for changing the norms from within, or the ability
to change traditions traditionally. It might involve the defense of some practices, the
transformation of others, and the veritable invention of new practices.

‘Autonomy’ is the pathway to change and survival underpinning Pablo’s adaptation
imaginary, as well as many other campesinos that I worked with. Although this is not a universal
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vision held by highland inhabitants, many of whom hold out no hope for cultivating relations of
care and support with the State, it appears to be an emergent and forceful political will arising from
within the local sphere. In this way, campesinos envision ‘staying with the trouble’ (Haraway,
2017), that is they are choosing to remain on their ancestral lands, within the domain of Huascaran
National Park, under State law, and in constant negotiation of their alternatively-modern livelihoods
along peri-capitalist edges. The shift, if their might be one, in their situated ‘trouble,’ through this
approach of changing traditions and practices from within, is contingent upon their position to
collaborate with trans-local actants. Here, radical social change depends on how far placed-based,
local, or niche social innovations are mobilized and articulated into dominant social institutions and
norms (regimes of power). There are several barriers found in the literature including, inflexible
regulations and laws (Unruh, 2000), over reliance on expert-technological fixes or solution-ism
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986), as well as the persistence of familiar-refrains, or the repetition of
onto-epistemic routines that blind professionals to development, design, or adaptation otherwise.
The barrier of onto-epistemic routines, also found within the adaptation literature and is argued to
result in path dependence, that reproduces current uneven geographies of power (Pelling, 2011).

Towards Adaptation Otherwise: Lessons Learned for Collaborative Adaptation
Thus far, I have attempted to map-out the scholarly relationships between collaborative
adaptation, transformational change and political ontology. Specifically, I have suggested that
collaborative adaptation is ontological politics that can yield transformational changes – even shift
the deep and at times unconscious beliefs and assumed wisdoms of capitalist-modernity. Yet, this
is not the main point of this chapter, nor of my three-years of collaborative work with agropastoralists in the Peruvian Andes. The purpose of storying this moment of collaborative
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survival/adaptation in the highlands, everything from its valorizing, failed, and ugly moments, is
to initiate the unfamiliar “arts of noticing” (Tsing, 2015), to illuminate the coloniality of power
that is performed and enacted in collaborative adaptation design spaces (formal and informal), and,
to set out a practice for decolonizing The Social Projects of Adaptation (and development more
broadly). My approach is not to wholesale abandon development, collaboration, capitalism,
science or government, but rather to learn how to make openings for thinking/doing adaptation
otherwise, and in a way that enables plural sustained worlds rather than ensures the sustainability
of the One-World-World while defuturing all others.75

This call for the construction of enabling environments for adaptation otherwise “requires
a significant reorientation of dominant adaptation from the functionalist, rationalistic, and
modernist/capitalist traditions from which it emerged, and within which it still functions with ease,
toward a type of rationality and set of practices attuned to the relational dimension of life”.76,77
With the remainder of this chapter, I draw upon experiences throughout this research, and
specifically, those from the project for knowledge integration (Chapter 4) and the collaborative
adaptation workshop discussed in this chapter, in order to sketch out some relational lessons
learned that I believe have some broadly transferable insights applicable for practitioners working
within the struggle for collaborative survival in Late Liberalism and our contemporary
transitionary times.

75

In a collaborative adaptation attempt, “the diverse set of actors must draw upon tools from their
own worlds, working to understand what can be understood about the diversity of worlds involved
and creating a shared space of collaborative social innovation that will be uncommon for all” (see
de la Cadena, 2015:4)
76
For a similar argument see Escobar (2018)
77
This is akin to what anthropologist Mario Blaser calls “life projects” and what critical design
scholar Manzini calls ‘collaborative life projects’
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Lesson 1: In recognition and defense of difference
Difference has its place. The goal of co-design and collaborative adaptation is frequently
understood among adaptation practitioners and designers as a project of consensus, building across
seemingly incommensurable world-views, beliefs, or value-systems. However, as I demonstrated
in chapter four, consensus building through the erasure of difference –

outcome of

modern/colonial reductionist hybrid designs – should not be taken as an assumed good or a
multiculturalism “win”. What has become apparent in the mapping of diverse adaptation
imaginaries converging in Quilcayhuanca are the important ways in the imaginaries are rendered
same but in which they also diverge. The “partial connections” are elements that both appear the
same through an equivocal homonym, and are also different. In this way, differences that are also
sameness, should be understood as only partially connected for their commonalities do not always
run very deep. For example, when campesinos, international NGOs and State agencies all come to
the table in a common ethic that “water is life,” the equivocations emerge as one realizes that the
former group understands water as the blood that courses through their bodies, families, farms,
and conditions their radical interconnectedness to “mother nature”, or rather, pachamama; while
the latter groups see water as something outside of the “human,” as “non-life” and locates it as a
commodity or resource to be managed efficiently and optimally. “TEK” was the shared sameness
that was also underpinned by ontological divergence in chapter four. Here TEK was described as
both ‘LTK’ and ‘MTK’ and the difference was again ontological: TEK as “transferable”,
“ownable”, and “archivable”, and TEK as experiential, local and enacted in relation to self, others
and pachamama. Such “sameness” that is also ontological difference results in radically different
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world-making practices (politics, language, economies, etc.) and incommensurable positions on
what constitutes viable climate adaptation projects. 78

While these misunderstandings and differences are seen as technical and social challenges
to be overcome by efforts of socialization, a shifting of the local worldviews and values, or through
the creation of improved resilience indicators and metrics, I suggest that ontological divergence
cannot and should not be “overcome”. Such efforts all too often are the imposition of one-way of
being upon another way of being, repeating old contests of becoming like the West – assimilating
and modernizing. Instead, I argue that some difference may be “productive equivocations” (Tsing,
2005) and some cannot, and should not, be explained away by global knowledge, policy discourse,
or expert rendering of reality. The goal of collaborative engagements should not be to make
sameness out of difference, but, rather to look for the partial connections and productive spaces of
becoming-with, even if not becoming one. To paraphrase Helen Verran (2013), a commoning –
that is to become community (and in this case an onto-epistemic network of multiple actors
belonging to the struggle for adaptation to radical environmental change) – will paradoxically
involve learning to refuse the colonizing reduction to a shared category, and accepting that we
(those involved in commoning) may not be metaphysically committed to a common world but
rather to going on together in divergence” (Cited in Blaser and de la Cadean, 2017:192).

Difference is essential. It is through difference and its associated frictions that social
transformation is possible – that “alternatives to the alternatives”, that is (re)structuring structures
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In Law’s framing of equivocations, he states that “‘this’ (whatever ‘this’ may be) is included in
‘that’, but ‘this’ cannot be reduced to that” (John Law, 2004:64) – a helpful heuristic that helps me
to begin to understand these collaborative misunderstandings.
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might be imagined and come into being. Yet, as I have shown through the vignette at the front of
this chapter, collaboration across difference is not without risk. The worst of collaborative
outcomes is the shutting down of will, possibility, and visions of the localized and autonomous
kinds – a slow and patient tactic of cultural genocide. However, as this chapter and other accounts
have illustrated, these outcomes are not uncommon in the context of collaborative environmental
governance and conventional development. Therefore, the sharable lesson learned during this
undertaking calls for: first, the respectful awareness of difference on its own terms (without
colonization or conversion into categories); and second, difference must be defended. To borrow
from James Scott:

“Utopian aspirations per se are not dangerous [...] where the utopian vision goes
wrong is when it is held by ruling elites with no commitment to democracy or civil
rights and who are therefore likely to use unbridled state power for its achievement.
Where it goes brutally wrong is when the society subjected to such utopian
experiments lacks the capacity to mount a determined resistance” (James Scott,
1998:89).

With an increasing global urgency for climate policy ambition, formal responses to climate
change have been understood as a political leverage for bypassing democratic processes within
world-making projects for the utopian vision of sustainability or resilience. As elite and scientific
claims for urgent climate action are likely to increase as humanity closes in on “tipping points”
and “dangerous climate change”. In these times, Belgian philosopher of Science, Isabell Stengers
warns against the coming barbarism, that is, the ideological force of a global technocratic elite that
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envisions a green salvation through an ethic of “sorry, but we have to” (2015:156). According to
Stengers’ prophecy, in the coming barbarism, survival will come on the backs of those who have
always suffered against dominant world-making projects through old and new tactics. As this
seems to be an all to probable fate, destined for the campesinos of Quebrada Quilcayhuanca, I
argue that difference must be defended.79

Lesson 2: Learning to learn from below
A subject-agent shift must be made possible. The work that is now needed by scholars and
activists of subaltern studies, as well as scholars and practitioners of global environmental change
(including climate adaptation) is precisely that of “learning to learn from the below” (Spivak,
2008),80 rather than to describe or treat subaltern groups. Spivak’s invitation is for the knowers,
experts and practitioners “to look at one’s own context, position, and complicities, to unlearn one’s
privilege” so to establish an ethical relationship to difference and to learn to learn from below.
This is precisely the second lesson that my fieldwork has brought me to (Andreotti, 2007:69).81,82

79

Povinelli’s work on otherwise is key here. “Again, if a social otherwise is to emerge from the
potentialities of this ordering of governance, then it must find a way of persisting and enduring in
these late liberal ways of making life, making die, and letting die” (Povinelli, 2011:29).
80
Spivak (2008) explains that the new subaltern studies must go beyond anthropological
description of the subaltern and “learn to learn from the subaltern”
81
I have written about this elsewhere through the theory of critical reflexivity – World-making
research and practice must exercise critical reflexivity, paying attention to its own positionality
within a practice continuum of ‘extractive’ to ‘empowering’ (Haverkamp, 2017).
82
Attempts for improvements to the coloniality of modern planning and international development
have already been undertaken, yet modern tools, however refined, continue to carry through a
coloniality of power. Therefore, I resist offering another technically prescriptive list of lessons
learned and policy recommendations. Rather than learning, my proposition is to unlearn.
Unlearn the lessons enshrined in our academic rigor and rationalism, in our capitalist drive for
efficiency and progress, in our evolutionary scheming and fears of finitude that unleash desires
of tech-optimist control… unlearn, so to learn of real alternatives to the modernist projects of care
that might be made possible in our very serious time of capitalist-climatic ruination, and so that
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De Sousa Santos argues that, “The problem is that after five centuries of ‘teaching’ the
world, the global North seems to have lost the capacity to learn from the experiences of the world.
In other words, it looks as if colonialism has disabled the global North from learning in noncolonial terms, that is, in terms that allow for the existence of histories other than the ‘universal’
history of the West. A hegemonic construction of knowledge claims and impossibilities is
precisely what needs to be resisted, so to open up to learning from multiple histories that enable
multiple futures. Learning to listen, or learning to learn, will however, not be simple. Rather, it
cuts deeply into the frequently misunderstood point of Spivak’s (1988) provocative question, “can
the subaltern speak?” As both this collaborative ethnographic moment shows, and as grand theory
suggests, the subaltern indeed has a voice, a vision and a will – and thus, the bypassed intention of
the inquiry remains – can the powerful listen?

The principle of dialogic cooperation — a conversation, of reciprocal exchange, in which
listening is as important as speaking – is argued to have made a huge difference in the coproduction of enabling conditions for collaborative/ life projects.83,84 “Collaborative life projects
resonate with the concept of life projects (Blaser, Feit and McRaw, 2004) that some indigenous
people in the Americas have been proposing in contradistinction to development projects. The

we can find a way of commoning (solutioning) together that doesn’t necessitate a universal way
of life but enables a world of many worlds.82
83
“Dialogism is a communicative reciprocal practice that might take place across worlds or
ontologies, making design for coalitions in which visionary capacity, dialogic process and diffuse
and expert driven design knowledge are all interwoven, with designers playing the role of
facilitator, activist, strategist, or cultural promoter, depending on the circumstances and the
character of the coalition at play.” (Escobar, 2018: 161?)
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indigenous concept is meant to make visible the notions of the good life emerging from their own
experiences in their place, and the ways it differs from the allegedly universal notion of the good
life offered to them by development projects” (Escobar, 2018:161). Establishment of dialogic
cooperation was never realized during the collaborative adaptation workshop chronicled here.
Instead, speaking to and being vulnerable with one’s oppressor proved profoundly difficult,
resulting in little being said from and for the campesino adaptation imaginary, and the domination
of a Capitalist-State adaptation imaginary. Moreover, the State’s ability to listen to, and cultivate
care and understanding with, those who it has deemed inferior proved a deaf note in the tune of
self-determination and alternative-adaptation designs. In this situation, the subaltern did not speak
(for fear of the persecution that arises when exposing their indigeneity), and nor did the powerful
listen.

For Manzini (2016:58), the capacity to listen is a crucial one and remains particularly
difficult, especially “for those who are still bound to the past century’s tradition of “big-ego
design”. At the end of the day, “the quality of co-design results largely depends upon the quality
of the ideas that came up in discussion. Thus, to adopt a dialogical approach, designers (grassroots,
experts, end users, etc) must actualize their willingness to listen and to also share their own visions
and ideas, and in appropriate ways” (Manzini, 2016:58). Actualizing a willingness to listen is the
art of not knowing and an uncomfortable practice for those who have been made to achieve by
displays of what they “know”.

Generating auspicious conditions for collaborative adaptation, co-designed, or ‘collective
life projects’ in a way that is not complicit with or emboldening the hegemony of
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rationalist/modernist world-making practices, demands the creation of supportive – that is, caring,
enabling, and nurturing – environments through appropriate “infrastructuring” (Escobar, 2018;
Spivak, UCSB lecture). “Infrastructuring” (not in a Marxist sense) refers to the relational and
invisible infrastructures through which non-material aspects of humanity travel (Spivak, UCSB;
Escobar, 2018:162; Manzini 2016; Star, 1999).85 It has been stated as a long-term effort aiming at
reworking existing relationships among a sociality (and one might add, a more than human
sociality) by exploring possible alignments between disparate interests (for more on
infrastructuring see Star 1999; and Star and Ruhleder 1996) (Seravalli et al. 2018:190). Such
communicative (but, not only) infrastructures have enabled flows of ideas, beliefs, and ontoepistemologies from the global north into “third world” and porous subaltern contexts for
centuries. Climate adaptation has been said to be one such a traveling idea (Weisser et al., 2014),
moving from the West into so-called “vulnerable” contexts and articulating with place-based
politics. In this way, climate adaptation can be understood as moving through established and
emergent global infrastuctures. In order to begin a subject-agent shift, infrastucturing that allows
for listening and learning from below, and dialogic cooperation is needed. “Enabling
infrastructures – the result of co-design and collaboration over time – are intended to counter the
defuturing infrastructures at the basis of most modern activities, subverting them from within (e.g.,
through retrofitting, broadly understood) or from without (via new designs) (Escobar, 2018: 162).

85

A guiding principle for co-design, infrastructuring, has been articulated as a long-term effort
aiming at reworking existing relationships among societal actors by exploring possible alignments
between their different interests (Hillgren, Seravalli, and Emilson 2011; Dreessen et al. 2015).
Additionally, Seravalli et al. (2017), consider infrastructuring a helpful approach in recognizing
possible frictions with existing logics and structures of the public sector. An infrastructure does
not grow de novo, but rather “it wrestles with the inertia of the installed base and inherent strengths
and limitations from that base’ (Star, 1999:338)” (Seravalli, Eriksen and Hillgren, 2017)
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Lesson 3: Bridge
Bridges and “border thinking” will be essential. Working across diverse cultures,
knowledges and ontologies requires intercultural translation. Intercultural translation is a hallmark
of anthropology, and consists of “searching for isomorphic concerns and underlying assumptions
among cultures, identifying differences and similarities, and developing, whenever appropriate,
new hybrid forms of cultural understanding and intercommunication that may be useful in favoring
interactions and strengthening alliances among social movements” (de Sousa Santos, 2016:22).
Drawing on de Sousa Santos (2016) and Stengers (2005), I suggest that intercultural translation is
a diplomatic act that is not neutral, rather must always be oriented against hegemonic and
imperializing forces such as capitalism, colonialism, and sexism, while moving towards social
justice, human dignity, or human decency (de Sousa Santos, 2016:22). The political work of
cultural translation between multiple worlds must move beyond anthropological description and
orient itself as a technology of belonging (Stengers, 2005) – always negotiating on behalf of which
world she belongs to. But not from an “either/or” demand that reinforces the “us/other” divide and
defutures alternative worlds, but rather from a conceptualization of “and/and”, a tool which opens
us up to the world multiple (Stengers, 2005).

Independent feminist scholar and activist, Gloria Anzaldúa’s powerful meditation on
bridges in liminal spaces, which she calls nepantla, allows for a deeply individual as well as
relational notion of what it means to bridge. Bridges, she acknowledges, allow for world-crossing,
travelling through, and interweaving. Yet, bridges are complex and two-fold. On the one hand,
they may be metaphorical infrastucturing objects that allow for such phenomena as “learning from
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below” (the focus of lesson two). In this sense, bridges have been understood as ‘boundary
objects’, fluid things designed for world-crossing. Yet, on the other hand, bridges are subjects with
agency who are caught in nepantla, the space where worlds meet.

To bridge, to become a bridge, means loosening one’s borders and not closing off to others.
“Bridging is the work of opening the gate to the stranger, within and without. To step across the
threshold is to be stripped of the illusion of safety because it moves us into unfamiliar territory and
does not grant safe passage. To bridge is to attempt community, and for that we must risk being
open to personal, political, and spiritual intimacy, to risk being wounded. Effective bridging comes
from knowing when to close ranks to those outside our home, group, community, nation – and
when to keep the gates open” (Anzaldúa, 2002:3). Not all stakeholders will engage in collaborative
gatherings in an ethics of mutual understanding, care, and listening. Rather, collaborative
encounters for Anthropocene survival will remain dangerous spaces of futuring potentiality,
producing outcomes of life and death. For this reason, cultural intermediaries (e.g. anthropologists)
are needed to bridge in the coming transitionary times, to become las nepantleras.

To bridge requires not only an understanding of cultural sameness and difference, rather,
to bridge ethically requires orienting oneself in the modernity-coloniality history in which we are
all situated, and doing away with demarcations like “us” and “other” [“nos/otras”]. “It’s about
honoring people’s otherness in ways that allow us to be changed by embracing that otherness rather
than punishing others for having a different view, belief system, skin color, or spiritual practice”
(Anzaldúa, 2002:4). This request to bridge is heavy. Juggling several languages, cultures, worldviews, imaginaries, value-systems, epistemologies and ontologies is a trying task that has resulted
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in exhaustion and complicity, but it has also resulted in a skilled “border thinking” – a mestiza
consciousness – that is most needed today for practices of diplomatic interweaving.

Anzuldúa (2015:82) writes that “our uncertain position as mestizas compels us to negotiate
the cracks between worlds, to accommodate contradictory identity positions and mutually
exclusive, inconsistent worlds. […] Nepantleras are not constrained by one culture or world but
experience multiple realities”. La nepantlera – the anthropologist, activist, or artist with mestiza
consciousness – offers an alternative self. They are intermediaries between multiple worlds, las
nepantla “speaks in tongues”—grasps the thoughts, emotions, languages, and perspectives
associated with varying individual and cultural positions. The work of nepantleras is bridging,
troubling the “us” and “other” divide. “Las nepantleras recognize that we are all complicit in the
existing power structures, that we must deal with conflictive as well as connectionist relations
within and among various groups. Ensuring that our acts not mirror or replicate the oppression and
dominant power structures we seek to dismantle, las nepantleras upset our culture’s foundations
and disturb the concepts structuring their realities. Las nepantleras nurture psychological, social
and spiritual metamorphosis” (Anzuldúa, 2015: 82-83).

Conclusion
In the times of capitalist-climatic ruination, those who can bridge are needed to midwife
the new de-colonial world-making practices in Anthropocene times. Those who can bridge must
bridge, and stretch themselves across altogether new ecologies of practice. Taking as my point of
departure in this chapter, a moment of structural violence in an attempt for collaborative
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adaptation, I argue that Anthropocene livability depends upon: 1) an awareness of, and defense of,
difference; 2) learning to learn from below; and 3) our collective capacity to bridge.
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EPILOGUE
In the contemporary moment, The Social Project of Adaptation in Quilcayhuanca
demands/necessitates a “sorry, but we must” ethic in which campesinos must voluntarily sacrifice
who they are for the possibility of a healthy (or resilient) highland ecology and water secure future.
In this way, I argue that the current Capitalist-State adaptation imaginary occupying
Quilcayhuanca offers no viable life options for highland campesinos ways of being and forecloses
on the infinite possibilities of adaptation otherwise. Elite and influential adaptation actors have
failed to listen, have known too much, and have explained away and subalternized alternative
adaptation imaginaries.

Yet, despite the oppressive and asymmetrical relationship between campesinos and the
State historically, and contemporarily – as performed during the collaborative workshop – Pablo
remains open to, and hopeful that, collaborative approaches will improve and an EbA
bioremediation project that does not evict campesinos (directly or indirectly) from their traditional
lands, will come to fruition. He recalls the representative from INAIGEM talking with him aside
during the workshop lunch: “They have told us that we will get together, hopefully true, there will
be a meeting… similar to the workshop. They [INAIGEM] said ‘we will also do it [the
bioremediation project],’ and, I will insist” (Interview, Pablo Pachari, 1 May 2018). Although
campesinos and state actors are gathering around the shared matter of concern – the acidifying
mountain waters – Pablo’s vision of bioremediation diverges from that which has been proposed
by the Social Project of Adaptation rhetoric. He does not speak of restoring the grasslands below
Q. Quilcayhuanca in hopes of passively pulling campesinos away from their traditional lands,
rather he describes that the bioremediation project must be within Quilcayhuanca, within the
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national park, and at the higher reaches of the quebrada where the acidification begins, “the
bioremediation has to be reconsidered there” he tells me.87 In this way, bioremediation is de-linked
from its hegemonic narrative of overgrazing and the unspoken, yet still powerful, enactments of
“modernization” through processes of capture and accumulation.

Taking my cue from Pablo, I remain committed to moments of productive collaborations
and equivocations for adaptation efforts. I refuse to pretend that global connections do not precede
this moment of capitalist climatic change, rather campesinos of the Andean highlands are already
mixed-up with vagaries of modernity, capitalism, and Science – all universals of the “West”.
Quilcayhuanca campesinos, like most Indinos of the Americas, exist in two or more worlds
simultaneously. This is what Gloria Anzaldúa calls being in “Nepantlera” (1987), and when
dwelling in Nepantlera, “purity” is not an option, rather “border crossing” and finding a way of
getting along together while also in respectful divergence is key for resisting totalizing and
imperializing world-making projects.

The Continuity of Coloniality
Working together, collaboratively across cultural, epistemological and ontological
difference in an effort to adapt to climate change must be done critically – which means in
awareness of the historical construction of our modern/colonial difference. In other words, all
worlds need to broach the project of remaking themselves from the critical perspective of their
historical location within the modern/colonial world system (Escobar, 2018:2010). As this study
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(Interview, Pablo Pachari, 1 May 2018).
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and others (Tsing, 2015) have shown, collaborative encounters are not always beneficial, they are
composed of ongoing power-imbalances, equivocations, and frictions. Therefore, I suggest that an
uncritical project of knowledge co-production, co-design or collaboration is one that will likely
exacerbate these issues and co-produce outcomes of social harms and even killings. If the task of
adapting to climate change calls for collaboration across a socially stratified world and ontoepistemological difference, then we must critically ask if The Social Project of Adaptation can be
extricated from its embeddedness in modernist unsustainable and defuturing practices and
redirected towards a tool for multiple worlds and multiple belongings – a tool for transforming the
hegemony of a One-World-World and transitioning towards a pluriverse?88

Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that a universalizing adaptation approach
(rationalist, capitalist and modernist) to climate change – what I call, The Social Project of
Adaptation – is a hegemonic global project that moves through performances (chapter 2),
neoliberal narratives and governmentalities (chapter 3), discursive practices of knowledge
integration (chapter 4), and collaborative governance (chapter 5). I have attempted to situate
adaptation within the broader schema of modernization and development and have argued that, in
its universal modality, adaptation programs, projects and policies reify social hierarchies and
conditions of precarity (i.e. vulnerabilities, inequalities and abandonment), through a coloniality
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I share this central inquiry with Escobar, who also positions this as the key issue of his book
Designs for the Pluriverse (2018). In Escobar’s words: “… again we confront one of the key issues
of this book: can design be extricated from its embeddedness in modernist unsustainable and
defuturing practices and redirected towards other ontological commitments, practices, narratives
and performances? Moreover, could design become part of the tool kit for transitions toward the
pluriverse?” (Escobar, 2018: 15)
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of power that colonizes the territories, knowledges and ontologies of the Other – the climate
vulnerable subjects.

But, is adaptation really like modernization and orthodox development? And, do adaptation
projects continue by way of colonizing tactics that fail indigenous peoples and ecologies the world
over? Let me begin by stating that this project did not begin as a study in search of contemporary
forms of coloniality, rather colonizing processes under the guise of “climate adaptation” are what
I found through an iterative three-year ethnographic approach that abductively oscillated between
fieldsite and theory. Indeed, the most appropriate analytical tool to articulate what I have heard,
seen, and felt is the “coloniality of power”. And, while I strive to articulate and theorize this
enactment of power from within The Social Project of Adaptation, it is not so to offer another
deconstructive critique of modernist or neoliberal adaptation as a wholesale bankrupt project, but
rather it is with a commitment to our interconnected global struggle of surviving the capitalistclimatic devastation that the world is already committed to. My critique should not lead to a call
for abandoning climate vulnerable communities (a neoliberal perversion of sovereignty), or the
end of adaptation across multiple scales, rather, it challenges us to work better, together.

To this end, I argue that adaptation, a rationality specifically designed for remaking worlds
and originating from Western centers of thought, must be done decolonially. In order to avoid rearticulating processes and histories of totalizing domination, contemporary adaptation planning
and policy (design) must delink itself from the coloniality of power of which it is embedded. A
decolonial collaborative adaptation approach will take seriously alternative ontological renderings,
narratives, visions, practices and so-called ‘epistemologies of the South’ (Escobar, 2108; de Sousa
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Santos, 2016). This is not a novel call however, and it can be found across postcolonial studies,
indigenous methodologies, and the environmental justice scholarship. Yet, it still has not been well
articulated across the body of climate adaptation literature (Parsons et al., 2016), nor implemented
in adaptation practice (Ford et al. 2012).89

I have found transformational adaptation – a practice that actively engages social change
and questions fundamental assumptions and taken for granted wisdoms of capitalist/modernity a
hopeful space for de-colonial work. However, transformational adaption has not gone far enough.
It discusses radical social and world-making change within a single nature that is home to many
cultures. Yet, this view for transformational adaption has yet to take seriously ontological difference
and recent discussions with the ontological turn in social theory (e.g. ontological pluralism).
Transformation that is simply the seed of a new culture that takes over the established dominant
regime is still a totalizing and colonizing project, is it not? Instead, the call that this dissertation
makes, is both ethnographically derived and theoretically connected and calls for transformational
adaptation and ‘transformation towards sustainability’ to re-orient itself towards creating enabling
environments for multinatures, multiple worlds, and multiple belongings: that is towards
ontological pluralism and towards the pluriverse.

89

From an indigenous studies of environmental change perspective, “a clear gap in sustainability
and transformation research is research that truly considers and is centered on ontological
pluralism and multinatures in the context of global environmental change” (Persons et al.
2016:100). Ford and colleagues also suggest that although alternative ways of thinking and doing
have grown in environmental change research, the subaltern, and particularly, “indigenous
peoples’ interests remain at the periphery of international climate change research and agreement
making, and there remains limited recognition that indigenous knowledge frameworks could (and
should) influence the processes and outcomes of climate change mitigation and adaptation”
(Persons et al., 2016:99).
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For these ends, a de-colonial process of de-linking (Mignolo, 2007) is called for.
International adaptation efforts originating from modern flows of capital and knowledge and
ontologies must be willing and capable of de-linking themselves (unlearning) the logic of
coloniality that mediates four spheres of modernity:
1) capitalism, the appropriation of land and the exploitation of labor
2) the control of authority
3) control of gender and sexuality
4) control of subjectivity and knowledge
How these four spheres of human experience are interrelated is by way of knowledge, racism and
capital – each of which I have dealt with in their own respective chapters throughout this
dissertation. While all of these spheres interact and are channels through which the project of
moderninty/colonialty travels, for Quijano, the starting point of the decolonial project is not in the
economic, cultural or political domains, but rather it begins with the decolonization of knowledge
(Quijano, 2007; Mignolo, 2007).

Delinking modern adaptation-development from the matrix of coloniaity from which it is
embedded requires foregrounding other epistemologies, other principles of knowledge, other ways
of being and doing, and consequently, other economies, other politics and other ethics. In this way,
privileged ways of knowing and being are de-centered (not destroyed) and set among many other
universals, leading to a pluri-universiality, or a pluriverse. What this shift enables is not more
alternatives within the universal way of thinking and being, but alternatives to the universal way
of thinking and being (modernity, rationalism, capitalism, etc.). “De-coloniality, then, means
working towards a vision of human life that is not dependent upon or structured by the forced
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imposition of one ideal of society over those that differ, which is what modernity/coloniality does
and, hence, where decolonization of the mind should begin. The struggle is for changing the terms
in addition to the content of the conversations” (Mignolo: 2007, 16-17).

The story of climate change and collaborative adaptation struggles that I have shared in
this dissertation are unfinished storylines with indeterminate endings. Thus, this dissertation has
no end. Rather the question which I leave for adaptation practitioners, activists and scholars, is
how might we craft encounters across onto-epistemological difference well? And, how might we
do this in a way that minimizes violence and maximizes the possibility of encounters that are as
peaceful, just, and open as possible?90 How can we world sustainable worlds together but also in
divergence, and without a totalizing, universalizing vision that socially engineers the One-WorldWorld?

90

I share these questions with John Law, as stated in (Law, 2015:134).
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APPENDIX A: METHODS
Semi-structured Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to gain a more holistic understanding of perceived
resilience characteristics or indicators held by governance actors (NGOs, international
organizations, and government bodies). The interviews ranged from an hour to an hour and fifty
minutes in length and were audio recorded. After exploratory interviews during preliminary
fieldwork in the summer of 2015, key informants were identified and sequential interview
informants were selected thereafter through criterion-chain referral. That is, interview participants
were asked to recommend another informant that was similarly involved with adaptation efforts in
the highlands. Recruitment of interview participants ceased in 2018 when no more further
interviews could be generated due to allocated research funds, yielding a total of 21 completed
interviews. Drawing on recommendations for qualitative interview design (Dunn in Hay, 2010),
the interview tool (see Appendix D) consisted of nine primary questions with prompts constructed
to gain insights into participant’s adaptation imaginary (i.e. perceptions of environmental change,
causality, responsibility and adaptation visions). All informants were systematically asked the
same set of formulated questions, allowing for comparison between interview and other forms of
data.
Oral (Living) History Interviews
The oral history interviews consisted of gathering personal reflections of events and their causes
and effects from campesinos (Creswell, 2013). The oral histories gathered served as campesinos’
stories of what environmental changes are happening in the highlands, how, why, and what it is
like from a personal perspective (George and Stratford in Hay, 2010). In this way, they are less
historical and more like living accounts of the ensuing environmental changes. Oral histories were
conducted with fourteen campesino participants, selected by a combined judgment-quota sampling
technique. Participants were recruited through judgement, after insights from previous
ethnographic research (i.e. observation and talking to community members) revealed that he or
she is a direct user of Q. Quilcayhuanca and is additionally concerned with the recent socioecological changes in the valley. The interview questions were formulated prior to entering the
field and for comparative reasons, the same set of questions were asked of each interview
participant. Fourteen different participants belonging to the Asociación de Usuarios de Quebrada
Quilcahyanca participated and several provided two interview sessions, resulting in 18 total
interviews. All interviews were either audio or video recorded, depending on the participants level
of comfort and preference.
Multi-level Stakeholder Influence Mapping (MSIM) Questionnaire
The multi-level stakeholder influence mapping (MSIM) tool is a questionnaire designed by Sova
et al. (2015) to assess and quantify the power, or influence, of diverse actor groups towards a stated
policy (see Appendix E). I included the MSIM tool within the design of the semi-structured
interviews to gain an understanding of who the political actors within the domain of climate change
adaptation are, as well as to understand stakeholder perceptions of relative influence and authority
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(i.e. which actors were perceived as having more or less relative influence). 17 of the 21
government and NGO interviews provided responses to the stakeholder mapping exercise and 18
campesino participants also provided responses during a participatory workshop on August 15,
2016. Assistance was provided by Quechua speaking, literate facilitators, when necessary.
Observation
Observational methods were employed throughout 2016 and 2018 fieldwork with campesinos
who utilize the Quilcayhuanca landscape for agropastoralist livelihoods. This distinctly
ethnographic method of watching and observing social life and phenomena can yield rich
contextual and complementary qualitative data (Kearns in Hay, 2010) to aid in obtaining research
objectives. Observational data was gained through thick descriptive note taking and photographic
documentation of pastoralist’s daily way of life, specifically, current livelihood practices, and their
relationship with the alpine landscape and resources (land, water, and ice). Observational accounts
gathered helped to illuminate contemporary ways of living in highlands and place-based humanenvironment relations – essential information for contextualizing experienced environmental
change and socio-ecological resilience. Observation often consisted of just being there, informally
participating in highland life, walking footpaths, talking, listening and watching the mundane
rhythms of everyday life. At other times, observation was conducted in more structured settings,
such as through transect walks and attendance to the pastoralist’s usuarios meeting on August 7,
2016. Two transect walks were taken in 2016, which consisted of guided tours by a knowledgeable
campesino of Quilcayhuanca, who identified places and visible markings of environmental change,
environmental risk and resource use in the valley.
Participant Observation
Participant observation was also undertaken from August 10th-13th at an international forum about
glaciers and mountain ecosystems in the city of Huaraz (about 20 minutes from Llupa by bus).
The International Forum for Glaciers and Mountain Ecologies was internationally promoted and
attracted world leading researchers in the fields of glacier risks, mountain ecology, water
resources, Andean culture, food and water security, among others (see Appendix F). This was an
important forum for climate adaptation stakeholders in the highlands, both state officials and
development actors were in attendance, including: The Ministry of the Environment (MINAM),
The National Water Authority (ANA), The Consortium for Sustainable Development in the
Andean Ecoregion, the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE-Peru), The
Mountain Institute (TMI), Swiss Agency for International Development (SIDA), The United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), expert scholars from
among a variety of international universities: Columbia University, University of California –
Santa Cruz, University of Texas – Austin, and Agrarian University, among others. J. Haverkamp
also participated at this forum as a participant observer. During the event, detailed observational
notes were taken and informal interviews conducted. Resulting from this research was a greater
contextual understanding of scholarly and professional climate change narratives and adaptation
imaginaries promoted by an elite group of adaptation actors and decision-makers. Prior to my
attendance at the forum, I requested, and was granted, permission to conduct observation research
through an email exchange with the forum organizers at both INAIGEM and TMI.
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Participatory Workshop 1
The participatory workshop was held on Sunday, August 15, 2016 from 8a.m. to 1p.m. in a meeting
room at Morales Guesthouse in barrio Jose Olaya, on the outskirts of the city of Huaraz. The
location was an acceptable option for campesinos who would not have to travel far from their
various residences to participate. The participatory workshop was facilitated by J. Haverkamp with
the assistance of two cultural assistants/translators. Twenty campesinos, 12 men and 8 women,
who are direct users of Q. Quilcayhuanca in the Cordillera Blanca, were in attendance. The purpose
of the workshop was to co-produce the meaning indictors of resilience for the highlands mountain
system in which the campesinos live. To accomplish this, I employed a range of methods,
including: photo-elicitation, geographic and seasonal mapping exercises, and focus group-like
discussions that relied on free-listing techniques. Campesinos were purposively selected to attend
using a systematic-stratified sample design that accounted for the institutional rules of pastoralists
territorial use rights in Q. Quilcayhunaca. The agro-pastoralists who use Quilcayhunca grasslands
are united along kinship and inheritance rights, bringing 240 members from 8 different geographic
sectors together in Quilcayhunaca. Through interviews and meetings with the President and
Secretary of the Asociación de Usuarios de Quebrada Quilcahyanca, I was able to attend a
usuarios meeting on August 7, 2016, in which the 240 user members were in attendance, and
formally announced the invitation to the workshop. The invitation was extended to the
representatives of each of the community eight sectors. However, as all the representatives were
men, the invitation required that each male representative be accompanied to the meeting by a
female representative from their sector as well. This announcement was made by the researcher
in Spanish and repeated by a field assistant in Quechua. On the date of the workshop, not only did
all 16 participants turn out, but four additional campesinos, including the association president,
secretary, and two other members attended. No one was turned away from participating in the
workshop.
Participatory Workshop 2
The collaborative multi-stakeholder workshop was the second participatory workshop in a series
of two. The purpose of the workshop was to create a space of collaboration between highland
campesinos, State officials, and NGO practitioners who are all entangled in the process of
adaptation in Q. Quilcayhuanca. In this way, the workshop enables the study to achieve PAR
objectives of co-learning, collective action, and even empowerment of an otherwise overlooked
and neglected campesino adaptation imaginary in adaptation efforts that effect their lives. Yet, it
is also a critical step in resolving the third and fourth research questions posed by creating a
window from which to empirically observe ‘collaborative encounters’ (Tsing, 2005), powerrelations, and frictions within collaborative adaption; as well as an opportunity to gain insights into
the influence of collaborative actions on shaping adaptation options.
The collaborative workshop ran for five hours on Sunday, April 29, 2018 at Morales Guesthouse.
This is the location of the previous workshop, which is familiar to campesinos and its proximity
to the City of Huaraz makes it easily accessible for government and NGO participants as well. I
opened the workshop with greetings. Prior to a presentation and discussion session on climate
impacts and adaptation options for Quilcayhuanca, all participants were asked to sign an IRBapproved informed consent. I presented this form in Spanish and a workshop assistant translated
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into Quechua. Discussion of climate impacts and adaptation in Q. Quilcayhuanca began with photo
elicitation techniques (Berbés-Blázquez, 2012) drawing on documentary photography and video
collected in Q. Quilcayhuanca over the past year and a half. After an open discussion of ongoing
environmental changes, I presented research findings, specifically highlighting campesinos
perceptions of climate change impacts and expressed needs and adaptation visions. Although I had
prepared a presentation on the synergies and divergence among the three distinct adaptation
imaginaries of concern, I decided not to use the data displays, as the categorical logics
underpinning them would arguably further alienate and exclude campesinos from further
adaptation discussions. In the latter half of the workshop, there was an open presentation session
for anyone to present on climate change impacts or adaptation options, this was a fruitful segment
in which three approximately 30 minute presentations were made by NGO and government
participants. During the last half-hour of the workshop participants were asked to complete a postworkshop questionnaire (discussed below). My researcher positionality remained the same for
both participatory workshops, in which I served as a facilitator and co-learner, and documented
the workshop with written field-notes and a video recording. Three local trilingual translators, who
have all engaged with previous research phases, were present at this workshop and helped to foster
a multi-lingual dialogue. Lunch and snacks were provided.
Recruitment for the workshop solicited participants who had already informed the co-constructed
adaptation imaginaries during previous research phases. This builds upon the nonprobability
sampling design (Bernard, 2002) of the previous workshop in 2016.
A post-workshop assessment was offered to all workshop participants. The questionnaire
instrument consisted of four open-ended questions intended to generate insights into how
participants’ attitudes and potential future behaviors regarding climate adaptation strategies may
or may not have changed as result of the workshop (McGuirk and O’Neill, 2010), and to
systematically assess how useful the collaborative workshop was. Several attribute questions
regarding occupation, gender, age, etc., were also included. As many campesinos are illiterate,
translators assisted with reading and recording answers, and separate follow-up interviews were
conducted with specific campesino participants to gain greater insights into their experience with
the collaborative workshop.
Resilience Questionnaire
The resilience questionnaire consisted of five questions related to describing
indicators/characteristics of socio-ecological resilience in the highlands of the Cordillera Blanca
(see Appendix H). Questions asked participants to identify these concepts along the five categories
of resilience represented in the Hybrid Resilient Framework by Engel et al. (2014), plus another
category labeled “other”, thereby leaving room for any other characteristics of resilience that do
not fit within the predefined categories. The questionnaire was solicited to government, NGO and
campesino actors comprising the epistemic network of adaptation actors working within Q.
Quilcayhuanca. Participants were selected through a purposive sampling design known as group
characteristics sampling and relied on criterion and typical case qualifications. Specifically,
seeking expert opinions from the consistent and recurrently influential adaptation actors identified
during ethnographic fieldwork in 2016 and 2018. The majority of questionnaires were delivered
to government and NGO actors in-person as a follow-up questionnaire to prior semi-structured
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interviews, whereas a focus group of twenty campesinos and I collaboratively addressed the
questionnaire questions during a participatory workshop on August 15, 2016. In total, 31
questionnaire responses were collected: 5 government responses; 6 NGO responses; and 20
campesino responses.
Ethical Considerations
For this research, I followed human subject research protocols set out by the International Review
Board (IRB). Informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to recording interviews,
workshops, and questionnaire data. The participatory workshops operated under a slightly different
protocol than other methods, one that was more reflective of its PAR aims. At the outset of the
workshop, prior to video recording, the PI spoke to the 20 campesino participants in a meeting
format, informing them verbally of the empowerment aims of the workshop, the journey that the
PI had undertaken to be there with them, her commitment to their adaptation challenges, and her
role as a collaborator in knowledge production with them. This was a critical and meaningful
verbal agreement (a Memorandum of Understanding) made between the campesino users of
Quilcayhuanca and myself, and was essential to building a trusting relationship and establishing a
common set of expectations between the research community and the researcher. This meeting
was furthermore grounded in a deeper rapport, as the PI had been conducting oral history
interviews, transect walks and attending the association meetings for two months prior to the
workshop. Through these methods, the PI and her family were fairly well acquainted with many
of the workshop attendees. Other ethical considerations for this study pertained to how to
compensate campesinos for their time investment into this project. For this I investigated what a
day’s amount of labor was valued at by campesinos themselves and compensated them
accordingly. This was to offset any loss in their incomes from their traditional agricultural
production earnings. Pertaining to data analysis and trustworthiness, follow-up interviews were
conducted in January 2018 and member checking procedures (Caretta, 2015) were undertaken in
the highlands during April-May 2018.
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APPENDIX B: QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
Beginning the process of organizing and analyzing the raw data was undeniably messy. Initial
organization began by constructing a qualitative database of all the data types and assigning an
anonymous ID to each research participant. Oral history and participatory workshop participants
were the only participants not guaranteed confidentiality or anonymity, this was due to video
recorded oral history interviews and the nature of public meetings. Yet, for the sake of congruency
and case comparison during this analysis all informants were given a non-identifiable ID. Raw
data were scanned-in (in the case of hand written interview and fieldnotes) and downloaded (in the
case of video, photos and audio recordings) into an NVivo 11 Pro database and password protected.
Access to the database has been limited to the co-authors of resulting dissertation papers only. An
additional copy of the raw data was furthermore backed-up and stored on a password protected
external hard drive maintained by the PI. Audio and video interview recordings went through two
phases of processing, first a verbatim transcription in Spanish and later a translation to English.
Some interviews were conducted in English and others in Spanish and this language conversion
process allowed for consistency in analysis. Striving to ensure that the translations were as close
to the original participant’s words, direct quotes were verified a second time after translation with
the original audio or video data before use in the analysis/interpretation.
Analysis of Adaptation Imaginaries consisted of two phases of coding, inductive descriptive
coding and deductive protocol coding. Four data sources, including: the workshop data, resilience
questionnaire, semi-structured interview, and oral history interview data were systematically
coded beginning with an inductive cycle of descriptive-pattern coding. Starting this process, a
descriptive code was assigned to the analyzed data segment, reflecting the essence of the imagined
resilience construct. For example, when campesinos discuss a resilient socio-ecological system in
the highlands they describe a return to traditional systems of exchange rooted in pastoralism and
reciprocity, a system known as the Minka. The descriptive code is then assigned to this text as
‘Minka’. Another cycle of organizing the descriptive codes was sequentially undertaken, revising
and clustering similar codes into pattern codes. Pattern codes kept the same organizational
structure utilizing the assigned prefix and combined similar open-codes into a new descriptive
code that represented the shared concept of the two or more individual codes.
The second, and deductive, phase of coding is known as protocol coding and relied on the
categorical structure of the Hybrid Resilience Framework’s five categories of resilience (e.g.,
environment, social, political, economic, infrastructure and other). Through this coding method,
descriptive codes were re-coded with a prefix code that corresponded with the HRF categories,
‘ECO’, ‘SOCI’, ‘POLI’, ‘ECOMC’, ‘INFR’ and ‘OTHER’, thereby creating a structural
organization consistent with the HRF framework and the resilience questionnaire. In the end, it
was possible to see what descriptive codes belonged to which categories of resilience and what
descriptive codes remained outside the HRF categorical bins.
Discourse Analysis
Qualitative data was also analyzed through a Foucauldian discourse analysis. Discourse analysis
has many benefits, particularly for projects committed to addressing social and environmental
injustice and challenging unequal power relationships (Waitt, 2010). Studying the process of
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adaptation through discourse analysis offers insights into how particular knowledges become ideas
with force, common sense and dominant, while simultaneously silencing different interpretations
of the world (Waitt, 2010). This approach specifically allowed for focusing on illuminating
dominate, emergent, and silenced adaptation discourses (Foucault, 1972; Rose, 2001) that
constitute adaptation practices (governance); as well as on the construction of discourse through
collaborative engagements. By tracing the production and circulation of adaptation knowledge
through a discourse analysis of the collected qualitative texts (observation notes, interview
transcripts, government pamphlets, reports and documents) insights into power-relations,
techniques of power and challenges for collaborative adaptation were identified.
This study employed Foucault’s notion of discourse, understanding the concept in three forms: i)
all meaningful statements that have effects on the world; ii) a group of statements that appear to
have a common theme that provides them with a unified effect; and, iii) the spoken or tacit
(unspoken) rules and structures that underpin and govern the unified, coherent, and forceful
statement produced (Waitt, 2010; Foucault, 1972). This definition of discourse informs a coding
structure of inductive-to-pattern coding across various data types. This was a less systematic
coding process than previously described and inductively strived to identify meaning in verbal and
non-verbal expressions of knowledge/power embodied in the process of adaptation – and thereby,
informing research questions one and three primarily. Texts were combed through word-by-word,
line-by-line, and frame-by-frame. Prior to coding, all texts were translated and transcribed
verbatim into Word documents. Careful preparation of texts prior to analysis required managing
data sources in a database and formatting transcripts with consistent heading styles for ease of
computer-based queries (Bazeley and Jackson, 2014). Translation and transcription services were
provided by two Peruvian women who are familiar with the local Quechua dialect. Lastly,
triangulation across the coded data sets helped to ensure analytic validity.
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APPENDIX C: DISPLAYING AND INTERPRETING DATA
Data were monitored through a data accounting log (Miles, Huberman & Saldaña, 2014:123)
(Figure A.1.). This data display method allowed for the creation of a database of the attributes of
collected data, for example, who (source), what file types or documents were collected, where,
when, and transcription/translation dates.
Table C.1. Data Accounting Log of Interview Data

Interviews

Case
Classification
Code (Ggovernment;
NGO- nongovernment;
C- Campesino)
G-01

Participant
Name

Date of
Interview

Original
video/audio

Original
notes

Transcription

Translation

27-Jul-16

audio (mpeg)

x (pdf)

x

x

G- 02

18-Jul-16

audio (mpeg)

x (pdf)

x

x

G-03

1-Aug-16

audio (mpeg)

x (pdf)

x

x

NGO-01

1-Aug-16

audio (mpeg)

x (pdf)

x

x

G-04

21-Jul-16

audio (mpeg)

x (pdf)

x

x (1/12/17)

G-05

20-Jul-16

audio (mpeg)

x (pdf)

x

x

NGO-02

18-Jul-16

audio (mpeg)

x (pdf)

x

x

G-06

17-Aug16
2016

audio (mpeg)

x (pdf)

x

n/a (english)

audio (mpeg)

x (pdf)

x

x

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x

x

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x

x

NGO-03

12-Aug16
17-Aug16
2015

audio (mpeg)

x(pdf)

x

n/a (english)

G-11

3-Aug-16

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x

x

G-12

4-Aug-16

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x

x

G-13

16-Jan-18

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x (3/25/18)

x (3/25/18)

G-14

17-Jan-18

x (mpg)

handwritten

x (3/26/18)

x (3/26/18)

NGO-01

2018

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x

x

NGO-04

2018

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x

x

NGO-05

14-Jan-18

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x

n/a (english)

NGO-06

15-Jan-18

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x

n/a (english)

G-15

19-Jan-18

audio (mpeg)

x (pdf)

x

x

C-01

2016

video

x (pdf)

x

x

C-02

2016

video

x (pdf)

x

x

C-03

2016

video

x (pdf)

x

x

C-04

2016

video

x (pdf)

x

x

C-05

24-July16
24-July16

video/ audio
(mpg)
video/ audio
(mpg)

x (pdf)

x

x

x (pdf)

x

x

G-08
G-09
G-10

C-06
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Table C.1. Continued.
C-07

video/audio

handwritten

x

x

C-08

10-Aug16
2018

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x (3/16/18)

x (3/16/18)

C-09

2018

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x (2/22/18)

x (2/22/18)

C-10

17-Jul-20

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x (3/4/18)

x (3/4/18)

C-11

2018

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x (3/4/18)

x (3/4/18)

C-12

2018

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x (3/4/18)

x (3/4/18)

C-13

2018

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x (3/16/18)

x (3/16/18)

C-14

18-Jan-18

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x

x

C-01

2018

handwritten

x

x

C-03

2016

Video/audio
(mpeg)
video

handwritten

x

x

C-04

2018

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

no

no

C-06

1-May-18

audio (mpeg)

handwritten

x

x

Table C.1. Data Accounting Log of Interview Data. This table is reflective of interview data
only and removed all identifiable attributes of participants. Similar logs using the same case
coding structure were kept for workshop and questionnaire data as well. 39 total semi-structured
and oral history interviews collected: government (N=14); NGO (N=7); campesinos (N=18).
To explore the data and make interpretations about the adaptation imaginaries, I triangulated three
types of data sets: oral history, semi-structured interviews and questionnaire data, through
variable-by-variable matrices which I translated into comparative tables (Appendix I) and group
queries (Figure A.1.) produced in NVivo 11 Pro, and a network display using Microsoft
Powerpoint.
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Figure C.1. Group Query Exploratory Visualization. The different color lines demarcate the
different stakeholder group views: red is for campesinos, blue is for NGOs, black is for
government.
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APPENDIX D: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS IN ENGLISH
Exploration of Climate Change, Adaptation and Resilience
in the Peruvian Andes:
Semi-structured interview questions (in English)
Background Information:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Name
Occupation
Job title
What are your work responsibilities related to climate adaptation in the Peruvian
highlands?
5. Are you a resident of the department of Ancash?
If yes, for how long?
If no, where are you from?
1. How has the local environment changed in the Santa Rio Watershed in the last several
decades?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Are the mountains changing?
Are the glaciers changing?
Are there changes in the water cycle?
Are their socio-economic changes? Tourism, scientists, modernization,
technology, mining, agriculture, urbanization, decentralization etc…?

2. What are the causes of the environmental changes in the Santa Rio watershed?
3. How are the environmental changes in the Santa River watershed affecting Peruvians?
4. What challenges exist for Peruvians due to climate change impacts in the Santa Rio
watershed?
5. What adjustments (adaptations) are being made to help Peruvians to respond to climate
impacts?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Autonomous adaptation efforts
Local level adaptation efforts
Regional level adaptation efforts
National level adaptation efforts
International adaptation efforts

6. Who is involved in adaptation efforts in the highlands?
a. Multi-level Stakeholder Influence Mapping (MSIM) exercise (map attached)
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7. Who is responsible for adaptation in the highlands within the Santa Rio watershed?
8. What would a resilient highlands community to climate change impacts look like?
9. How might this resilient system be achieved?

Demographic Information:
Gender: Male / Female

Age:

Ethnicity/Race:

Native language:

Married: Yes / No

Highest level of education:

Homeowner: Yes / No

Employed: Yes / No

Children/dependence: Yes / No
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APPENDIX E: MULTI-LEVEL STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE MAPPING
QUESTIONNAIRE
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APPENDIX F: INTERNATIONAL GLACIER AND MOUNTAIN ECOLOGY FORUM
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Program to the Foro Internacional de Glaciares Y Ecosistemas de Montaña (the International
Forum of Glaciers and Mountain Ecosystems) held August 10-13 in Huaraz, Peru.
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APPENDIX G: THE HYBRID RESILIENCE FRAMEWORK

Figure G.1. The Hybrid Resilience Framework. This resilience framework is proposed by
Engle et al. 2014. Its application in this dissertation is discussed in detail in chapter 4.
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APPENDIX H: RESILIENCE QUESTIONNAIRE
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APPENDIX I: COMPARATIVE TABLE OF “ADAPTATION IMAGINARIES”
ACROSS CAMPESINOS, STATE AND NGO ACTORS
Table I.1. Comparative Table of Adaptation Imaginaries
Campesino/a Imaginary

State Imaginary

NGO Imaginary

Government
Collaborative governance

Command & Control governance

Subsidies for socio-environmental
health

Zoning and land use regulations

Devolution of land use planning
decisions

Improved water management

community-focused development
(e.g. CBD)

Improved ecosystem management

Access for localized engagement in
State politics

Mandate (dictate) laws for CO2
emissions (global?)
Evacuation plans
Improved confidence/trust between
communities and State authorities
Increased institutional understanding
of climate impacts
improved community-level political
organization

Environment
Clean water

Clean water

Ecosystem restoration

Ensuring “enough water” or water
security

Sustainable use of the quebrada

Restoration of bofedales and alpine
grasslands

Improved wastewater management

Aid in the adaptation and recovery
of native Andean species (i.e.
bofedales, quinualles, etc.)

Protection and Preservation of native
ecosystems

Afforestation & reforestation

Afforestation and reforestation
projects

Ancestral land ethic

Conservation ethic
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Table I.1. Continued.

Restoration of bofedales & alpine
grasslands

Restoration of bofedales and alpine
grasslands

Protection and Preservation of
native ecosystems (enclosures)

Social
Strengthening of traditional
“pensameinto”

Collection and use of local
environmental knowledge (TEK)

Collection and use of local
environmental knowledge (TEK)

Prayer

Knowledge integration (local with
global)

Social innovation

Improved nutrition (food security)

Strong agricultural management

Environmental education

Preventative health care

Inclusion of emotional factors in
adaptive responses

Return to traditional practices and
relational ontologies

Environmental education and
training

Environmental education

Socialization

Pachamama ethic

Water appreciation/valuation

Economic
Minka

New management of pastoralist
livelihoods (cattle rearing)

Diversified agricultural production

Tourism

Tourism

Livelihood diversification

Livelihood diversification

Livelihood diversification

Extra ag. income (repetitive?)

Capture of ecosystem services
Production of organic crops
Diversified agriculture production

Infrastructure
Green infrastructure for water
collection (e.g. reservoir)

Green infrastructure for water
collection (e.g. reservoir)

Green infrastructure for water
collection (e.g. reservoir)

Rainwater harvesting

Gray infrastructure

Cellular communication capability
(i.e. emergency response)
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Table I.1. Continued.
Fences

“Technologize” “Technify”
infrastructure

Ecosystem restoration (in
environment)

Improved roads

Irrigation systems

Irrigation systems

Creation and maintenance of public
facilities/works (i.e. restrooms for
tourists, trash or recycling bins,
vender booths at valley entrance,
bridges and foot paths, etc.)

Filtration ditches, micro-reservoirs
wastewater treatment

Wastewater treatment

Other
Lack of options

Table I.1. Comparative Table of Adaptation Imaginaries. This table reflects indictors of
resilience put forward by campesino, state and NGO actors for climate adaptation in Q.
Quilcayhuanca. These perspectives are divided along five categories or resilience: ‘government’
(or political), ‘environmental’, ‘social’, ‘economic’, ‘infrastructure’ and ‘other’.
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